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Introduction
This thesis is on credit risk, and more specically on credit derivatives. Credit
risk is the risk that an obligor does not honour his payment obligations, while a
credit derivative could be dened as a security whose payo¤ is a¤ected by credit
risk. A credit derivative is primarily used to transfer, hedge or manage credit
risk.
For modelling credit risk, two classes of models exist: structural models and
reduced-form models. Structural models date back to the papers of Black & Sc-
holes (1973) and Merton (1974). These papers demonstrated how option pricing
formulas can be applied to the valuation of equity and corporate bonds. In these
models equity, debt and other claims issued by a rm are viewed as contingent
claims on the value of the rms underlying assets. While the original models
of Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) relied on a number of simplify-
ing assumptions, there has been a large literature of extensions to the original
framework, such as the inclusion of taxes, bankruptcy costs and a continuous
default boundary. These features have made the models more realistic, and have
e.g. made it possible to describe the rms optimal capital structure. Default
is modelled as the assets of the rm falling short of a default boundary and the
probability of this occurring is determined by the amount of debt in the rm and
the volatility of its assets. Structural models are extremely important for building
intuition and for understanding how changes in a rms capital structure or its
business risk a¤ects the rms cost of capital. Furthermore, the models are useful
if one wants to understand the co-movement between debt and equity of the same
rm, which is why the models are also used for relative value trading between
credit and equity markets. The practical implementation of structural models is
often done by calibrating the chosen model to the equity market, which makes it
possible to estimate rm specic default probabilities. This type of calibration is
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widely used in industry models such as Creditgrades, and also forms the basis of
Moodys Expected Default Frequency measure (EDF).
The second type of approach to the modelling of credit risk is the so-called
reduced form (or intensity) models. In these models a rms default time is
unpredictable and driven by a default intensity, which is a function of a number
of either latent or observed state variables. The focus in these models is more
on consistent pricing across debt instruments, and the reason for default is not
modelled. Thus, a reduced form model does not give any fundamental reason for
the arrival of defaults, but instead a consistent description of the market implied
distribution of default arrival times. These models can thus be used for relative
value trading across debt instruments and credit derivatives. Lando (2004) and
also Schönbucher (2003) contain a treatment of both types of models.
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays, which can be read indepen-
dently. However, they are interrelated through their use of structural credit risk
models. Chapter 1 estimates the impact of accounting transparency on the term
structure of Credit Default Swap spreads (CDS spreads) for a large cross-section
of rms. Using a newly developed measure of accounting transparency in Berger,
Chen & Li (2006), we nd a downward-sloping term structure of transparency
spreads, which is in accordance with the theory in Du¢ e & Lando (2001). Chap-
ter 2 analyzes the use of CDSs in a convergence-type trading strategy popular
among hedge funds and proprietary trading desks. This strategy, termed capital
structure arbitrage, takes advantage of a lack of synchronicity between equity and
credit markets and is related to recent studies on the lead-lag relationship between
bond, equity and CDS markets. Chapter 3 estimates the time-series behavior of
credit risk premia in the market for Credit Default Swaps. The risk premium
peaks in the third quarter of 2002, but the subsequent drop in the risk premium
is not as dramatic, when expected losses are based on implied volatility instead
of a historical volatility measure. The credit risk premium tends to be counter-
cyclical when expected losses are based on implied volatility and the results of
the paper also suggest that structural models should contain a time-varying risk
premium.
Finally, English and Danish summaries of the three essays are provided at the
back.
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Chapter1
Accounting Transparency and the Term
Structure of Credit Default Swap
Spreads
1
Coauthored with Peter Tind Larsen, School of Economics and Management,
University of Aarhus
Abstract1
This paper estimates the impact of accounting transparency on the term struc-
ture of CDS spreads for a large cross-section of rms. Using a newly developed
measure of accounting transparency in Berger et al. (2006), we nd a downward-
sloping term structure of transparency spreads. Estimating the gap between the
high and low transparency credit curves at the 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10-year matu-
rity, the transparency spread is insignicant in the long end but highly signicant
and robust at 20 bps at the 1-year maturity. Furthermore, the e¤ect of account-
ing transparency on the term structure of CDS spreads is largest for the most
risky rms. These results are strongly supportive of the model by Du¢ e & Lando
(2001), and add an explanation to the underprediction of short-term credit spreads
by traditional structural credit risk models.
1We thank Lombard Risk for access to the credit default swap data. We thank Christian
Riis Flor, Peter Løchte Jørgensen, David Lando, Mads Stenbo Nielsen, Thomas Plenborg and
participants at the Danish Doctoral School of Finance Workshop 2007 for valuable comments
and insights. Any remaining errors are our own.
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1.1 Introduction
Traditional structural credit risk models originating with Black & Scholes (1973)
and Merton (1974) dene default as the rst passage of a perfectly measured asset
value to a default barrier. While later extensions that allow for endogenous default
and debt renegotiations have increased predicted spread levels, it is well-known
in the empirical literature that structural models underpredict corporate bond
credit spreads, particularly in the short end.2 Reasons for the poor performance
may lie in shortcomings in the models as well as factors other than default risk
in the corporate bond credit spread.
As noted in Du¢ e & Lando (2001), it is typically di¢ cult for investors in
the secondary credit markets to observe a rms assets directly, either because
of noisy or delayed accounting reports or other barriers to monitoring. Instead,
investors must draw inference from the available accounting data and other pub-
licly available information. As a consequence they build a model where credit
investors are not kept fully informed on the status of the rm, but receive noisy
unbiased estimates of the asset value at selected times. This intuitively simple
framework has a signicant implication for the term structure of credit spreads.
In particular, for rms with perfectly measured assets credit spreads are rel-
atively small at short maturities and zero at zero maturity, regardless of the
riskiness of the rm. However, if rm assets periodically are observed with noise,
credit spreads are strictly positive under the same limit because investors are
uncertain about the distance of current assets to the default barrier.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by estimating the component
of the term structure of credit spreads associated with a lack of accounting trans-
parency.3 To this end, credit default swap (CDS) spreads at the 1, 3, 5, 7 and
10-year maturity for a large cross-section of rms are used together with a newly
developed measure of accounting transparency by Berger et al. (2006). We relate
this transparency measure to CDS spreads in two ways.
First, it is used to estimate a gap between the high and low transparency credit
curves. This gap interpreted as a transparency spread is estimated at 20 bps at
2See e.g. Jones, Mason & Rosenfeld (1984), Ogden (1987), Huang & Huang (2003) and
Eom, Helwege & Huang (2004).
3Consistent with the literature, we use the terms "accounting noise" and "accounting trans-
parency" interchangeably. If the noise in the reported asset value is low, the accounting trans-
parency is high.
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the 1-year maturity and narrows to 14, 8, 7 and 5 bps at the 3, 5, 7 and 10-year
maturity, respectively. The downward-sloping term structure of transparency
spreads is highly signicant in the short end but most often insignicant above
the 5-year maturity. Furthermore, the e¤ect of accounting transparency is largest
for the most risky rms. These results are robust across alternative econometric
specications controlling for within cluster correlations and a large set of control
variables.
Second, we analyze each maturity class in isolation using the raw transparency
measure and a rank transformation. In this specication, the equal maturities
across rms xed through time in the CDS data allow the control variables to
impact spreads di¤erently across maturity classes. Since insights from above are
preserved, the results are supportive of hypotheses derived from Du¢ e & Lando
(2001) and add an explanation to the underprediction of short-term credit spreads
by traditional structural models.
However, the explanatory power of accounting transparency and a typical set
of control variables is small for less risky rms. This observation is supportive of
the problems in earlier studies, when explaining the credit spreads of low-yield
rms using structural models. This paper suggests that variables other than
accounting transparency are needed, also in the short end.
The results contradict an earlier study by Yu (2005), who analyzes corporate
bond credit spreads in 1991 to 1996 using the AIMR analyst ranking of corporate
disclosure. He attributes a u-shaped transparency spread with the largest a¤ect
at longer maturities to a discretionary disclosure hypothesis, where rms hide
information that would adversely a¤ect their long-term outlook. While Du¢ e
& Lando (2001) assume an exogenous unbiased accounting noise, the theory of
discretionary disclosure starting with Verrecchia (1983) suggests that withheld
information may signal hidden bad news about a company. Consistent with the
term structure implications in Du¢ e & Lando (2001), our study shows that the
transparency spread is downward-sloping in the CDS market.
Although a close relation exists between corporate bond and CDS spreads
(Du¢ e (1999)), the latter are preferable from several perspectives when analyzing
the determinants of the shape of the credit curve. First, the xed maturities in
CDS contracts make term structures directly comparable across rms and time.
There is no maturity shortening as there would be with corporate bonds, and we
are not forced to interpolate maturities to compare spreads in the cross-section.
4
Second, quotes at di¤erent maturities should be compared on the same curve,
and a study of multiple maturity observations for a given rm at a given date is
in e¤ect only possible in the CDS market. Third, a use of CDS spreads avoids
any noise arising from a misspecied risk-free yield curve (Houweling & Vorst
(2003)). Fourth, as shown in Lando & Mortensen (2005) and Agrawal & Bohn
(2005), the shape of the corporate bond credit curve depends on deviations from
par under the realistic recovery of face value assumption. As Yu (2005) focuses
on secondary market yields this technical e¤ect may inuence his results. The
same e¤ect is not present in the CDS market as CDS spreads are closely related
to par bond spreads.
Fifth, CDS contracts are less likely to be a¤ected by di¤erences in contrac-
tual arrangements such as embedded options, guarantees, covenants and coupon
e¤ects. Although bonds with e.g. call features may be deliverable in default, this
e¤ect is likely to be present across the term structure of CDS spreads.
Sixth, several recent studies nd that CDS spreads are a purer measure of
credit risk and represent more timely information than corporate bonds. Non-
default components stemming from asymmetric taxation and illiquidity have been
compared across corporate bond and CDS markets.4 However, the component
due to imprecisely observed assets, let alone the term structure implications, is
much less understood.
A reason for the lack of evidence on the impact of accounting transparency is
the di¢ culty in constructing an empirical measure of a rms overall information
quality. The accounting literature explaining e.g. the cost of capital has relied
on the AIMR analyst ranking of corporate disclosure. Analyzing the cost of
debt, Sengupta (1998) nds a negative relationship between the AIMR measure
and o¤ering yields. This measure is also adopted by Yu (2005), with a resulting
sample almost entirely made up of investment grade rms. As the measure ends
in 1996, it cannot be related to CDS curves.
However, a newly developed measure of accounting transparency by Berger
4Blanco, Brennan & Marsh (2005) nd that the CDS market leads the corporate bond
market. Longsta¤, Mithal & Neis (2005) nd a signicant non-default related component in
the corporate bond credit spread correlated with illiquidity proxies. Ericsson, Reneby & Wang
(2006) nd this not to be present in CDSs. Elton, Gruber, Agrawal & Mann (2001) document a
tax premium of 29 to 73 percent of the corporate bond credit spread, depending on the rating.
Related studies on corporate bonds include Delianedis & Geske (2001) and Huang & Huang
(2003).
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et al. (2006) can be readily calculated for a large sample of rms. This allows
us to study a large set of credit curves across rating categories. The idea be-
hind the measure is that given the idiosyncratic cash ow volatility, the better
a rms information quality the higher its rm-specic equity return volatility.
Berger et al. (2006) conduct several tests to assess their measure, and nd results
in accordance with intuition. Our application in the credit derivatives market
provides additional evidence to the validity of the measure.
This paper is related to Sarga &Warga (1989), Fons (1994), Helwege & Turner
(1999), Lando & Mortensen (2005) and Agrawal & Bohn (2005) who analyze the
slope of the credit curve as a function of credit quality. Ignoring noisy asset
reports, standard theory predicts an upward-sloping credit curve for high quality
rms and a humped shaped or mostly downward-sloping credit curve for low
quality rms. However, these papers are silent on decomposing the curve and the
e¤ect of accounting transparency.
Early studies mainly analyze the 5-year maturity, which is considered the
most liquid point on the curve. This paper contributes to an increasing litera-
ture analyzing the entire term structure of CDS spreads. In addition to Lando
& Mortensen (2005) and Agrawal & Bohn (2005) this includes Huang & Zhou
(2007), who conduct a consistent specication analysis of traditional structural
models. Although the 5-year maturity dominates our data, a signicant number
of observations are found at the 1, 3, 7 and 10-year maturity.
Finally, the paper is related to studies on the determinants of credit spreads
such as Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein & Martin (2001), Campbell & Taksler (2003),
Ericsson, Jacobs & Oviedo (2005), Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout & Weinbaum
(2006) and Cao, Yu & Zhong (2006). These papers analyze the explanatory
power of traditional structural variables such as leverage, asset volatility and
risk-free interest rates, but are silent on di¤erent maturity classes and accounting
transparency. Finally, Güntay & Hackbarth (2007) study the relation between
corporate bond credit spreads and the dispersion of equity analysts earnings
forecasts.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the Du¢ e & Lando
(2001) model and motivates the hypotheses. This section also shows a formula
for the CDS spread that avoids a double integral and is easily comparable with
the case of perfect information. Section 1.3 outlines the accounting transparency
measure developed in Berger et al. (2006), while section 1.4 presents the data.
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The descriptive statistics are presented in section 1.5, while section 1.6 and 1.7
contain the empirical results and a robustness analysis. Section 1.8 concludes.
Appendix A and B give details behind the Du¢ e & Lando (2001) model and the
transparency measure, respectively.
1.2 Hypotheses
In traditional structural credit risk models, default is dened as the rst hit-
ting time of a perfectly observed di¤usion process on a default barrier. This
default barrier can be exogenously determined as in e.g. Black & Cox (1976) and
Longsta¤ & Schwartz (1995) or endogenously derived as in e.g. Leland (1994)
and Leland & Toft (1996).
As shown in Leland (2004), these models do a reasonable job in predicting
longer horizon default rates while the prediction of short-term default rates is
far to low. The problem is that conditional on the rm value being above the
barrier, the probability that it will cross the barrier in the next t is o(t) and
the conditional default probability converges to zero as time goes to zero.
Du¢ e & Lando (2001) argue that it is typically di¢ cult for investors in the
secondary credit markets to perfectly observe the rms assets and introduce ac-
counting noise into a Leland (1994)-type model. More specically, the value of
the rms assets is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion unobserv-
able to the credit investors. Instead, the rm periodically issues noisy unbiased
accounting reports, which makes investors uncertain about the distance of the
assets to the default barrier.
Conditional on the accounting reports and the fact that the rm has not
defaulted investors are able to compute a distribution of the value of assets. This
conditional distribution of assets is reproduced in Figure 1.1 for various degrees
of accounting noise a and a set of base case parameters. The crucial parameter
a measures the standard deviation of the normal noise-term added to the true
asset value. A lower a thus represents a higher degree of accounting transparency
and less uncertainty about the true asset value. When a approaches zero the
distribution will eventually collapse around the latest reported asset value.
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According to Du¢ e & Lando (2001) this simple mechanism of uncertainty
surrounding the true asset value is enough to produce a default probability within
the next t that is of the same order as t. In fact, they show that the default
stopping time  has an intensity. The Du¢ e & Lando (2001) model is further
described in appendix A.
Figure 1.1: Conditional Asset Density
The gure illustrates the conditional asset density for varying accounting precisions,
reproducing the base case in Du¢ e & Lando (2001). The tax rate  = 0:35, volatility
 = 0:05, risk-free rate r = 0:06, drift m = 0:01, payout ratio  = 0:05 and default cost
 = 0:3. The coupon rate C = 8:00 and the default barrier V B(C) = 78. A noise-free
asset report V (t  1) = V^ (t  1) = 86:3 is assumed together with a current noisy asset
report V^ (t) = 86:3. The standard deviation a is assumed at 0:05, 0:1 and 0:25 and
measures the degree of accounting noise.
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The payments in a CDS t nicely into a continuous-time framework since the
accrued premium must also be paid if a credit event occurs between two payment
dates. In appendix A we show that with continuous payments the CDS spread
with maturity T can be written as
c(0; T ) = r(1 R)
R1

G(x; T )g(x)dx
1  e rT R1

(1   (T; x  )) g (x) dx  R1

G(x; T )g(x)dx
;
(1.1)
where r is the risk-free interest rate and R is the recovery rate.5  (T; x  )
denotes the probability of rst passage time of a Brownian motion with constant
drift and volatility parameter from an initial condition (x  ) > 0 to a level
below zero at time T , where x and  denote the logarithm of the asset value and
default barrier, respectively. The formulas for  (T; x  ) and G(x; T ) are given
in closed form in the appendix together with the conditional density function of
the logarithm of assets g (x) at the time of issuance of the CDS.
In the case of perfect information the integral and the density function g (x)
simply disappears, leading to a closed form solution for the CDS spread known
from traditional structural credit risk models.
In Figure 1.2, the term structure of CDS spreads in equation (1.1) is shown
for the associated conditional distribution of assets in Figure 1.1 and the various
degrees of accounting noise a. Also depicted is the traditional case of perfect
information a = 0, where the spread approaches zero as maturity goes to zero.
However, this is not the case when noisy reports are introduced. As a becomes
larger, the probability that the asset value is, in fact, close to the default barrier
and may cross in a short period of time increases, resulting in higher short-term
spreads. The di¤erence in spreads due to a lack of accounting transparency is
less pronounced at longer maturities.
Figure 1.3 and 1.4 depict the case of a lower leverage and a lower asset volatil-
ity, respectively. This captures the e¤ect of accounting transparency on CDS
spreads for less risky rms than the base case. The spreads are compressed com-
pared to Figure 1.2, indicating that we should expect a lower absolute e¤ect of
accounting transparency for less risky rms.
5The formula in Du¢ e & Lando (2001) is based on semiannually payments and a double
integral over time and the asset density. The assumption of continuous payments implies that
it is only necessary to calculate a single integral numerically to evaluate the CDS spread.
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Figure 1.2: CDS Spreads for Varying Accounting Precisions
The gure illustrates the CDS spreads associated with the conditional asset densities
for varying accounting precisions, reproducing the base case in Du¢ e & Lando (2001).
The tax rate  = 0:35, volatility  = 0:05, risk-free rate r = 0:06, drift m = 0:01,
payout ratio  = 0:05, default cost  = 0:3 and recovery rate R = 0:5. The coupon rate
C = 8:00 and the default barrier V B(C) = 78. A noise-free asset report V (t   1) =
V^ (t   1) = 86:3 is assumed together with a current noisy asset report V^ (t) = 86:3.
The standard deviation a is assumed at 0:05, 0:1 and 0:25 and measures the degree of
accounting noise.
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Figure 1.3: CDS Spreads For a Low Leverage Firm
The gure illustrates the CDS spreads for varying accounting precisions in Du¢ e &
Lando (2001). A higher current and lagged asset report are assumed, capturing a lower
leverage ratio. The tax rate  = 0:35, volatility  = 0:05, risk-free rate r = 0:06, drift
m = 0:01, payout ratio  = 0:05, default cost  = 0:3 and recovery rate R = 0:5.
The coupon rate C = 8:00 and the default barrier V B(C) = 78. A noise-free asset
report V (t 1) = V^ (t 1) = 90:0 is assumed together with a current noisy asset report
V^ (t) = 90:0. The standard deviation a is assumed at 0:05, 0:1 and 0:25 and measures
the degree of accounting noise.
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Figure 1.4: CDS Spreads For a Low Volatility Firm
The gure illustrates the CDS spreads for varying accounting precisions in Du¢ e &
Lando (2001) for a rm with low volatility. The tax rate  = 0:35, volatility  = 0:04,
risk-free rate r = 0:06, drift m = 0:01, payout ratio  = 0:05, default cost  = 0:3 and
recovery rate R = 0:5. The coupon rate C = 8:00 and the default barrier V B(C) = 78.
A noise-free asset report V (t  1) = V^ (t  1) = 86:3 is assumed together with a current
noisy asset report V^ (t) = 86:3. The standard deviation a is assumed at 0:05, 0:1 and
0:25 and measures the degree of accounting noise.
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Finally, an adverse e¤ect of the exogenous and unbiased accounting noise in
the Du¢ e & Lando (2001) model, which is also addressed in Yu (2005), is depicted
in Figure 1.5. In this case, the current report shows a substantially lower asset
value than the lagged report, which leads to the counterintuitive result that a
higher transparency is associated with higher spreads for most parts of the term
structure. With perfect information the lagged report is irrelevant, but as a
increases and transparency is reduced the current report becomes less reliable
and more weight is put on the lagged report suggesting a higher asset value.6
Hence, more mass of the conditional asset distribution is shifted towards higher
asset values implying lower credit spreads. This example illustrates the need
for structural models to incorporate accounting transparency as an endogenous
choice. With discretionary disclosure this situation would not arise since the
rm would choose not to reveal the bad news in the rst place. The theory of
discretionary disclosure starting with Verrecchia (1983) suggests that withheld
information may signal hidden bad news about a company. As a result, a lower
transparency is associated with higher credit spreads. The above intuition leads
to the following hypotheses for the qualitative e¤ect of accounting transparency
on CDS spreads.
H1. Firms with a lower level of accounting transparency have higher CDS
spreads.
H2. The e¤ect of accounting transparency is more pronounced at shorter
maturities, leading to a term structure e¤ect.
H3. A stronger e¤ect of accounting transparency is expected for more risky
rms.
The level e¤ect in the rst hypothesis is due to the theory of discretionary
disclosure, while the second and third hypotheses are due to Du¢ e & Lando
(2001). At reasonable parameter values, Du¢ e & Lando (2001) do not predict a
signicant spread due to noisy reports above the 5-year maturity.
The term structure e¤ect of discretionary disclosure is less obvious and de-
pends on the nature of information that a rm tries to conceal. A temporary
shock to the rm value a¤ects short-term spreads, while a permanent shock such
as a negative outlook on earnings growth a¤ects long-term spreads. Yu (2005)
notes that the positive net-worth requirement e¤ectively present in short-term
6Under perfect information, the term structure of CDS spreads in Figure 1.2 and 1.5 are
identical.
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debt implies that rms have little incentive to conceal information that they are
soon forced to reveal anyway.7 Hence, he argues that discretionary disclosure is
most likely to concern permanent shocks and long-term spreads.
Figure 1.5: CDS Spreads For a Higher Initial Firm Level
The gure illustrates the CDS spreads for varying accounting precisions in Du¢ e &
Lando (2001). The current asset report is at its base case level, while the lagged asset
report is higher. The tax rate  = 0:35, volatility  = 0:05, risk-free rate r = 0:06,
drift m = 0:01, payout ratio  = 0:05, default cost  = 0:3 and recovery rate R = 0:5.
The coupon rate C = 8:00 and the default barrier V B(C) = 78. A noise-free asset
report V (t 1) = V^ (t 1) = 90:0 is assumed together with a current noisy asset report
V^ (t) = 86:3. The standard deviation a is assumed at 0:05, 0:1 and 0:25 and measures
the degree of accounting noise.
7See Leland (1994) for the relationship between short-term debt and positive net-worth
requirements.
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1.3 Measuring Accounting Transparency
To assess accounting transparency, we construct a newly developed measure by
Berger et al. (2006) that can be readily calculated for a large sample rms. The
idea behind the measure is that when pricing equity, investors use a weighted
average of reported earnings and industry earnings. Investors put more weight
on the rms reported earnings when the accounting transparency is high. It
turns out that the measure of accounting transparency is the ratio of idiosyn-
cratic equity return volatility to the idiosyncratic volatility in earnings growth.
Appendix B establishes the theoretical link between the measure and accounting
transparency. The current section implements it as prescribed in Berger et al.
(2006).
In particular, to measure transparency empirically in year t two regressions
are performed for each rm. The rst uses monthly data from year t  5 to t  1
to calculate the idiosyncratic volatility in equity returns
rjt = a
r
j + b
r;M
j r
M
t + b
r;I
j r
I
t + "
r;j
t ; (1.2)
where rjt is rm j
0smonthly equity return, rMt is the CRSP value-weighted market
return and rIt is a value-weighted industry return using the 48 industries in Fama
& French (1997).8 To ensure the accuracy at least 50 valid monthly returns are
required for each rm. The annualized idiosyncratic volatility of returns IV OLrt;j
is then calculated as
p
12  std("r;j).
The second regression uses quarterly data from year t  5 to t  1 to calculate
the idiosyncratic volatility in earnings growth
EGjt = a
EG
j + b
EG;M
j EG
M
t + b
EG;I
j EG
I
t + "
EG;j
t ; (1.3)
where EGjt is the annual growth rate in rm j
0s quarterly operating earnings
calculated as operating earningstoperating earningst 4 1.
9 The growth rate is measured between identical
quarters to avoid complications that arise from seasonality. If the lagged earnings
are negative the growth rate is not meaningful and that particular growth rate is
8Market capitalization is used as weights when calculating the market and industry returns.
All rms in the CRSP database enter the return and later earnings growth calculations.
9The quarterly operating earnings is data item number 8 in the Compustat database.
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dropped.10 To ensure the accuracy, we require at least 15 quarters of data. EGMt
is the earnings-weighted average market growth rate and EGIt is the earnings-
weighted average growth rate in the Fama & French (1997) industries.
The idiosyncratic volatility in earnings growth IV OLEGt;j is std("
EG;j), and the
measure is nally constructed as the ratio of the idiosyncratic volatility in equity
returns to the idiosyncratic volatility in earnings growth
t;j =
IV OLrt;j
IV OLEGt;j
: (1.4)
Hence, the idiosyncratic volatility in equity returns is driven by the idio-
syncratic volatility in earnings growth and the rms information quality. The
measure is theoretically constrained to the unit interval, and a higher score cor-
responds to a higher accounting transparency.
Berger et al. (2006) calculate the measure for 41,615 rm-years in 1980 to 2004
and nd empirical evidence in accordance with intuition and theory. In particular,
they assess the validity of the measure by relating it to di¤erent measures of
disclosure quality and the cost of equity. First, the measure increased after two
new regulations that increased mandatory disclosures in the pension and oil and
gas sectors. Second, the measure is strongly correlated with the investor relations
component of the AIMR measure and weakly correlated with the total AIMR
measure. Third, rms with a higher measure are followed by more analysts and
have a lower forecast dispersion of earnings per share. Finally, the measure is
negatively related to three estimates of the cost of equity.
In the end, we necessarily test the joint hypotheses of the validity of the
accounting transparency measure developed in Berger et al. (2006), and the term
structure e¤ects suggested in Du¢ e & Lando (2001). Our application in the credit
derivatives market provides additional evidence to the validity of the measure.
1.4 Data
Data on CDS spreads is provided by the ValuSpread database from Lombard
Risk Systems, dating back to July 1999. The number of entities and frequency
of quotes increase signicantly through time, reecting the growth and improved
10Since operating income and not net income is used the loss of observations is small.
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liquidity in the market. This data is also used by Lando & Mortensen (2005) and
Berndt, Jarrow & Kang (2006). The data consists of mid-market CDS quotes
on both sovereigns and corporates with varying maturity, restructuring clause,
seniority and currency. For a given date, reference entity and contract specica-
tion, the database reports a composite CDS quote together with an intra-daily
standard deviation of the collected quotes. The composite quote is calculated
as a mid-market quote by obtaining quotes from up to 25 leading market mak-
ers. This o¤ers a more reliable measure of the market spread than using a single
source, and the standard deviation measures how representative the mid-market
quote is for the overall market.
To test the e¤ect of accounting transparency on the term structure of CDS
spreads, contracts with a maturity of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years are analyzed. We
furthermore conne ourselves to composite CDS quotes on senior unsecured debt
for North American corporate obligors with currencies denominated in US dol-
lars. Regarding the specication of the credit event, we follow large parts of the
literature in using contracts with a modied restructuring clause.
To generate a proper subsample, several lters are applied to the data. First,
the CDS data is merged with quarterly balance sheet data from Compustat and
daily stock market data from CRSP. The quarterly balance sheet data is lagged
one month from the end of the quarter to avoid the look-ahead bias in using data
not yet available in the market. Second, rms from the nancial and utility sector
are excluded as their capital structure is hard to interpret.
Third, the composite quote at a given maturity must have a certain quality.
Therefore, we dene the relative quote dispersion as the intra-daily standard
deviation of collected quotes divided by the mid-market quote. We follow Lando
& Mortensen (2005) and delete all daily mid-market quotes with an intra-daily
quote dispersion of zero or above 20 percent. Fourth, 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10-year
constant maturity treasury yields are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis.
Fifth, we restrict the sample to end-of-month dates. This selection criteria is
also applied by Lando & Mortensen (2005), as these dates have the highest num-
ber of quotes. This leaves us with 31,525 month-end consensus quotes distributed
across 8,309 curves and 432 rms. Finally, for each year t the month-end curves
are merged with the annual transparency measure calculated for each rm in
section 1.3. The result is 25,599 quotes, 6,756 month-end curves and 890 annual
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transparency scores distributed across 368 rms from May 2002 to September
2004.11
1.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 illustrates the distribution of the annual accounting transparency mea-
sure. Panel A represents statistics based on the pooled measure across rms and
years, while statistics in Panel B are calculated after averaging the measure for
each rm in the time-series. The pooled mean and median are 0.50 and 0.29,
respectively. A few high transparency scores drive up the average, and about 10
percent of the sample rm-years have scores larger than the theoretical upper
bound of 1. A similar result based on a larger set of rms is found in Berger et al.
(2006), who attribute it to possible time-varying expected returns.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Accounting Transparency
This table reports summary statistics for the accounting transparency measure devel-
oped in Berger, Chen & Li (2006) and calculated in section 1.3. Panel A represents
statistics when pooling the measure across rms and years, while panel B displays
statistics after averaging the measure in the time-series for each rm. In panel A, N
denotes the number of rm-years with su¢ cient data to calculate the accounting trans-
parency measure and with associated CDS data. In panel B, N denotes the number of
unique rms.
N Mean Std.dev. Min 25% 50% 75% 99% Max
Panel A. Statistics on the pooled transparency measure
890 0.50 0.61 0.00 0.16 0.29 0.60 3.23 5.65
Panel B. Statistics on the time-series average transparency measure
368 0.50 0.57 0.01 0.16 0.30 0.62 2.84 4.44
11One rm is excluded, Colgate Palmolive, as the transparency measure is calculated at 10.23,
11.56 and 11.89 in year 2002-2004. This persistently large score far above the remaining rms
might indicate a data problem specic to the rm.
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The standard deviation is 0.61 and the inter-quartile range is 0.44. The same
variation is observed in Panel B after averaging the measure in the time-series,
indicating a large variation in accounting transparency across the rms. The data
allow for a maximum of 3 consecutive annual transparency scores with associated
CDS data for each rm. An untabulated mean and median annual absolute
change of 0.17 and 0.04, respectively, indicate a somewhat persistent transparency
measure in the time-series.
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics of key variables across the senior unse-
cured credit rating from Standard & Poors. The variables presented are averages
across time and across rms. Consistent with the predictions of structural credit
risk models, a lower rating is associated with a higher credit spread level repre-
sented by the 5-year CDS spread, a higher equity volatility and a higher leverage.
The equity volatility is calculated using 250 days of equity returns, and lever-
age is total liabilities divided by the sum of total liabilities and equity market
capitalization.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Major Variables
This table reports averages of key variables across rms and time. The statistics are
presented across the senior unsecured credit rating from Standard & Poors. The 5-year
spread represents the overall spread level and is averaged over rms and end-of month
observations. The volatility is calculated at month-end using 250-days of historical
equity returns. The associated leverage is total liabilities divided by the sum of total
liabilities and equity market capitalization. The accounting transparency measure is
developed in Berger, Chen & Li (2006) and calculated in section 1.3. NR means not
rated.
5yr spread Volatility Leverage Transparency
AAA 23 0.29 0.28 0.92
AA 26 0.28 0.21 0.88
A 48 0.33 0.34 0.60
BBB 128 0.36 0.49 0.40
BB 392 0.49 0.61 0.39
B 658 0.74 0.76 0.20
NR 137 0.33 0.31 0.66
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A better credit rating is associated with a higher accounting transparency.
This observation and a correlation of 0.16 in Table 1.3 provide additional evi-
dence to the validity of the transparency measure as documented empirically in
Berger et al. (2006). As noted in Sengupta (1998) and Yu (2005), credit agen-
cies claim to have incorporated the quality of information disclosure in the credit
ratings. Hence, we follow Sengupta (1998) and Yu (2005) and use credit rat-
ings with caution when controlling for the cross-sectional determinants of credit
spreads other than accounting transparency. We use an alternative set of con-
trol variables from studies on the determinants of credit spreads such as equity
volatility, leverage, liquidity and the risk-free yield curve. However, we also an-
alyze whether credit ratings absorb the e¤ect of accounting transparency on the
term structure of CDS spreads.
As a nal remark, the correlation between the accounting transparency mea-
sure and leverage and volatility, respectively, is estimated at -0.16 and -0.08. This
is of similar sign and magnitude as the correlations found in Yu (2005) based on
the AIMR measure in 1991 to 1996.
Table 1.3: Average Correlations Among Major Variables
This table reports the Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cients between the major vari-
ables. The correlations are calculated each month, and the resulting average correla-
tions are reported. The volatility is calculated at month-end using 250-days of historical
equity returns. The associated leverage is total liabilities divided by the sum of total
liabilities and equity market capitalization. The accounting transparency measure is
developed in Berger, Chen & Li (2006) and calculated in section 1.3. The senior un-
secured credit ratings from Standard & Poors are transformed to a numerical scale,
where rms rated AAA are assigned the highest number, AA the next highest and so
forth.
5yr spread Volatility Leverage Transp
Volatility 0.57
Leverage 0.62 0.25
Transp. -0.11 -0.08 -0.16
Rating -0.76 -0.41 -0.55 0.16
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The distribution of the CDS spreads across credit ratings and maturities is
illustrated in Table 1.4 Panel A. The mean consensus quote across time and rms
is found in the rst row, while the number of observations and the mean relative
quote dispersion are found in the second and third row, respectively. Panel B con-
tains the statistics for full month-end curves with observations at all maturities at
month-end for a given rm. By considering full curves, the mean consensus quotes
within a given rating class are comparable across maturities, since all averages
are calculated from the same set of dates and rms. As expected, the mean con-
sensus quotes increase monotonically with maturity for high credit quality rms
and decrease monotonically with maturity for the lowest credit quality rms.12
The 5-year maturity accounts for the highest number of observations, but
even the least observed 1-year maturity accounts for almost 15 percent of the
observations. Across ratings the lower end of the investment grade segment has
the highest number of observations. However, we are able to study a signicant
proportion of sample spreads across maturities in the low credit quality segment.
For BB-rated rms the sample consists of 449 to 757 month-end quotes for each
maturity and 342 full curves, while the number of quotes for B-rated rms ranges
from 66 to 87 with 50 full curves.13
Lando & Mortensen (2005) interpret the relative quote dispersion as a proxy
for liquidity. The more agreement about a quote, the higher the liquidity for that
particular credit. Adopting this liquidity proxy, we see a liquidity smile for a xed
rating across maturities. This is consistent with the fact that the 5-year maturity
is considered the most liquid point on the curve. However, the di¤erence in the
mean relative quote dispersion across maturities is small.
12Theory predicts an upward-sloping credit curve for high quality rms and a humped shaped
or mostly downward-sloping credit curve for low quality rms. While the rst is well-established
in the empirical literature, the latter is more controversial. See Sarga & Warga (1989), Fons
(1994), Helwege & Turner (1999), Lando & Mortensen (2005) and Agrawal & Bohn (2005).
13For comparison, Yu (2005) studies 0 speculative grade bonds in 1991-1994, 4 in 1995 and
15 in 1996.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics by Credit Rating and Maturity
This table illustrates the distribution of month-end CDS quotes across credit ratings
and maturities. The mean consensus quote across time and rms is found in the rst row
for each rating category, while the number of observations and the mean relative quote
dispersion are found in the second and third row, respectively. The latter is calculated
as the standard deviation of collected quotes divided by the consensus quote. Panel
A reports the statistics for unrestricted curves, while Panel B reports statistics for full
curves with an observation at a maturity of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years.
1yr 3yr 5yr 7yr 10yr Total
Panel A. Unrestricted curves
AAA 24 25 25 33 38 29
34 59 92 66 45 296
0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
AA 24 24 26 29 35 28
146 264 351 297 226 1,284
0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13
A 45 44 48 52 59 50
1,177 1,930 2,136 1,856 1,658 8,757
0.14 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.11
BBB 131 126 128 127 131 128
1,732 2,568 2,736 2,365 2,234 11,635
0.13 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.10
BB 419 407 392 390 368 395
449 702 757 559 567 3,034
0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
B 761 712 658 613 615 672
66 82 87 76 70 381
0.12 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10
NR 142 137 137 184 183 154
31 53 55 35 38 212
0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09
Total 141 136 133 129 139
3,635 5,658 6,214 5,254 4,838
0.13 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.11
22
Table 1.4: Summary Statistics by Credit Rating and Maturity (cont.)
This table illustrates the distribution of month-end CDS quotes across credit ratings
and maturities. The mean consensus quote across time and rms is found in the rst row
for each rating category, while the number of observations and the mean relative quote
dispersion are found in the second and third row, respectively. The latter is calculated
as the standard deviation of collected quotes divided by the consensus quote. Panel
A reports the statistics for unrestricted curves, while Panel B reports statistics for full
curves with an observation at a maturity of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years.
1yr 3yr 5yr 7yr 10yr Total
Panel B. Full curves
AAA 33 44 54 56 61 49
18 18 18 18 18 90
0.14 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12
AA 28 35 39 41 46 38
94 94 94 94 94 470
0.14 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12
A 48 55 60 63 69 59
893 893 893 893 893 4,465
0.14 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12
BBB 133 140 143 144 146 142
1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 7,140
0.13 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.10
BB 428 425 413 403 390 412
342 342 342 342 342 1,710
0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10
B 690 690 668 642 626 663
50 50 50 50 50 250
0.12 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10
NR 210 219 219 231 222 220
12 12 12 12 12 60
0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
Total 148 154 155 155 157
2,837 2,837 2,837 2,837 2,837
0.13 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.11
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In the end, the measure developed in Berger et al. (2006) allows us to re-
late accounting transparency to CDS curves for a large cross-section of rms.
Importantly, the distribution of CDS spread observations across credit quality
and maturity is desirable in our attempt to understand the impact of accounting
transparency on the term structure of CDS spreads. The accounting transparency
varies considerably in the large cross-section but less in our relatively short time-
series. Furthermore, some evidence indicates that credit spread changes in the
time-series are mostly driven by market factors that tend to overwhelm the ef-
fect of rm-level characteristics.14 Hence, cross-sectional regressions form our
benchmark approach. This makes the results comparable to Yu (2005), as cross-
sectional regressions constitute the only regression framework in his study. Later,
various econometric specications are introduced to ensure that the results are
not driven by spurious correlations.
1.6 Empirical Results
First, we estimate a gap between the high and low transparency credit curves.
This allows us to directly estimate the term structure of transparency spreads.
We then study a restricted set of full curves and estimate the transparency spread
term structure for high and low risk rms.
1.6.1 The Term Structure of Transparency Spreads
Du¢ e & Lando (2001) predict accounting transparency to be an important vari-
able in explaining credit spreads in the short end. At reasonable parameter values,
the model does not predict a signicant impact of accounting transparency above
the 5-year maturity. However, discretionary disclosure may still imply an e¤ect
in the long end.
The corporate bond data used in Yu (2005) consists of bonds with unequal
and shortening maturities and durations. This forces him to construct a piecewise
linear function of bond maturity across the rms at each month-end. He then es-
timates the level of the credit spread at the constructed and articial knot points.
14The results in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) suggest that the time-series variation in corpo-
rate bond credit spreads is mainly determined by local supply and demand shocks independent
of credit risk factors and liquidity proxies. Huang & Zhou (2007) nd that ve popular struc-
tural models cannot capture the time-series behavior of CDS spreads.
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As a starting point, we adopt a comparable specication and estimate the gap
between the high and low transparency credit curves. However, we estimate the
gap between the two curves at the equal, xed and therefore directly comparable
maturities in the CDS data, and interpret the gap as a transparency spread term
structure.
In particular, dene d as a dummy variable that equals 1 if a rms trans-
parency measure calculated in equation (1.4) in a given year ranks above the
median score. Furthermore, dene mT as a dummy variable that attains a value
of 1 if the CDS spread has a maturity of T and zero otherwise. Hence, in the
linear combination 1m1 + 2m3 + 3m5 + 4m7 + 5m10 the coe¢ cient i rep-
resents the level of the term structure at maturities 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years. Now,
dene dmT as the product of the transparency dummy d and mT . The regression
coe¢ cient in front of this term can be directly interpreted as the transparency
spread, i.e. the gap between the high and low transparency credit curves at the
given maturity.
Hence, we run monthly cross-sectional regressions of CDS spreads on the
transparency variables, volatility (vol), leverage (lev) and relative quote disper-
sion (Qdisp)15
SpreaditT = 1m1it + 2m3it + 3m5it + 4m7it + 5m10it (1.5)
+6dm1it + 7dm3it + 8dm5it + 9dm7it + 10dm10it
+11V olit + 12Levit + 13QdispitT + "itT :
The coe¢ cient estimates are averaged in the time-series and standard errors
are calculated following Fama & MacBeth (1973). Table 1.5 displays the results.
Focusing on the rst column, the transparency spread is highly signicant and
estimated at 23 bps at the 1-year maturity and 20, 13, 13 and 11 bps at the
remaining maturities. Particularly the transparency spread in the short end rep-
resents a considerable part of the average CDS spread level of 130 to 140 bps
across maturities as reported in Table 1.4.
15To facilitate interpretation the regression equation does not include an intercept term.
Hence, the R2 is not reported under this empirical specication.
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Table 1.5: Estimation of the Term Structure of Transparency Spreads
This table reports the results of monthly cross-sectional regressions when estimating the
gap between high and low transparency CDS spread curves. The coe¢ cient estimates
are averaged in the time-series. T-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on
the standard error in Fama & MacBeth (1973). d is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
transparency measure developed in Berger, Chen & Li (2006) and calculated in section
1.3 in a given year ranks above the median score. mT is a dummy that attains a value of
1 if the CDS maturity equals T . The regression coe¢ cient in front of the product dmT
can be directly interpreted as the transparency spread. The volatility is calculated using
250 days of historical equity returns, and leverage is total liabilities divided by the sum
of total liabilities and equity market capitalization. Quote dispersion is the standard
deviation of collected quotes divided by the consensus quote. Full curves are a restricted
set of curves with an observation at a maturity of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years. The monthly
regressions are SpreaditT = 1m1it + 2m3it + 3m5it + 4m7it + 5m10it + 6dm1it +
7dm3it + 8dm5it + 9dm7it + 10dm10it + 11V olit + 12Levit + 13QdispitT + "itT :
*, ** and *** denote signicance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unrestr. Unrestr. Full curves Full curves
m1 -293.64*** -299.10*** -315.01*** -333.24***
(-11.21) (-12.78) (-11.48) (-13.84)
m3 -292.11*** -297.06*** -312.26*** -328.17***
(-11.17) (-12.66) (-10.78) (-12.54)
m5 -293.64*** -297.26*** -316.80*** -328.18***
(-10.87) (-11.94) (-10.82) (-12.00)
m7 -296.34*** -300.50*** -315.20*** -328.85***
(-10.74) (-11.87) (-10.36) (-11.74)
m10 -295.43*** -300.12*** -311.45*** -327.26***
(-10.37) (-11.55) (-9.90) (-11.44)
dm1 -22.66*** -22.35*** -23.56*** -24.31***
(-4.22) (-4.11) (-3.91) (-4.29)
dm3 -20.04*** -19.98*** -20.52*** -20.94***
(-6.58) (-6.44) (-3.57) (-3.67)
dm5 -13.15*** -13.24*** -17.61*** -18.18***
(-5.56) (-5.54) (-3.11) (-3.21)
dm7 -12.88*** -13.05*** -14.67** -15.78***
(-5.98) (-5.75) (-2.71) (-2.82)
dm10 -10.94*** -10.82*** -13.08** -14.06**
(-5.26) (-5.21) (-2.47) (-2.59)
Volatility 805.44*** 805.59*** 873.06*** 874.86***
(16.50) (16.53) (12.92) (12.99)
Leverage 317.20*** 318.99*** 315.71*** 321.00***
(12.98) (13.14) (11.80) (12.29)
Qdisp -33.37 -122.68**
(-1.07) (-2.37)
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As expected, the volatility and leverage are highly signicant in explaining
credit spreads. However, the relative quote dispersion varies in signicance and
has a negative coe¢ cient estimate. If proxying for liquidity, the coe¢ cient is
expected to be positive. Hence, although the variable allows for reasonable in-
terpretations on average as liquidity in Table 1.4, it is questionable whether the
relative quote dispersion captures di¤erences in liquidity as suggested in Lando
& Mortensen (2005). As the control variable only has a minor impact on the
remaining coe¢ cient estimates and signicance, we keep it in our future regres-
sions16.
Firms usually have corporate bonds outstanding with just a few (or one)
maturities. Hence, studying multiple maturity observations for a given rm at a
given date is in e¤ect only possible in the CDS market, and therefore not pursued
in Yu (2005). Table 1.5 also contains the regression results for a restricted set
of full month-end curves with observations at all maturities at month-end for a
given rm. This makes CDS spreads directly comparable across maturities as
all observations are from the same set of dates and rms. As noted in Helwege
& Turner (1999) rms with heterogenous credit quality are known to populate
di¤erent ends of the corporate bond credit curve. This maturity bias is avoided
when studying full curves in the CDS market.
A highly signicant downward-sloping term structure of transparency spreads
also emerges from a study of full curves. From a transparency spread of 24 bps
at the 1-year maturity it decreases to 13 bps at the longest maturity.
The results in Table 1.5 to some extend support the ndings in Yu (2005).
While agreeing on the statistically and economically signicant transparency
spread in the short end, Yu (2005) nds a widening transparency spread at
longer maturities. In fact, he nds the transparency spread larger in the long
end than short end. He attributes this observation to the discretionary disclo-
sure hypothesis where rms hide information that would adversely a¤ect their
long-term outlook.17 In alternative econometric specications building on the
16Unreported results show that the presence or omission of relative quote dispersion has no
impact on any results reported in the paper.
17Although Yu (2005) has only few observations in the longest end, he calculates a trans-
parency spread at the 30-year knot point coinciding with the maximum corporate bond matu-
rity. Hence, this estimate is likely to be less reliable. However, while our transparency spread
term-structure remains downward-sloping, his exhibits a u-shape already at the 10-year knot
point. More precisely, he estimates a transparency spread of 11, 3, 9 and 13 bps at the 0, 5, 10
and 30-year knot points.
27
interpretation of dmT as a transparency spread, we later show that the term
structure of transparency spreads is not only strictly downward-sloping but most
often insignicant in the long end.
As argued in section 1.2, a stronger e¤ect of accounting transparency is ex-
pected for more risky rms. Therefore, each month the rms are separated into
high and low leverage and volatility groups by the respective medians. The re-
gression in (1.5) is then presented for each group in Table 1.6.18
For the low leverage and low volatility groups, the e¤ect of accounting trans-
parency on credit spreads is small and of varying signicance. While the trans-
parency spread term structure is insignicant for low leverage rms, it is most
often signicant for the low volatility rms. However, the transparency spread
is estimated at around 3 to 7 bps, which constitutes a small part of the average
CDS spread level for low volatility rms of 69 to 84 bps across maturities.
In contrast, the e¤ect of accounting transparency is large for the high leverage
and high volatility groups. For the high leverage group the term structure of
transparency spreads is highly signicant and estimated at 29, 34, 23, 22 and 14
bps across maturities. For the high volatility group it is estimated at 33, 26, 14,
12 and 7 bps. The transparency spread is highly signicant in the short end but
insignicant at longer maturities.
Finally, for rms with both a high leverage and a high volatility, the term
structure of transparency spreads is very steep and estimated at 51, 40, 23, 22
and 15 bps. Again, the transparency spread is highly signicant in the short
end while weakly signicant at the longest maturity. Compared to an average
spread of 180 to 220 bps across maturities in both groups, the transparency spread
constitutes a relatively larger component of the CDS spread level for risky rms.
Unreported results on full curves support these insights.
18As noted in Table 1.3, the correlation between the transparency measure and leverage and
volatility, respectively, is -0.16 and -0.08. As an extreme example, all rms with below median
leverage or volatility could have above median accounting transparency. In such a case, the
regression would not be able to identify a relation between transparency and CDS spreads.
However, the summary statistics on accounting transparency for each high and low leverage or
volatility group are not far from those reported in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.6: Estimation of the Term Structure of Transparency Spreads
for High and Low Risk Firms
This table reports the results of monthly cross-sectional regressions when estimating the
gap between high and low transparency CDS spread curves. The coe¢ cient estimates
are averaged in the time-series. T-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on
the standard error in Fama & MacBeth (1973). d is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
transparency measure developed in Berger, Chen & Li (2006) and calculated in section
1.3 in a given year ranks above the median score. mT is a dummy that attains a value of
1 if the CDS maturity equals T . The regression coe¢ cient in front of the product dmT
can be directly interpreted as the transparency spread. The volatility is calculated using
250 days of historical equity returns, and leverage is total liabilities divided by the sum
of total liabilities and equity market capitalization. Quote dispersion is the standard
deviation of collected quotes divided by the consensus quote. Full curves are a restricted
set of curves with an observation at a maturity of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years. The monthly
regressions are SpreaditT = 1m1it + 2m3it + 3m5it + 4m7it + 5m10it + 6dm1it +
7dm3it + 8dm5it + 9dm7it + 10dm10it + 11V olit + 12Levit + 13QdispitT + "itT :
Each month, the rms are separated into high and low leverage and volatility groups
by the respective medians. The regression is then performed for each group. *, ** and
*** denote signicance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High Lev. Low Lev. High Vol. Low Vol. High-High Low-Low
m1-m10 supp. supp. supp. supp. supp. supp.
dm1 -28.52*** -13.31* -33.45*** -2.91 -50.91*** -9.32***
(-3.38) (-1.96) (-3.11) (-1.21) (-3.88) (-2.81)
dm3 -34.21*** -2.01 -25.56*** -7.57*** -40.21*** -5.95***
(-5.90) (-1.26) (-4.24) (-4.38) (-4.02) (-3.30)
dm5 -22.69*** -1.44 -14.06*** -7.07*** -23.05*** -4.71**
(-5.64) (-0.78) (-2.77) (-3.92) (-2.97) (-2.69)
dm7 -21.51*** -3.75* -11.70* -5.15*** -22.35** -5.72***
(-4.29) (-1.98) (-1.85) (-4.10) (-2.52) (-3.13)
dm10 -14.44*** -5.97** -7.22 -5.47*** -14.61* -6.18***
(-3.22) (-2.40) (-1.32) (-3.73) (-1.73) (-2.88)
Volatility 979.19*** 338.10*** 1045.61*** 242.07*** 1150.61*** 200.79***
(14.08) (11.95) (12.61) (8.72) (10.75) (12.86)
Leverage 473.62*** 171.83*** 423.95*** 122.31*** 582.42*** 109.80***
(8.15) (11.15) (11.78) (10.64) (7.98) (13.54)
Qdisp -78.90 -177.14*** -22.81 -235.41*** 11.49 -145.59***
(-1.47) (-7.29) (-0.47) (-12.22) (0.18) (-9.34)
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To summarize at this point, we nd a highly signicant downward-sloping
term structure of transparency spreads. Furthermore, the e¤ect of accounting
transparency on the term structure of CDS spreads is largest for the most risky
rms. We now show that the term structure of transparency spreads remains
downward-sloping under alternative econometric specications. Furthermore,
while highly signicant in the short end, it is often insignicant at maturities
exceeding 5 years. Hence, the ndings are strongly supportive of hypotheses H2
and H3 from Du¢ e & Lando (2001). The ndings only weakly support the overall
level e¤ect due to discretionary disclosure in hypothesis H1
1.7 Robustness Analysis
This section conducts various robustness tests, e.g. controlling for a residual de-
pendence across a given credit curve. In a nal specication, we allow the control
variables to impact CDS spreads di¤erently across maturities, which is possible
since the CDS data consists of equal maturities across rms and time. This
exercise is based on the raw transparency measure and a rank transformation.
1.7.1 Alternative Econometric Specications
Table 1.7 presents the results of estimating the gap between the high and low
transparency credit curves under di¤erent econometric specications. The bench-
mark regression (1) is a pooled OLS regression with White standard errors. As
standard errors in the remaining regressions are robust to heteroscedasticity, dif-
ferences in standard errors across columns (1) to (8) are due to within cluster
correlations - including the Fama & MacBeth (1973) standard errors in (7) and
(8).19
Clustered standard errors (also called Rogers standard errors) account for a
residual dependence created by a rm e¤ect, time e¤ect or similar. The correla-
tion can be of any form as no parametric structure is assumed. Regression (2)
controls for a possible correlation in residuals across maturities for a given rm
and month, by allowing for within cluster correlation at the curve level. The clus-
tered standard errors in regression (3) control for a possible time e¤ect, where the
residuals of a given month may be correlated across di¤erent rms and maturities.
19See the survey of panel data methods used in nance by Petersen (2007).
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Regression (4) to (6) extend these specications and control for a constant
time e¤ect. We do that by addressing the latter parametrically using monthly
dummies. Clustering by month while including monthly dummies allows one to
separate the time e¤ect into a constant and non-constant part. A non-constant
time e¤ect is present, if a shock in a given month has a di¤erent e¤ect on di¤erent
rms.
The cross-sectional Fama & MacBeth (1973) regression from Table 1.5 is re-
peated in regression (7). This regression also accounts for a cross-correlation in
residuals stemming from a time e¤ect, and it assumes that the monthly coe¢ cient
estimates are independent of each other. However, when estimating the standard
error of their mean the annual accounting transparency measure may imply a
serial correlation in the monthly coe¢ cient estimates. We adopt the method in
Abarbanell & Bernard (2000) and present the adjusted standard errors in regres-
sion (8). This adjustment is designed to correct for a rm e¤ect arising from
persistent rm characteristics.2021
The conclusion from Table 1.7 Panel A is that the transparency spread is very
robust in the short end and estimated around 20 bps at the 1-year maturity. At
longer maturities the transparency spread narrows and is estimated around 14,
8, 7 and 5 bps at the 3, 5, 7 and 10-year maturity, respectively. While highly
signicant in the short end across all specications, the transparency spread is
most often insignicant after the 7-year maturity. The same conclusion results
from Panel B, where the di¤erent econometric specications are applied on full
curves22.
20To be conservative, the adjustment is not applied when the estimated serial correlation is
less than zero.
21We do not report standard errors after clustering at the rm level or introducing rm
dummies for a number of reasons. First, the short time-series implies that we only have 1 year
of data for a signicant number of rms (as noted in Table 1.1 the data consists of 368 rms
and 890 rm-years in 2002 to 2004). This makes an identication of a rm e¤ect separate
from accounting transparency impossible. Second, as shown in Petersen (2007) the bias from
a rm e¤ect is increasing in the number of periods. Third, the inclusion of rm xed e¤ects
would force an identication of the transparency spread from time-series changes in accounting
transparency, which is unreasonable.
22Other unreported specications such as purely cross-sectional regressions and annual cross-
sectional regressions based on the time-series average CDS spreads and control variables support
these ndings.
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Table 1.8 repeats the specications in Table 1.7, but includes the senior un-
secured credit rating from Standard & Poors as an additional control variable
in equation (1.5). As noted in Sengupta (1998) and Yu (2005), credit agencies
claim to have incorporated the quality of information disclosure in the credit rat-
ings. The results show that credit ratings do not absorb the e¤ect of accounting
transparency on the term structure of credit spreads. After accounting for the
information content in credit ratings, the transparency spread continues to be
highly signicant at the 1-year maturity and downward-sloping. However, now
the gap between the high and low transparency credit curves is insignicant after
the 5-year maturity. As expected, the credit rating is highly signicant and a
one notch increase in rating lowers the CDS spread by approximately 50 bps.
Unreported results based on full curves support these ndings.
Consistent with empirical ndings in Du¤ee (1998), structural models such as
Longsta¤& Schwartz (1995) predict an inverse relationship between the risk-free
rate and credit spreads. An increase in the risk-free rate increases the risk-neutral
drift of the asset value process and reduces the risk-neutral default probability. If
an increase in the slope of the risk-free yield curve increases the expected future
short rate, then by the same argument as above it implies a decrease in credit
spreads. From a di¤erent perspective, as noted in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), a
decrease in the slope of the risk-free yield curve may imply a weakening economy
with decreasing expected recovery rates and higher default rates. Once again,
a negative relationship between the slope of the risk-free yield curve and credit
spreads is expected. The risk-free term structure variables are constant across
all rms in a given month. Hence, they cannot be included in the empirical
specications from Table 1.7 based on Fama &MacBeth (1973) or when including
monthly dummies. Table 1.9 presents the results from including the slope of the
yield curve in addition to credit ratings in equation (1.5). The slope is dened
as the di¤erence between the 10 and 1-year constant maturity treasury yields.23
The slope of the risk-free yield curve is highly signicant and estimated with a
negative coe¢ cient. However, the transparency spread continues to be highly
signicant in the short end, downward-sloping and insignicant after the 5-year
maturity.
23The level of the risk-free yield curve is discussed in section 1.7.2, where individual maturity
classes are studied.
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Table 1.9: The Term Structure of Transparency Spreads and the Yield
Curve
This table estimates the gap between the high and low transparency CDS curves under
various econometric specications. (1) is a pooled OLS regression with White errors,
while (2) and (3) control for residual dependence by estimating cluster-robust errors
by curves and time, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parantheses. The senior
unsecured credit ratings from Standard & Poors are transformed to a numerical scale,
where rms rated AAA are assigned a score of 10, AA a score of 9 and so forth. The
slope of the yield curve is the di¤erence between the 10 and 1-year constant maturity
treasury rates. Panel A displays the results for unrestricted curves, while Panel B
displays results for full curves with an observation at a maturity of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10
years. The regressions are SpreaditT = 1m1it+ 2m3it+ 3m5it+ 4m7it+ 5m10it+
6dm1it+7dm3it+8dm5it+9dm7it+10dm10it+11V olit+12Levit+13QdispitT+
14Ratingit+15Slopet+"itT : *, ** and *** denote signicance at 10, 5 and 1 percent,
respectively.
Panel A. Unrestricted curves Panel B. Full curves
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
White Cluster Cluster White Cluster Cluster
m1-m10 supp. supp. supp. supp. supp. supp.
dm1 -15.48*** -15.48*** -15.48*** -13.93** -13.93** -13.93***
(-2.70) (-2.75) (-2.77) (-2.30) (-2.35) (-3.16)
dm3 -11.60*** -11.60*** -11.60*** -9.02* -9.02* -9.02**
(-3.05) (-3.23) (-3.20) (-1.72) (-1.78) (-2.13)
dm5 -6.27** -6.27** -6.27** -6.22 -6.22 -6.22*
(-2.05) (-2.14) (-2.37) (-1.33) (-1.38) (-1.72)
dm7 -4.68 -4.68 -4.68** -3.76 -3.76 -3.76
(-1.43) (-1.49) (-2.05) (-0.84) (-0.87) (-1.10)
dm10 -2.89 -2.89 -2.89 -1.50 -1.50 -1.50
(-0.91) (-0.95) (-1.23) (-0.36) (-0.37) (-0.42)
Volatility 649.90*** 649.90*** 649.90*** 682.60*** 682.60*** 682.60***
(32.52) (19.57) (9.56) (35.31) (17.12) (7.99)
Leverage 263.51*** 263.51*** 263.51*** 270.80*** 270.80*** 270.80***
(43.31) (22.04) (10.83) (34.71) (15.91) (10.58)
Qdisp 94.90*** 94.90*** 94.90** 75.96** 75.96 75.96
(4.18) (3.09) (2.29) (2.25) (1.54) (1.13)
Rating -49.38*** -49.38*** -49.38*** -57.97*** -57.97*** -57.97***
(-37.37) (-20.74) (-13.66) (-35.79) (-16.72) (-13.58)
Slope -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.65*** -0.65*** -0.65***
(-22.26) (-11.09) (-3.19) (-18.99) (-8.89) (-2.82)
Cluster - Curve Month - Curve Month
Dummy - - - - - -
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1.7.2 Individual Maturity Classes
When included in equation (1.5), the control variables are only allowed to induce
a parallel shift in the term structure of CDS spreads. As a nal exercise, we allow
the control variables to impact CDS spreads di¤erently across maturities. For that
purpose, we analyze each maturity class in isolation using the raw transparency
measure calculated in equation (1.4) and a rank transformation. This is possible
since the data consists of CDS spreads with equal and xed maturities.
For each maturity class T , Table 1.10 Panel A presents the results of monthly
cross-sectional regressions of CDS spreads on the transparency measure, volatility,
leverage and relative quote dispersion
Spreadit = 0 + 1Transpit + 2V olit + 3Levit + 4Qdispit + "it: (1.6)
The coe¢ cient estimates are averaged in the time-series and standard errors
are calculated following Fama &MacBeth (1973). The average adjustedR2 ranges
from 0.58 to 0.60 and accounting transparency is signicant or highly signicant at
all maturities. From a coe¢ cient of -13.45 at the 1-year maturity, the coe¢ cient
on accounting transparency decreases to -6.75 and -6.68 at the 3 and 5-year
maturity, respectively. After this point a u-shape kicks in with coe¢ cients of
-8.49 and -9.56 at the 7 and 10-year maturity, respectively. The variation in
accounting transparency in each maturity class is similar to the variation reported
in Table 1.1 for the entire sample. Hence, a one standard deviation increase in
transparency reduces the spread by approximately 8, 4, 4, 5 and 6 bps across the
curve.
Table 1.10 Panel B contains the regression results for the restricted set of full
curves with observations at all maturities at month-end for a given rm. The
resulting coe¢ cients on accounting transparency are all highly signicant and
larger at -22.28, -21.32, -19.75, -12.15 and -17.90 at maturities of 1, 3, 5, 7 and
10 years, respectively. A one standard deviation increase in transparency reduces
the spread by approximately 14, 13, 12, 7 and 11 bps across the curve, and main
insights from the unrestricted curves in Panel A are preserved. Under alternative
econometric specications and a broader set of control variables, the impact of
accounting transparency is later shown to strictly decrease with maturity.
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A concern is that the accounting transparency measure is a noisy estimate of
"true" accounting transparency, where an interpretation of the distance between
two scores in a cardinal manner is unreasonable. Hence, we transform the annual
accounting transparency measure to evenly spaced observations on the unit in-
terval [0,1], and only interpret the annual ranking ordinally. A transformed score
of 1(0) in a given year is assigned to the rm with highest(lowest) transparency.
Table 1.11 Panel A presents highly signicant coe¢ cient estimates of -36.69,
-27.73, -20.11, -26.93 and -26.89 across the curve. If a rm is able to improve its
accounting transparency from the lowest to a median ranking, say, the result is
a reduction in CDS spreads of 18, 14, 10, 13 and 13 bps at maturities of 1, 3, 5,
7 and 10 years, respectively. A similar conclusion is reached from full curves in
Panel B.
Table 1.12 analyzes the impact of accounting transparency for high and low
risk rms using the annual transparency ranks. Consistent with the results in the
previous section, the e¤ect of accounting transparency is small and most often
insignicant when based on rms with a low leverage and a low volatility in Panel
B. However, for the most risky rms with a high leverage and a high volatility
in Panel A, the coe¢ cient estimates are -99.02, -83.78, -68.09, -70.84 and -66.29
and highly signicant. Hence, if a risky rm is able to improve its accounting
transparency from the lowest to a median ranking, say, the result is a reduction
in CDS spreads of 50, 42, 34, 35 and 33 bps at maturities of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10
years, respectively.
Note the large R2 of 0.59 to 0.63 for the risky rms and the much smaller R2 of
0.14 to 0.20 for the rms with low leverage and low volatility. This observation is
supportive of the problems in earlier studies when explaining the credit spreads of
low-yield rms using structural models. This paper suggests that variables other
than accounting transparency are needed - also in the short end.
40
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Finally, we allow the broader set of control variables to impact spreads dif-
ferently across the curve under the alternative econometric specications intro-
duced earlier.24 The conclusion is a downward-sloping impact of accounting
transparency across maturities that is highly robust in the short end. Across
all specications, a move from the lowest to a median transparency ranking, say,
reduces the 1-year spread by approximately 15 bps.
In particular, Table 1.13 presents the results from including the credit rating
as a control variable. In the cross-sectional regressions in Panel A and B, the
coe¢ cients on accounting transparency are insignicant or only weakly signicant
after the 5-year maturity. The remaining specications in Panel C to F support
a highly signicant e¤ect of accounting transparency at the 1-year maturity and
a declining coe¢ cient with varying signicance at longer maturities. The credit
rating is highly signicant in all specications, and R2 increases to 0.68 compared
to an R2 around 0.60 without credit ratings in the Fama & MacBeth (1973)
regressions in Table 1.10.
Table 1.14 presents the results from including the slope of the yield curve in
addition to credit ratings.25 As before, this variable can only be included in a
subset of the empirical specications. While estimated with a highly signicant
negative coe¢ cient, the slope of the yield curve only increases R2 marginally.
Accounting transparency continues to be highly signicant in the short end, and
the impact continues to decline as maturity increases.
24As each maturity class is analyzed in isolation, the various econometric specications do
not include standard errors robust to within cluster correlation at the curve level.
25Including the maturity-matched constant maturity treasury yield in addition to the slope
implies that both are estimated insignicantly. However, coe¢ cients and signicance of the
transparency gap are unchanged.
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1.8 Conclusion
Motivated by the theoretical contribution in Du¢ e & Lando (2001), this paper
relates a newly developed empirical measure of accounting transparency by Berger
et al. (2006) to the term structure of CDS spreads for a large cross-section of rms.
We nd a highly signicant e¤ect of accounting transparency at the 1-year
maturity, and a declining impact at longer maturities. Estimating the gap be-
tween the high and low transparency credit curves, the transparency spread is
estimated around 20 bps at the 1-year maturity. At longer maturities, the trans-
parency spread narrows and is estimated at 14, 8, 7 and 5 bps at the 3, 5, 7
and 10-year maturity, respectively. While highly signicant in the short end and
robust across alternative econometric specications and control variables, the
impact of accounting transparency is not robust and most often insignicant for
maturities exceeding 5 years. Finally, the e¤ect of accounting transparency on
the term structure of CDS spreads is largest for the most risky rms.
Thus, the results are strongly supportive of hypotheses H2 and H3 derived
from Du¢ e & Lando (2001), and add an explanation to the underprediction of
short-term credit spreads by traditional structural credit risk models. Only weak
evidence supports the presence of an overall level e¤ect as suggested in hypothesis
H1.
The results contrast an earlier study by Yu (2005), who analyzes corporate
bond credit spreads using the AIMR analyst ranking of corporate disclosure in
1991 to 1996. He attributes a strongly u-shaped transparency spread with the
largest e¤ect at longer maturities to the theory of discretionary disclosure, where
rms hide information that would adversely a¤ect their long-term outlook.
Liquid CDS contracts are highly desirable when studying the determinants
of the shape of the credit curve. As opposed to corporate bonds, this allows
us to study multiple maturity observations for a given rm at a given day, and
maturities are equal across rms and xed through time. Furthermore, technical
e¤ects are known to impact the slope of the credit curve for corporate bonds
trading o¤ par. Hence, ndings based on CDS spreads are likely to be more
reliable than studies based on corporate bonds. Our study shows that the term
structure of transparency spreads is downward-sloping in the CDS market across
alternative econometric specications.
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A Du¢ e & Lando (2001)
The setup and results on optimal capital structure and default are close to Leland
(1994) and Leland & Toft (1996). The rms assets V are modeled as a geometric
Brownian motion, which is dened on a xed probability space (
;F ; Q) : More
specically, V (t) = exp(Z(t)) where
Zt = Z0 +mt+ Wt; (1.7)
for a standard Brownian motion W , a volatility parameter  and a parameter m
that determines the expected asset growth rate
 =
log[E (Vt=V0)]
t
= m+ 2=2: (1.8)
The rm generates cash ow at the rate Vt at time t and issues debt to take
advantage of the tax shields o¤ered for interest expense at the tax rate . The
debt is modeled as a consol bond with a constant coupon rate C. Hence, the
tax benets are C until default, where  2 [0; 1] of the asset value is lost as a
frictional cost. All agents in the model are risk-neutral and discount cash ows
at a constant market interest rate r.
The rm is operated by its equity owners, who are completely informed at all
times on the value of the assets V and choose when to liquidate the rm.26 The
default time is chosen endogenously by the equity owners to maximize the value
of equity, and is given as the rst time (VB) = infft : Vt  VBg the asset value
falls to the default barrier
VB (C) =
(1  )C (r   )
r(1 + )
; (1.9)
where
 =
m+
p
m2 + 2r2
2
: (1.10)
26This means that the equity owners have the information ltration (Ft) generated by V;
where Ft is the -algebra generated by fVs : 0  s  tg:
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The resulting equity value is
S(V;C) =
V
r     
VB (C) 
r   

V
VB (C)
 
+ (   1) C
r
"
1 

V
VB (C)
 #
;
(1.11)
while the value of the consol bond is
d (V;C) =
(1  )VB (C) 
r   

V
VB (C)
 
+
C
r
"
1 

V
VB (C)
 #
: (1.12)
Finally, the optimal coupon is chosen such that the initial total value of the
rm S(V;C) + d (V;C) is maximized.
After issuance, bond and CDS investors are not kept fully informed on the
status of the rm. They do understand that equity owners will force liquidation
when the asset value falls to VB, but they cannot observe the asset process V
directly. Instead, they receive an accounting report at selected times t1; t2:::; ti < t
in terms of a noisy estimate of the asset value given by bVt, where log bVt and log Vt
are joint normal. Specically,
Y (t) = log bVt = Z(t) + U (t) ; (1.13)
where U (t) is independent of Z(t) and normally distributed with mean u =
 a2
2
= E (Ut) and variance a2 = V ar(Ut): Hence, the standard deviation a of Ut
measures the degree of accounting noise. Also observed at each t is whether the
rm has defaulted or not. For simplicity, it is assumed that equity is not traded
in the public market and equity owners are precluded from trading in the credit
market.27
Based on the information available, it is possible for the investors to calculate
the conditional distribution of assets Vt. With the simple case of having observed
only a single noisy asset report at time t = t1, the density g ( j Yt; z0; t) of Zt can
be computed conditional on the noisy observation Yt, a lagged noise-free report
z0 and  > t. With ey = y    u, ex = x   and ez = z0   , where log(VB) = ,
27Hence, the information ltration in the credit market is dened as Ht =

 
Y (t1) ; ::::; Y (tn) ; 1f(VB)sg : 0  s  t
	
for the largest n such that tn  t:
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the density is shown to be
g (x j y; z0; t) =
q
0

exp ( J (ey; ex; ez0)) 1  exp   2exez02t 
exp

21
40
  3



1p
20

  exp

22
40
  3



  2p
20
 ;
(1.14)
where
J (ey; ex; ez0) = (ey   ex)2
2a2
+
(ez0 +mt  ex)2
22t
; (1.15)
0 =
a2 + 2t
2a22t
; (1.16)
1 =
ey
a2
+
ez0 +mt
2t
; (1.17)
2 =  1 + 2
ez0
2t
; (1.18)
3 =
1
2
 ey
a2
+
(ez0 +mt)2
2t
!
(1.19)
and  is the standard normal distribution function. Conditional on survival up to
time t, this density gives us the conditional distribution of assets as g(V )=V , de-
picted in Figure 1.1. The conditional survival probability q(t; s) = Q ( > s j Ht)
to some future time s > t is
q(t; s) =
Z 1

(1   (s  t; x  )) g (x j Yt; z0; t) dx: (1.20)
 (s  t; x  ) at time t denotes the probability of the rst passage of a
Brownian motion with driftm and volatility parameter  from an initial condition
(x  ) > 0 to a level below zero at time s. This probability is known as
1   (s  t; x  ) (1.21)
= 
 
(x  ) +m (s  t)

p
(s  t)
!
  exp

 2m (x  )
2


 
  (x  ) +m (s  t)

p
(s  t)
!
:
A.1 Pricing the CDS
A CDS is an insurance contract against credit events such as the default on a
corporate bond (the reference obligation) by a specic issuer (reference entity).
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In case of a credit event, the seller of insurance is obligated to buy the reference
obligation from the protection buyer at par. For this protection, the buyer pays
a periodic premium to the protection seller until the maturity of the contract or
the credit event, whichever comes rst. Since the accrued premium must also be
paid if a credit event occurs between two payment dates, the payments t nicely
into a continuous-time framework. The present value of the premium payments
can be calculated as
EQ

c
Z T
0
exp

 
Z s
0
rudu

1f>sgds

, (1.22)
where c denotes the annual premium known as the CDS spread, T the maturity
of the contract, r the risk-free interest rate,  the default time of the obligor and
EQ denotes the expectation under the risk-neutral pricing measure. Assuming
independence between the default time and the risk-free interest rate, this can be
written as
c
Z T
0
P (0; s)q(0; s)ds, (1.23)
where P (0; s) is the price of a default-free zero-coupon bond with maturity s, and
q(0; s) is the risk-neutral survival probability until time s at the time of issuance,
derived in equation (1.20). The present value of the credit protection is equal to
EQ

(1 R) exp

 
Z 
0
rudu

1f<Tg

, (1.24)
where R is the recovery of bond market value measured as a percentage of par in
the event of default. Maintaining the assumption of independence between the
default time and the risk-free interest rate and assuming a constant R, this can
be written as
 (1 R)
Z T
0
P (0; s)q0(0; s)ds, (1.25)
where   q0(0; t) =  dq(0; t)=dt is the probability density function of the default
time. The CDS spread is determined such that the value of the contract is zero
at initiation
0 = c
Z T
0
P (0; s)q(0; s)ds+ (1 R)
Z T
0
P (0; s)q0(0; s)ds, (1.26)
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and hence
c(0; T ) =  (1 R)
R T
0
P (0; s)q0(0; s)dsR T
0
P (0; s)q(0; s)ds
. (1.27)
As mentioned, the model assumes a constant interest rate r, implying that
c(0; T ) =  (1 R)
R T
0
e rsq0(0; s)dsR T
0
e rsq(0; s)ds
: (1.28)
Integrating the denominator by parts yields
c(0; T ) =  r(1 R)
R T
0
e rsq0(0; s)ds
1  e rT q(0; T ) + R T
0
e rsq0(0; s)ds
: (1.29)
We nd q0(0; s) by di¤erentiating equation (1.20) inside the integral. To ease
notation, we denote b = x  , g (x) = g (x j Yt; z0; t) and t = 0, implying that a
noise-free report is received one period before. Since g (x) does not depend on s,
we only need to di¤erentiate 1   (s; b) with respect to s yielding
@(1   (s; b))
@s
=
 b

p
2s3
exp
 
 1
2

(b+ms)

p
s
2!
=  f(x; s); (1.30)
where f(x; s) is the rst hitting time density of a Brownian motion with drift m
and volatility parameter . Therefore,
q0(0; s) =  
Z 1

f (x; s) g(x)dx; (1.31)
and hence Z T
0
e rsq0(0; s)ds =  
Z T
0
e rs
Z 1

f (x; s) g(x)dxds (1.32)
=  
Z 1

g(x)
Z T
0
e rsf (x; s) dsdx;
again since g (x) does not depend on s: The inner integral
R T
0
e rsf (x; s) ds is the
integral of a discounted rst hitting time density known from Reiner & Rubinstein
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(1991) and Leland & Toft (1996) in closed form as
G(x; T ) =
Z T
0
e rsf (x; s) ds (1.33)
= exp (( c+ z) b)  (h1 (T )) + exp (( c  z) b)  (h2 (T )) ;
where
h1 (T ) =
( b  z2T )

p
T
; (1.34)
h2 (T ) =
( b+ z2T )

p
T
; (1.35)
c =
m
2
; (1.36)
and
z =
(m2 + 2r2)
1
2
2
: (1.37)
In the end, to calculate the CDS spread we only need to evaluate a single
integral numerically
c(0; T ) = r(1 R)
R1

G(x; T )g(x)dx
1  e rT q(0; T )  R1

G(x; T )g(x)dx
(1.38)
= r(1 R)
R1

G(x; T )g(x)dx
1  e rT R1

(1   (T; x  )) g (x) dx  R1

G(x; T )g(x)dx
:
B The Accounting Transparency Measure
The basic idea in Berger et al. (2006) is that when pricing equity, investors per-
ceive a rms permanent earnings as a geometrically weighted average of reported
earnings and industry average earnings. Investors put more weight on the rms
reported earnings when the accounting transparency is high.
Denote eEj;t as investorsperception of rm j0s permanent earnings in year
t, Ej;t as the rms reported earnings and EI;t as the industry average earnings.
Scaling the earnings by rm asset Aj;t and industry assets AI;t, the permanent
earnings perceived by investors is formally written as
eEj;t
Aj;t 1
=

Ej;t
Aj;t 1
 
EI;t
AI;t 1
1 
; (1.39)
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where  2 [0; 1] is the weight put on rm-specic information. Taking logarithms
and rst-order di¤erences yields
ej;t = ej;t + (1  ) eI;t + (1  )lnAj;t 1
AI;t 1

  ln

Aj;t 2
AI;t 2

: (1.40)
Lower case letters denote the log-growth rate of the variable ej;t = ln eEj;teEj;t 1,
ej;t = ln

Ej;t
Ej;t 1

, eI;t = ln

EI;t
EI;t 1

and Aj;t
AI;t
represents the rms share of the
industry assets. Assuming this share does not change much from year t   2 to
t  1, we approximately have
ej;t = ej;t + (1  ) eI;t: (1.41)
The equity price Pj;t is determined by investors perception of permanent
earnings, and with the assumption of a constant cost of capital j and a constant
expected growth rate gj, we have
Pj;t =
eEj;t
j   gj
: (1.42)
Hence, a rms equity return equals its permanent earnings growth rate rj;t =ej;t, implying that the idiosyncratic variance of the return must equal the idio-
syncratic variance of the perceived permanent earnings. Idiosyncratic is dened
relative to the industry, and the following relations between rm and industry
returns and between rm and industry earnings, respectively, are assumed
rj;t = ej;t = r + rI;t + "rj;t (1.43)
ej;t = a
e + beI;t + "
e
j;t: (1.44)
Finally, using equations (1.41), (1.43) and (1.44), the idiosyncratic variance of
the perceived earnings growth equals 2 times the idiosyncratic variance of the
reported earnings growth
var("rj) = 
2var("ej); (1.45)
and the measure of accounting transparency  is calculated as the idiosyncratic
volatility of equity returns divided by the idiosyncratic volatility in earnings
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growth
 =
vol("rj)
vol("ej)
: (1.46)
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Chapter2
Capital Structure Arbitrage: Model
Choice and Volatility Calibration
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Coauthored with Peter Tind Larsen, School of Economics and Management,
University of Aarhus
Abstract1
When identifying relative value opportunities across credit and equity mar-
kets, the arbitrageur faces two major problems, namely positions based on model
misspecication and mismeasured inputs. Using credit default swap data, this pa-
per addresses both concerns in a convergence-type trading strategy. In spite of
di¤erences in assumptions governing default and calibration, we nd the exact
structural model linking the markets second to timely key inputs. Studying an
equally-weighted portfolio of all relative value positions, the excess returns are in-
signicant when based on a historical volatility. However, relying on an implied
volatility from equity options results in highly signicant excess returns. The gain
is largest in the speculative grade segment, and cannot be explained from system-
atic market risk factors. Although the strategy may seem attractive at an aggregate
level, positions on individual obligors can be very risky.
1We thank Lombard Risk for access to the credit default swap data. We are grateful to
Peter Løchte Jørgensen, David Lando, Hayne Leland, Svein-Arne Persson, Stephen Schaefer,
Ilya Strebulaev, Carsten Sørensen, participants at the C.R.E.D.I.T. 2006 Doctoral Tutorial in
Venice, the Danish Doctoral School of Finance Workshop 2007, a Credit Risk Workshop at
Aarhus School of Business, the Nordic Finance Network Workshop 2007 in Helsinki, the Euro-
pean Financial Management Associations 2007 meeting in Vienna and seminar participants at
University of Aarhus and Aarhus School of Business for useful discussions and comments. Any
remaining errors are our own.
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2.1 Introduction
Capital structure arbitrage refers to trading strategies that take advantage of the
relative mispricing across di¤erent security classes traded on the same capital
structure. As the exponential growth in the credit default swap (CDS) market
has made credit much more tradable and traditional hedge fund strategies have
su¤ered declining returns (Skorecki (2004)), important questions arise for hedge
funds and proprietary trading desks. In particular, do credit and equity markets
ever diverge in opinion on the quality of an obligor? What is the risk and re-
turn of exploiting divergent views in relative value strategies? Although trading
strategies founded in a lack of synchronicity between equity and credit markets
have gained huge popularity in recent years (Currie & Morris (2002) and Zuck-
erman (2005)), the academic literature addressing capital structure arbitrage is
very sparse.
This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of the risk and return of capi-
tal structure arbitrage using CDS data on 221 North American obligors in 2002
to 2004. When looking at one security in order to signal the sale or purchase
of another, the resulting link and initiation of a trade depends on the chosen
model relating the markets. We address two major problems facing the arbi-
trageur, namely relative value opportunities driven by model misspecication or
mismeasured inputs.
Duarte, Longsta¤ & Yu (2005) analyze traditional xed income arbitrage
strategies such as the swap spread arbitrage, but also briey address capital struc-
ture arbitrage. Yu (2006) cites a complete lack of evidence in favor of or against
strategies trading equity instruments against CDSs. Hence, he conducts the rst
analysis of the strategy by implementing the industry benchmark CreditGrades
using a historical volatility, which is a popular choice among professionals.2
We show that the more comprehensive model by Leland & Toft (1996) only
adds an excess return of secondary order. However, when exploiting a wider array
of inputs and securities in model calibration and identication of relative value
opportunities, the result is a substantial improvement in strategy execution and
returns.
2That CreditGrades is the preferred framework among professionals is argued in Currie &
Morris (2002) and Yu (2006), while the CreditGrades Technical Document by Finger (2002)
advocates for the 1000-day historical volatility.
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When searching for relative value opportunities, the arbitrageur uses a struc-
tural model to gauge the richness and cheapness of the 5-year CDS spread. Using
the market value of equity, an associated volatility measure and the liability
structure of the obligor, he compares the spread implied from the model with the
market spread. When the market spread is substantially larger(smaller) than the
theoretical counterpart, he sells(buys) a CDS and sells(buys) equity. If the mar-
ket and equity-implied spread from the model subsequently converge, he prots.
Hence, a model that links rm fundamentals with di¤erent security classes helps
to identify credits that either o¤er a discount against equities or trade at a very
high level.
In fact, the chosen underlying model relating equity with credit plays a central
role in all parts of the strategy. First, it is used to calculate equity-implied CDS
spreads governing entry and exit decisions in equity and credit markets. Second,
to calculate daily returns on an open position, it is necessary to keep track on the
total value of an outstanding CDS position. This is done from the model-based
term structure of survival probabilities. Third, the model is used to calculate the
equity hedge by a numerical di¤erentiation of the value of the CDS position wrt.
the equity price.
CreditGrades loosely builds on Black & Cox (1976), with default dened as
the rst passage time of rm assets to an unobserved default barrier. This model,
like other structural models, is based on a set of restrictive assumptions regarding
the default mechanism and capital structure characteristics.
Although allowing for a random recovery, CreditGrades belongs to the class of
models with an exogenous default barrier. However, Leland (1994) subsequently
extended in Leland & Toft (1996) has pioneered models with endogenous default.
In these models, the default barrier is chosen by managers as the asset value where
it is no longer optimal for the equityholders to meet the promised debt service
payments. Hence, the default barrier and survival probability are determined not
only by debt principal but a number of structural variables.
As a result of model variations, di¤erences in model calibration exist. For
structural models, this is particularly relevant as many key inputs are di¢ cult to
measure. Bypassing strict denitions CreditGrades is developed for immediate
application, while the calibration of Leland & Toft (1996) is more extensive.
Hence, the number and characteristics of parameters to be estimated, as well as
the method to infer the underlying asset value process and default barrier, di¤er
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across models.
Duarte et al. (2005) and Yu (2006) solely rely on CreditGrades calibrated with
a 1000-day historical volatility. When based on a large divergence between mar-
kets, both nd that capital structure arbitrage is protable on average. At the
aggregate level, the strategy appears to o¤er attractive Sharpe ratios and a posi-
tive average return with positive skewness. Yet, individual positions can be very
risky and most losses occur when the arbitrageur shorts CDSs but subsequently
nd the market spread rapidly increasing and the equity hedge ine¤ective.
Due to the substantial di¤erences in model assumptions and calibration, the
key observed gap between the market and model spread fueling the arbitrageur
may be driven by model misspecication. Furthermore, key inputs may be mis-
measured sending the arbitrageur a false signal of relative mispricing. Hence,
there is a need to understand how the risk and return vary with model choice
and calibration. These caveats are unexplored in Duarte et al. (2005) and Yu
(2006).
We address these two problems facing the arbitrageur, and study how the
characteristics of capital structure arbitrage vary with model choice and asset
volatility calibration. For this purpose, we apply the CreditGrades model and
Leland & Toft (1996). As the volatility measure is a key input to the pricing
of credit, we identify relative value opportunities from a traditional 250-day his-
torical volatility used extensively in the bond pricing literature and a volatility
measure implied from equity options.
Based on anecdotal evidence using CreditGrades, Finger & Stamicar (2005a)
and Finger & Stamicar (2005b) show how model spreads based on historical
volatilities lag the market when spreads increase, while overpredicting the market
as spreads recover. However, the more responsive option-implied volatility sub-
stantially improves the pricing performance. Cremers et al. (2006) and Cao et al.
(2006) analyze the information content of equity options for corporate bond and
CDS pricing. They nd the forward-looking option-implied volatility to dominate
the historical measure in explaining credit spreads, and the gain is particularly
pronounced among rms with lower credit ratings. Only analyzing the determi-
nants of credit spreads, they are silent on the risk and return of capital structure
arbitrage.
As the arbitrageur feeds on large variations in credit and equity markets, these
insights suggest the implied volatility to lead to superior entry and exit decisions
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and trading returns. Furthermore, the gain from a more timely credit signal is
expected to be largest for the obligors of most interest to the arbitrageur, namely
those in the speculative grade segment.
Hence, we implement the strategy on 221 North American industrial obligors
in 2002 to 2004. Case studies illustrate that while model choice certainly mat-
ters in identifying relative value opportunities, the volatility input is of primary
importance. The historical volatility may severely lag the market, sending the
arbitrageur a false signal of relatively cheap protection in the aftermath of a cri-
sis. The result is large losses for the arbitrageur as market spreads continue to
tighten. Indeed, the implied volatility may result in the exact opposite positions,
with obvious consequences for the arbitrageur.
When studying the risk and return at an aggregate level, we focus on holding
period returns and a capital structure arbitrage index of monthly excess returns.
Both models generally result in insignicant excess returns, when calibrated with
a traditional volatility from historical equity returns. However, the gain from
identifying relative value opportunities from option-implied volatilities is sub-
stantial.
In a variant of the strategy based on CreditGrades, the mean holding period
return for speculative grade obligors increases from 2.64 percent to 4.61 percent
when implemented with option-implied volatilities. The similar numbers based
on Leland & Toft (1996) are 3.14 versus 5.47 percent. However, the incremental
return is much smaller for investment grade obligors.
Additionally, the corresponding excess returns are highly signicant when
option-implied volatilities are used to identify opportunities. Based on Credit-
Grades, the mean excess return is 0.44 percent on investment grade and 1.33
percent on speculative grade obligors, both highly signicant. The similar num-
bers when Leland & Toft (1996) is used to identify relative value opportunities
are 0.27 and 2.39 percent, both highly signicant. At a low threshold for strategy
initiation, the excess return may turn negative and signicant based on the his-
torical measure, while it continues to be positive and signicant based on implied
volatilities. Finally, we do not nd the excess returns to represent compensation
for exposure to systematic market factors.
However, irrespective of model choice and volatility calibration, the strategy is
very risky at the level of individual obligors. Convergence may never happen and
the equity hedge may be ine¤ective. This may force the arbitrageur to liquidate
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positions early and su¤er large losses.
We conclude that while model choice matters for the arbitrageur, it is second
to properly measured key inputs in the calibration. Hence, if the arbitrageur relies
on the dynamics of option prices when identifying relative value opportunities
across equity and credit markets, the result is a substantial aggregate gain in
trading returns above the benchmark application of capital structure arbitrage in
Duarte et al. (2005) and Yu (2006).
This paper is based on the premise that structural models price CDSs reason-
ably well. Ericsson et al. (2006) nd that Leland (1994), Leland & Toft (1996) and
Fan & Sundaresan (2000) underestimate bond spreads consistent with previous
studies. However, the models perform much better in predicting CDS spreads,
particularly Leland & Toft (1996). The resulting residual CDS spreads are found
to be uncorrelated with default proxies as well as non-default proxies. Further-
more, this paper is related to Schaefer & Strebulaev (2004), who show that struc-
tural models produce hedge ratios of equity to debt that cannot be rejected in
empirical tests.
Since the rationale for the strategy is to exploit a lack of integration between
various markets, capital structure arbitrage is also related to studies on the lead-
lag relationship among bond, equity and CDS markets like Hull, Predescu &
White (2004), Norden & Weber (2004), Longsta¤ et al. (2005) and Blanco et al.
(2005). While the CDS is found to lead the bond market, no denitive lead-lag
relationship exists between equity and CDS markets. Finally, Hogan, Jarrow,
Teo & Warachka (2004) study statistical arbitrages, while Mitchell & Pulvino
(2001) and Mitchell, Pulvino & Sta¤ord (2002) are important studies on merger
and equity arbitrage.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the trading strategy,
while the data is presented in section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents the underlying
models and calibration, and section 2.5 illustrates some case studies. Section 2.6
presents the aggregate results of the strategy, and section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Trading Strategy
This section describes the trading strategy underlying capital structure arbitrage.
The implementation closely follows Duarte et al. (2005) and Yu (2006), to whom
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we refer for a more elaborate description. Since a time-series of predicted CDS
spreads forms the basis of the strategy, we start with a short description of how
to price a CDS.
2.2.1 CDS Pricing
A CDS is an insurance contract against credit events such as the default on a
corporate bond (the reference obligation) by a specic issuer (reference entity).
In case of a credit event, the seller of insurance is obligated to buy the reference
obligation from the protection buyer at par.3 For this protection, the buyer pays a
periodic premium to the protection seller until the maturity of the contract or the
credit event, whichever comes rst. There is no requirement that the protection
buyer actually owns the reference obligation, in which case the CDS is used more
for speculation rather than protection. Since the accrued premium must also be
paid if a credit event occurs between two payment dates, the payments t nicely
into a continuous-time framework.
First, the present value of the premium payments from a contract initated at
time 0 with maturity date T can be calculated as
EQ

c(0; T )
Z T
0
exp

 
Z s
0
rudu

1f>sgds

, (2.1)
where c(0; T ) denotes the annual premium known as the CDS spread, r the risk-
free interest rate, and  the default time of the obligor. EQ denotes the expec-
tation under the risk-neutral pricing measure. Assuming independence between
the default time and the risk-free interest rate, this can be written as
c(0; T )
Z T
0
P (0; s)q0(s)ds, (2.2)
where P (0; s) is the price of a default-free zero-coupon bond with maturity s, and
q0(s) is the risk-neutral survival probability of the obligor, P ( > s), at t = 04.
3In practice, there may be cash settlement or physical settlement, as well as a possible
cheapest-to-deliver option embedded in the spread. However, we refrain from this complication.
Credit events can include bankruptcy, failure to pay or restructuring.
4Later, we focus on constant risk-free interest rates. This assumption allows us to concentrate
on the relationship between the equity price and the CDS spread. This is exactly the relationship
exploited in the relative value strategy.
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Second, the present value of the credit protection is equal to
EQ

(1 R) exp

 
Z 
0
rudu

1f<Tg

, (2.3)
where R is the recovery of bond market value measured as a percentage of par in
the event of default. Maintaining the assumption of independence between the
default time and the risk-free interest rate and assuming a constant R, this can
be written as
 (1 R)
Z T
0
P (0; s)q00(s)ds, (2.4)
where   q00(t) =  dq0(t)=dt is the probability density function of the default time.
The CDS spread is determined such that the value of the credit default swap is
zero at initiation
0 = c(0; T )
Z T
0
P (0; s)q0(s)ds+ (1 R)
Z T
0
P (0; s)q00(s)ds, (2.5)
and hence
c(0; T ) =  (1 R)
R T
0
P (0; s)q00(s)dsR T
0
P (0; s)q0(s)ds
. (2.6)
The preceding is the CDS spread on a newly minted contract. To calculate
daily returns to the arbitrageur on open trades, the relevant issue is the value of
the contract as market conditions change and the contract is subsequently held.
To someone who holds a long position from time 0 to t, this is equal to
(t; T ) = (c(t; T )  c(0; T ))
Z T
t
P (t; s)qt(s)ds, (2.7)
where c(t; T ) is the CDS spread on a contract initiated at t with maturity date
T . The value of the open CDS position (t; T ) can be interpreted as a survival-
contingent annuity maturing at date T , which depends on the term-structure
of survival probabilities qt(s) through s at time t. The survival probability qt(s)
depends on the market value of equity St through the underlying structural model,
and we follow Yu (2006) in dening the hedge ratio t as
t = N  @(t; T )
@St
, (2.8)
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where N is the number of shares outstanding.5 Hence, t is dened as the dollar-
amount of shares bought per dollar notional in the CDS. The choice of underlying
model-framework and calibration is discussed in section 2.4.
2.2.2 Implementation of the Strategy
Using the market value of equity, an associated volatility measure and the liability
structure of the obligor, the arbitrageur uses a structural model to gauge the
richness and cheapness of the CDS spread. Comparing the daily spread observed
in the market with the equity-implied spread from the model, the model helps
identify credits that either o¤er a discount against equities or trade at a very high
level.
If e.g. the market spread at a point in time has grown substantially larger
than the model spread, the arbitrageur sees an opportunity. It might be that
the credit market is gripped by fear and the equity market is more objective.
Alternatively, he might think that the equity market is slow to react and the
CDS spread is priced fairly. If the rst view is correct, he should sell protection
and if the second view is correct, he should sell equity. Either way, the arbitrageur
is counting on the normal relationship between the two markets to return. He
therefore takes on both short positions and prots if the spreads converge. In the
opposite case with a larger model spread, the arbitrageur buys protection and
equity.
This relative value strategy is supposed to be less risky than a naked position
in either market, but is of course far from a textbook denition of arbitrage.
Two important caveats to the strategy are positions initiated based on model
misspecication or mismeasured inputs. Such potential false signals of relative
mispricing are exactly what this paper addresses.
We conduct a simulated trading exercise based on this idea across all obligors.
Letting  be the trading trigger, c0t the CDS spread observed in the market at
date t and ct short-hand notation for the equity-implied model spread, we initiate
5This calculation deviates slightly from the one in Yu (2006), since we formulate all models
on a total value basis and not per share. Equation (2.8) follows from a simple application of
the chain rule.
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a trade each day if one of the following conditions are satised
c0t > (1 + ) ct or ct > (1 + ) c
0
t: (2.9)
In the rst case, a CDS with a notional of $1 and shares worth $   t  1 are
shorted.6 In the second case, the arbitrageur buys a CDS with a notional of $1
and buys shares worth $  t  1 as a hedge.
Since Yu (2006) nds his results insensitive to daily rebalancing of the equity
position, we follow his base case and adopt a static hedging scheme. The hedge
ratio in equation (2.8) is therefore xed throughout the trade and based on the
model CDS spread ct when entering the position.
Knowing when to enter positions, the arbitrageur must also decide when to
liquidate. We assume that exit occurs when the spreads converge dened as
ct = c
0
t or by the end of a pre-specied holding period, which ever comes rst. In
principle, the obligor can also default or be acquired by another company during
the holding period. Yu (2006) notes that in most cases the CDS market will
reect these events long before the actual occurrences, and the arbitrageur will
have ample time to make exit decisions.7 Specically, it is reasonable to assume
that the arbitrageur will be forced to close his positions once the liquidity dries
up in the underlying obligor. Such incidents are bound to impose losses on the
arbitrageur.
2.2.3 Trading returns
The calculation of trading returns is fundamental to analyze how the risk and
return di¤er across model assumptions and calibration methods. Since the CDS
position has a zero market value at initiation, trading returns must be calcu-
lated by assuming that the arbitrageur has a certain level of initial capital. This
assumption allows us to hold xed the e¤ects of leverage on the analysis. The
initial capital is used to nance the equity hedge, and is credited or deducted as
a result of intermediate payments such as dividends or CDS premia. Each trade
6t is, of course, negative.
7This argument seems to be supported in Arora, Bohn & Zhu (2005), who study the surprise
e¤ect of distress announcements. Conditional on market information, they nd only 11 percent
of the distressed rmsequities and 18 percent of the distressed bonds to respond signicantly.
The vast majority of prices are found to reect the credit deterioration well before the distress
announcement.
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is equipped with this initial capital and a limited liability assumption to ensure
well-dened returns. Hence, each trade can be thought of as an individual hedge
fund subject to a forced liquidation when the total value of the portfolio becomes
zero.8
Through the holding period the value of the equity position is straightforward,
but the value of the CDS position has to be calculated using equation (2.7) and
market CDS spreads c0(t; T ) and c0(0; T ). Since secondary market trading is very
limited in the CDS market and not covered by our dataset, we adopt the same
simplifying assumption as Yu (2006), and approximate c0 (t; T ) with c0 (t; t+ T ).
That is, we approximate a CDS contract maturing in four years and ten months,
say, with a freshly issued 5-year spread. This should not pose a problem since
the di¤erence between to points on the curve is likely to be much smaller than
the time-variation in spreads.
Yu (2006) nds his results insensitive to the exact size of transaction costs for
trading CDSs. We adopt his base case, and assume a 5 percent proportional bid-
ask spread on the CDS spread. The CDS market is likely to be the largest single
source of transaction costs for the arbitrageur. We therefore ignore transaction
costs on equities, which is reasonable under the static hedging scheme.
2.3 Data
Data on CDS spreads is provided by the ValuSpread database from Lombard
Risk Systems, dating back to July 1999. This data is also used by Lando &
Mortensen (2005) and Berndt, Jarrow & Kang (2006). The data consists of mid-
market CDS quotes on both sovereigns and corporates, with varying maturity,
restructuring clause, seniority and currency. For a given date, reference entity
and contract specication, the database reports a composite CDS quote together
with an intra-daily standard deviation of collected quotes. The composite quote
is calculated as a mid-market quote by obtaining quotes from up to 25 leading
market makers. This o¤ers a more reliable measure of the market spread than
using a single source, and the standard deviation measures how representative
the mid-market quote is for the overall market.
8This is reminiscent of potential large losses when marked to market, triggering margin calls
and forcing an early liquidation of positions.
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We conne ourselves to 5-year composite CDS quotes on senior unsecured debt
for North American corporate obligors with currencies denominated in US dollars.
Indeed, the 5-year maturity is the most liquid point on the credit curve (see e.g.
Blanco et al. (2005)). Regarding the specication of the credit event, we follow
Yu (2006) and large parts of the literature in using contracts with a modied
restructuring clause. The frequency of data on CDS quotes increases signicantly
through time, reecting the growth and improved liquidity in the market. To
generate a subsample of the data suitable for capital structure arbitrage, we
apply several lters.
First, we merge the CDS data with quarterly balance sheet data from Compu-
stat and daily stock market data from CRSP. The quarterly balance sheet data
is lagged one month from the end of the quarter to avoid the look-ahead bias
in using data not yet available in the market. We then exclude rms from the
nancial and utility sector.
Second, for each obligor in the sample, daily data on the 30-day at-the-money
put-implied volatility is obtained from OptionMetrics. OptionMetrics is a com-
prehensive database of daily information on exchange-listed equity options in the
U.S. since 1996. OptionMetrics generates the 30-day at-the-money put-implied
volatility by interpolation.
Third, in order to conduct the simulated trading exercise, a reasonably con-
tinuous time-series of CDS quotes must be available. In addition, the composite
quote must have a certain quality. Therefore, we dene the relative quote dis-
persion as the intra-daily standard deviation of collected quotes divided by the
mid-market quote. All daily mid-market quotes with an intra-daily quote dis-
persion of zero or above 40 percent are then deleted.9 For each obligor, we next
search for the longest string of more than 100 daily quotes no more than 14 cal-
ender days apart, which have all information available on balance sheet variables,
equity market and equity options data.10 As noted in Yu (2006), this should also
yield the most liquid part of coverage for the obligor, forcing the arbitrageur to
9One could argue for a cut-o¤ point at a lower relative dispersion, but on the other hand
a trader is likely to take advantage of high uncertainty in the market. The vast majority of
quotes have a relative dispersion below 20 percent.
10As discussed below, this may give rise to a survivorship issue. However, we try to minimize
this by requiring a string of only 100 spreads, far less than Yu (2006). In any case, this should
not pose a problem, since the focus of the paper is on relative risk and return across models
and calibration methods, and not absolute measures.
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close his positions once the liquidity vanishes.
Finally, the 5-year constant maturity treasury rate and the 3-month treasury
bill rate are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The 5-year
interest rate is used to calculate the equity-implied 5-year CDS spread, while
the 3-month interest rate is chosen when calculating daily excess returns from
the trading strategy11. Applying this ltration to the merged dataset results in
221 obligors with 65,476 daily composite quotes, dating back to July 2002 and
onwards to the end of September 2004.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the obligors across the senior un-
secured credit rating from Standard & Poors when entering the sample. The
variables presented are averages over time and then rms. The majority of rms
are BBB rated, and 16 rms are in the speculative grade segment, including
one non-rated obligor. A lower spread is associated with a lower leverage and
volatility, which is in line with predictions of structural credit risk models.
We implement the trading strategy using the implied volatility from equity
options (IV), and a 250-day volatility from a historical time-series of equity values
(HV). On average these volatilities are similar, but it turns out that the dynamics
of option prices provide the arbitrageur with superior information. The average
correlation between changes in the spread and the equity value is negative as
expected from a structural viewpoint, but fairly low. This is consistent with Yu
(2006) and correlations ranging from minus 5 to minus 15 percent quoted by
traders in Currie & Morris (2002). This indicates that the two markets may drift
apart and hold divergent views on obligors, which fuels the arbitrageur ex ante.
Ex post, it suggests that the equity hedge may be ine¤ective.
11This choice of short-term interest rate is consistent with Yu (2006). Changes in shorter
maturity rates are to a larger extend driven by idiosyncratic variation (see Dufee (1996)).
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Table 2.1: Sample Characteristics
This table reports sample characteristics for the 221 obligors. First, the average charac-
teristics are calculated for each obligor over time, then averaged across rms. The sta-
tistics are presented across the senior unsecured credit rating from Standard & Poors.
N is the number of obligors and spread is the 5-year composite CDS quote. While the
historical equity volatility HV is calculated from a 250-day rolling window of equity
returns, the implied equity volatility IV is inferred from 30-day at-the-money put op-
tions. The leverage ratio lev is total liabilities divided by the sum of total liabilities and
equity market capitalization, and size is the sum of total liabilities and equity market
capitalization in millions of dollars. Finally, corr is the correlation between changes in
the CDS spread and the equity value, averaged across ratings.
Rating N Spread HV IV Lev. Size Corr.
AAA 4 16 0.284 0.227 0.197 142,619 -0.107
AA 11 23 0.267 0.257 0.216 95,237 -0.050
A 80 40 0.305 0.293 0.354 40,274 -0.089
BBB 109 103 0.346 0.337 0.502 25,431 -0.124
BB 15 270 0.386 0.377 0.524 13,667 -0.056
B 1 355 0.554 0.555 0.564 34,173 -0.261
NR 1 172 0.229 0.219 0.450 11,766 -0.129
2.4 Model Choice and Volatility Calibration
Having the trading strategy and data explained, next we introduce the two un-
derlying models and the associated calibration. The formulas for each model
including the risk-neutral survival probability qt(s), the CDS spread c(0; T ), the
contract value (t; T ) and the equity delta (t; T ) are described in the appendix.
Further details on the models can be found in Finger (2002) and Leland & Toft
(1996).
2.4.1 CreditGrades
The CreditGrades model is jointly developed by RiskMetrics, JP Morgan, Gold-
man Sachs and Deutsche Bank with the purpose to establish a simple framework
linking credit and equity markets. As noted by Currie & Morris (2002) and Yu
(2006), this model has become an industry benchmark widely used by traders,
preferably calibrated with a rolling 1000-day historical volatility as advocated in
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Finger (2002). It loosely builds on Black & Cox (1976), with default dened as
the rst passage time of rm assets to an unobserved default barrier. Hence,
deviating from traditional structural models, it assumes that the default barrier
is an unknown constant drawn from a known distribution. This element of uncer-
tain recovery increases short-term spreads, but cannot do so consistently through
time.12
Originally, the model is built on a per-share basis taking into account preferred
shares and the di¤erences between short-term versus long-term and nancial ver-
sus non-nancial obligations, when calculating debt per share. Like Yu (2006),
we only work with total liabilities and common shares outstanding. Therefore,
we formulate the model based on total liabilities and market value of equity.
Under the risk-neutral measure, the rm assets V are assumed to follow
dVt = V VtdWt, (2.10)
where V is the asset volatility and Wt is a standard Brownian motion. The zero
drift is consistent with the observation of stationary leverage ratios in Collin-
Dufresne & Goldstein (2001). The default barrier is LD, where L is a random
recovery rate given default, and D denotes total liabilities. The recovery rate
L follows a lognormal distribution with mean L, interpreted as the mean global
recovery rate on all liabilities, and standard deviation . Then, R in equation
(2.6) is the recovery rate on the specic debt issue underlying the CDS.
Instead of working with a full formula for the value of equity S; CreditGrades
uses the linear approximation
V = S + LD, (2.11)
which also gives a relation between asset volatility V and equity volatility S
V = S
S
S + LD
: (2.12)
The model is easy to implement in practice. In particular, D is the total
liabilities from quarterly balance sheet data, S is the market value of equity
calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price,
12A theoretically more appealing approach is given by Du¢ e & Lando (2001).
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and r is the 5-year constant maturity treasury yield. Furthermore, the bond-
specic recovery rate R is assumed to be 0:5 and the standard deviation of the
global recovery rate  is 0:3. All parameters are motivated in Finger (2002) and
Yu (2006).
The volatility measure is a key input to the pricing of credit. Instead of
using a rolling 1000-day volatility S from historical equity values as Yu (2006),
we implement the strategy using a 250-day historical volatility and the implied
volatility from equity options. According to Cremers et al. (2006) and Cao et al.
(2006), the implied volatility contains important and timely information about
credit risk di¤erent from the historical measure. This may potentially lead the
arbitrageur to superior entry and exit decisions and trading returns. We expect
the gain to be mostly pronounced for the speculative grade sample, where obligors
typically experience large variations in spreads. Here, historical volatilities may
lag true market levels and send a false signal of mispricing to the arbitrageur.
Finally, we follow Yu (2006) in using the mean global recovery rate L to align
the model with the credit market before conducting the trading exercise. In
particular, we infer L by minimizing the sum of squared pricing errors using the
rst 10 CDS spreads in the sample for each rm. Now, all parameters are in place
to calculate the time-series of CDS spreads underlying the analysis, together with
hedge ratios and values of open CDS positions.
2.4.2 Leland & Toft (1996)
This model assumes that the decision to default is made by a manager, who acts
to maximize the value of equity. At each moment, the manager must address
the question if meeting promised debt service payments is optimal for the eq-
uityholders, thereby keeping their call option alive. If the asset value exceeds
the endogenously derived default barrier VB, the rm will optimally continue to
service the debt - even if the asset value is below the principal value or if cash
ow available for payout is insu¢ cient to nance the net debt service, requiring
additional equity contributions.
In particular, rm assets V are assumed to follow a geometric Brownian mo-
tion under the risk-neutral measure
dVt = (r   )Vtdt+ V VtdWt, (2.13)
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where r is the constant risk-free interest rate,  is the fraction of asset value paid
out to security holders, V is the asset volatility and Wt is a standard Brown-
ian motion. Debt of constant maturity  is continuously rolled over, implying
that at any time s the total outstanding debt principal P will have a uniform
distribution over maturities in the interval (s; s+). Each debt contract in the
multi-layered structure is serviced by a continuous coupon. The resulting total
coupon payments C are tax deductible at a rate  , and the realized costs of nan-
cial distress amount to a fraction  of the value of assets in default VB. Rolling
over nite maturity debt in the way prescribed implies a stationary capital struc-
ture, where the total outstanding principal P , total coupon C, average maturity

2
and default barrier VB remain constant through time.
To determine the total value of the levered rm v(Vt), the model follows Leland
(1994) in valuing bankruptcy costs BC(Vt) and tax benets resulting from debt
issuance TB(Vt) as time-independent securities. It follows, that
(Vt) = Vt + TB(Vt) BC(Vt) (2.14)
= S(Vt) +D(Vt),
where S(Vt) is the market value of equity and D(Vt) the market value of total
debt.
To implement the model, we follow Ericsson et al. (2006) in setting the realized
bankruptcy cost fraction  = 0:15, the tax rate  = 0:20 and the average debt
maturity 
2
= 3:38.13 Furthermore, as above, P is the total liabilities from
quarterly balance sheet data, S is the market value of equity and r is the 5-year
constant maturity treasury yield. We also follow Ericsson et al. (2006) in assuming
that the average coupon paid out to all debtholders equals the risk-free interest
rate, C = rP .14 The asset payout rate  is calculated as a time-series mean of
the weighted average historical dividend yield and relative interest expense from
13The choice of 15 percent bankruptcy costs lies well within the range estimated by Andrade
& Kaplan (1998). 20 percent as an e¤ective tax rate is below the corporate tax rate to reect
the personal tax rate advantage of equity returns. Stohs & Mauer (1996) nd an average debt
maturity of 3.38 years using a panel of 328 industrial rms with detailed debt information in
Moodys Industrial Manuals in 1980-1989.
14A rms debt consists of more than market bonds, and usually a substantial fraction of total
debt is non-interest bearing such as accrued taxes and supplier credits. Furthermore, corporate
bonds may be issued below par, which also opens up for this approximation.
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balance sheet data
 =

Interest expenses
Total liabilities

 L + (Dividend yield) (1  L) (2.15)
L =
Total liabilities
Total liabilities+Market equity
.
Contrary to CreditGrades, the default barrier VB is endogenously determined
and varies with fundamental characteristics of the rm such as leverage, asset
volatility, debt maturity and asset payout rates. Due to the full-blown relation-
ship between equity and assets, the estimation of the asset value V and asset
volatility V is a more troublesome exercise in Leland & Toft (1996). Hence,
when analyzing the trading strategy with a 250-day historical volatility, we use
the iterative algorithm of Moodys KMV outlined in Crosbie & Bohn (2003) and
Vassalou & Xing (2004) to infer the unobserved time-series of asset values and
asset volatility. This iterative algorithm is preferable over an instantaneous re-
lationship between asset volatility V and equity volatility S, governed by Itos
lemma. The latter underlies the implementation of CreditGrades in equation
(2.12), and is used in Jones et al. (1984). As noted in Lando (2004), the iterative
algorithm is particularly preferable when changes in leverage are signicant over
the estimation period.
In short, the iterative scheme goes as follows. The value of equity St is a func-
tion of the asset value Vt, asset volatility V and a set of parameters  in equation
(2.31), i.e. St = f(Vt; V ; ). We use a 250-day window of historical equity values
to obtain an estimate of the equity volatility S, by viewing the value of equity as
a geometric Brownian motion. Given this initial estimate of the asset volatility
V and quarterly balance sheet data, we calculate the value of the default barrier.
Using the daily market values of equity and the equity pricing formula we then
back out an implied time-series of asset values Vt(V ) = f 1(St; V ; ). Next, the
daily asset values allow us to obtain an improved estimate of the asset volatility
V , which is used in the next iteration. This procedure is repeated until the
values of V converge.
When analyzing the trading exercise based on implied volatilities from equity
options, we do not face the problem of changing leverage in a historical estimation
75
window. Therefore, we solve the instantaneous relationship given by
St = f(Vt; V ; ) (2.16)
S =
@St
@Vt
V
Vt
St
(2.17)
numerically for the unknown asset value Vt and asset volatility V .
Before conducting the trading exercise, we now use the bond-specic recovery
rate R to align the model with the market spreads. This is possible since the
default barrier is endogenously determined. For this purpose, again we use the
rst 10 CDS spreads in the sample for each rm. As noted in Yu (2006), the
bond-specic recovery rate is also the free parameter used in practice by traders
to t the level of market spreads.
2.4.3 Model Calibration and Implied Parameters
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of implied parameters from Credit-
Grades and Leland & Toft (1996) using a rolling 250-day historical volatility
(HV) and implied volatility (IV). The table also shows average calibration tar-
gets from the equity and equity options market together with asset payout rates.
In CreditGrades implemented with a historical volatility in Panel A, the average
market value of assets V is $20,592 million with a median of $14,839 million,
while the average and median expected default barrier LD are $8,556 million and
$3,846 million, respectively. The mean asset volatility V is 22.8 percent with a
median of 21.3 percent. Finally, the average and median mean global recovery
rate L are 0.799 and 0.573, respectively. Similar implied parameters result on
aggregate when implemented with the implied volatility in Panel B.
When implementing Leland & Toft (1996) in Panel C and D, several di¤er-
ences from CreditGrades are apparent. First, the asset values appear larger and
asset volatilities lower. This is due to the observation that the relatively high
endogenous default barrier VB increases the theoretical equity volatility, ceteris
paribus. Hence, the model implies a higher asset value and/or lower asset volatil-
ity in order to match the theoretical and observed equity volatility.
Second, the variation in implied bond recovery R across the two volatility
measures is large. Based on the historical volatility, both the average and median
implied bond recovery are highly negative, indicating that the model underesti-
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mates the level of market spreads in the beginning of the sample period.15 Implied
recoveries are more plausible when inferred from option-implied volatilities. Al-
though the mean continues to be negative, the median is now 0.233. This is
indicative of an implied volatility that varies stronger with changes in the CDS
spread. Indeed, calculating the mean correlation between changes in CDS spreads
and changes in volatility measures, the correlation is 1.8 and 9.9 percent based
on historical and implied volatilities, respectively.
The variation in implied mean global recovery L in CreditGrades is much
smaller across volatility measures. This is a manifestation of the di¤erence in
information used at various stages, when calibrating the two models. In Cred-
itGrades the expected default barrier is exogenous, while it is endogenously de-
termined in Leland & Toft (1996). As a result of the linear approximation in
equation (2.11), asset values, the asset volatility and the expected default barrier
are not nailed down and determined in CreditGrades until the mean global re-
covery rate is inferred from the initial CDS spreads. Subsequent to nailing down
this key parameter, there is a one-to-one relationship between changes in equity
and assets, @S
@V
= 1.
The default mechanism in Leland & Toft (1996) implies a di¤erent use of mar-
ket data. Here, the asset value and asset volatility are solely determined from
the equity and equity options market. Together with the endogenous default bar-
rier, this gives far less exibility when tting the nal bond recovery from initial
CDS spreads. The result is more extreme values for this parameter.16 However,
the subsequent relationship and wedge between equity and assets vary with the
distance to default. When close to default, @S
@V
is very steep and below one. Al-
though delta may go above one as the credit quality improves, the relationship
approaches one-to-one when far from default. Hence, the variation in asset dy-
namics across the two models may be substantial for speculative grade obligors,
with direct consequences for the arbitrageur.
15This should not be a problem for the current trading strategy, since subsequent movements
in relative prices across equity and credit markets drive the arbitrageur, not absolute levels.
The most extreme bond recovery of -1,858 results from an underestimation of only 50 bps. In
this case, the market spread is close to 50 bps, while the model spread with a reasonable bond
recovery is close to zero.
16If CreditGrades is implemented with a mean global recovery of 0.5 as suggested in Finger
(2002), we qualitatively get the same results for the implied bond recovery as in Leland & Toft
(1996).
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Implied Parameters
This table reports the central implied parameters from CreditGrades and Leland &
Toft (1996), calibrated with a historical volatility HV and option-implied volatility
IV . While the rst measure is calculated from a 250-day rolling window of equity
returns, the latter is implied from 30-day at-the-money put options. The descriptive
statistics for the payout rate, global recovery and bond recovery are calculated across
obligors. The remaining variables are rst averaged over time, before the statistics
are calculated across obligors. The equity value, asset value and default barrier are
measured in millions of dollars. The upper three rows report the summary statistics
of calibration targets from the equity and equity options market. The global recovery
rate is the mean global recovery on all liabilities of the rm, while the bond recovery
is the recovery rate on the specic debt issue underlying the CDS. Finally, the payout
rate is calculated from historical dividend yields and relative interest expenses.
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Equity value 20,592 9,479 33,425 919 238,995
HV 0.329 0.313 0.106 0.175 0.989
IV 0.318 0.302 0.090 0.135 0.717
Panel A. CreditGrades HV
Asset value 29,895 14,839 46,655 1,360 337,381
Asset vol. 0.228 0.213 0.085 0.084 0.583
Default barrier 8,556 3,846 15,892 59 154,585
Global rec. 0.799 0.573 0.772 0.009 6.025
Panel B. CreditGrades IV
Asset value 26,189 12,914 40,418 1111 294,685
Asset vol. 0.232 0.227 0.079 0.0843 0.552
Default barrier 4,901 2,199 9,071 14 93,838
Global rec. 0.549 0.285 0.719 0.0097 5.715
Panel C. Leland & Toft HV
Asset value 34,837 18,100 53,727 2,008 417,807
Asset vol. 0.179 0.167 0.073 0.0382 0.446
Default barrier 12,445 5,939 32,871 591 374,849
Bond rec. -17.410 -0.443 129.611 -1,858 0.919
Payout rate 0.020 0.020 0.011 0 0.059
Panel D. Leland & Toft IV
Asset value 34,502 17,897 52,035 1972 373,672
Asset vol. 0.167 0.156 0.069 0.0077 0.413
Default barrier 12,762 6,105 33,360 593 364,376
Bond rec. -3.554 0.233 18.256 -222.69 0.835
Payout rate 0.020 0.020 0.011 0 0.059
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From the discussion in section 2.2, the chosen structural model plays a central
role in all parts of capital structure arbitrage. In particular, the model underlies
the term-structure of survival probabilities, equity-implied CDS spreads, hedge
ratios, the valuation of open CDS positions and trading returns. As shown above,
assumptions behind CreditGrades and Leland & Toft (1996), as well as practi-
cal implementation, vary substantially. How these di¤erences in model choice
and calibration manifest in protability and strategy execution is analyzed next.
Before turning to the general results across all obligors, some case studies are
analyzed.
2.5 Case Studies
In this section, the two models calibrated with historical and option-implied
volatilities are used to identify divergent views in equity and credit markets.
The case studies illustrate that while model choice certainly matters in identify-
ing relative value opportunities, the volatility input is of primary importance. In
fact, the two volatility measures may result in opposite positions, with obvious
consequences for the arbitrageur. The nal study illustrates that the strategy is
very risky at the level of individual obligors.
2.5.1 Sears, Roebuck and Company
Figure 2.1 illustrates the fundamentals of capital structure arbitrage for the large
retailer Sears, Roebuck and Company rated A by S&P and Baa1 by Moodys.
Panel A and B depict the equity-implied model spreads and CDS spreads observed
in the market from September 2002 to June 2004 (excluding the initial 10 spreads
reserved for calibration), while Panel C and D depict equity volatilities and the
market value of equity, respectively.
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Figure 2.1: Sears, Roebuck and Company
This gure illustrates the fundamentals behind capial structure arbitrage. In panel A,
we depict market CDS spreads together with model spreads in Leland & Toft (1996)
LT inferred from historical HV and option-implied volatilities IV . In panel B, the
corresponding spreads are depicted based on CreditGrades CG. Panel C depicts the
historical and option-implied volatility, where the rst is calculated from a rolling
250-day window of equity returns and the latter is inferred from 30-day at-the-money
puts. Finally, panel D illustrates the total market value of equity in millions of dollars.
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The uncertainty in the markets increases substantially in the beginning of the
period. Moodys changes their rating outlook to negative on October 18, 2002 due
to increasing uncertainty in the credit card business and management changes.
In this period equity prices tumble and CDS spreads reach 379 bps on October
24, 2002, a doubling in 2 weeks. While the markets begin to recover shortly
thereafter, model spreads based on the sticky historical volatility continue far
into 2003 to suggest the arbitrageur to buy protection and buy equity as a hedge.
However, with only few exceptions the market spreads tighten in the succeeding
period, and the market and model spreads never converge. Depending on the
size of the trading trigger and the chosen model, many losing CDS positions are
initiated although partially o¤set by an increasing equity price.
Panel C illustrates how the historical volatility severely lags the more timely
implied volatility, sending the arbitrageur a false signal of relatively cheap pro-
tection in the aftermath of the crisis. In fact, spreads inferred from implied
volatilities quickly tighten and may initiate the exact opposite strategy. Using
this volatility, spreads in Leland & Toft (1996) indicate that protection is trading
too expensive relative to equity from the end of 2002. Indeed, selling protec-
tion and selling equity as hedge result in trading returns of 5 to 15 percent on
each daily position due to tightening market spreads and convergence on June
5, 2003. Subsequent to convergence, implied volatilities suggest the equity and
credit markets to move in tandem and hold similar views on the credit outlooks.
As a nal observation, model spreads in CreditGrades react stronger to changes
in volatility than Leland & Toft (1996), widening to over 1,000 bps as the im-
plied volatility from equity options peaks. This may be due to the endogenous
default barrier in the latter model. Indeed, increasing the asset volatility causes
equityholders to optimally default later in Leland & Toft (1996). This mitigates
the e¤ect on the spread.
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2.5.2 Time Warner and Motorola
Simulating the trading strategy on Time Warner and Motorola supports the for-
mer insights. Figure 2.2 depicts the fundamentals behind Time Warner, rated
BBB by S&P and Baa1 by Moodys. In August 2002 just prior to the beginning
of the sample, Moodys changes their outlook to negative as the SEC investigates
the accounting practices and internal controls. As markets recover in late 2002,
CreditGrades with historical volatility indicates that protection is cheap relative
to equity, while spreads in Leland & Toft (1996) are more neutral. Although eq-
uity prices increase throughout 2003, many losing trades are initiated as market
spreads are more than cut by half within few months and Moodys changes their
outlook back to stable.
Again, the historical volatility lags the market following the episode, while
the implied volatility is more responsive. In October and November 2002, where
market spreads have already tightened substantially, model spreads inferred from
implied volatilities suggest that protection is expensive relative to equity and
should tighten further. Selling protection at 339 bps and equity at $14.75 on
October 31, 2002 result in convergence and 15 percent returns on December
12, where the CDS and equity are trading at 259 bps and $13.56, respectively.
However, spreads inferred from implied volatilities are volatile, resulting in rather
noisy estimates of credit outlooks and a frequent liquidation of positions as market
spreads tighten. Operating with a very low trigger may reverse positions several
times during this period, while a trigger of 0.5 results in only few positions.
In Figure 2.3, the key variables for Motorola rated BBB by S&P are depicted.
Building on historical volatilities the arbitrageur initiates many trades and su¤ers
losses, while implied volatilities suggest the two markets to move in tandem and
hold similar views on the obligor. In the latter case, only few relative value
opportunities are apparent.
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Figure 2.2: Time Warner
This gure illustrates the fundamentals behind capial structure arbitrage. In panel A,
we depict market CDS spreads together with model spreads in Leland & Toft (1996)
LT inferred from historical HV and option-implied volatilities IV . In panel B, the
corresponding spreads are depicted based on CreditGrades CG. Panel C depicts the
historical and option-implied volatility, where the rst is calculated from a rolling 250-
day window of equity returns and the latter is inferred from 30-day at-the-money puts.
Finally, panel D illustrates the total market value of equity in millions of dollars.
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Figure 2.3: Motorola
This gure illustrates the fundamentals behind capial structure arbitrage. In panel A,
we depict market CDS spreads together with model spreads in Leland & Toft (1996)
LT inferred from historical HV and option-implied volatilities IV . In panel B, the
corresponding spreads are depicted based on CreditGrades CG. Panel C depicts the
historical and option-implied volatility, where the rst is calculated from a rolling 250-
day window of equity returns and the latter is inferred from 30-day at-the-money puts.
Finally, panel D illustrates the total market value of equity in millions of dollars.
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2.5.3 Mandalay Resort Group
Capital structure arbitrage is very risky when based on individual obligors, and
the arbitrageur may end up in severe problems irrespective of model choice and
calibration. Figure 2.4 presents the fundamental variables behind Mandalay Re-
sort Group, rated BB by S&P. Throughout the coverage, spreads in Leland & Toft
(1996) based on historical volatilities diverge from market spreads in a smooth
manner, while spreads in CreditGrades diverge more slowly. In both cases the
arbitrageur sells protection and equity as hedge, but su¤ers losses as positions
are liquidated after the maximum holding period.
Based on implied volatilities, May and June 2004 are particularly painful as
model spreads plunge and stay tight throughout the coverage. On June 4, 2004
the competitor MGMMirage announces a bid to acquire Mandalay Resort Group
for $68 per share plus assumption of Mandalays existing debt. Moodys places
the rating on review for a possible downgrade due to a high level of uncertainty
regarding the level of debt employed to nance the takeover. As a result, the
equity price increases from $54 to $69 over a short period, the implied volatility
plunges and the CDS spread widens from 188 bps to 227 bps.17 On June 15, 2004
a revised o¤er of $71 per share is approved, and the transaction is completed on
April 26, 2005.
This opposite reaction in equity and credit gives the arbitrageur short in both
markets a painful one-two punch similar to the one experienced by hedge funds
in May 2005, where General Motors is downgraded while the equity price soars.18
Luckily, not many trades are open during the takeover bid as model and market
spreads recently converged. However, the short positions initiated in May 2004,
where credit seems expensive relative to equity, su¤er large losses on both legs.
17Implied volatilities from at-the-money calls plunge as well.
18This case study is discussed in Duarte et al. (2005).
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Figure 2.4: Mandalay Resort Group
This gure illustrates the fundamentals behind capial structure arbitrage. In panel A,
we depict market CDS spreads together with model spreads in Leland & Toft (1996)
LT inferred from historical HV and option-implied volatilities IV . In panel B, the
corresponding spreads are depicted based on CreditGrades CG. Panel C depicts the
historical and option-implied volatility, where the rst is calculated from a rolling 250-
day window of equity returns and the latter is inferred from 30-day at-the-money puts.
Finally, panel D illustrates the total market value of equity in millions of dollars.
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2.6 General Results
In this section, we simulate the trading strategy for all 221 obligors. Following
Yu (2006), we assume an initial capital of $0.5 for each trade and $1 notional in
the CDS. The strategy is implemented for trading triggers  of 0.5 and 2, and
maximum holding periods of 30 and 180 days.
Naturally, absolute trading returns will vary with the above characteristics, as
well as the particular period studied and how to account for vanishing liquidity.
However, these characteristics are all xed when studying the relative risk and
return across models and calibration methods. Therefore, a scaling of returns with
the amount of initial capital is unlikely to inuence our conclusions.19 Indeed,
although based on a di¤erent dataset, the benchmark results for CreditGrades
with a historical volatility are similar to the ndings in Yu (2006).
Table 2.3 and 2.4 present the summary statistics of holding period returns
based on CreditGrades and Leland & Toft (1996), respectively. A longer maxi-
mum holding period leads to more converging trades, fewer trades with negative
returns and higher average returns. This fundamental result underlies both mod-
els and volatility measures. Consistent with Yu (2006), although the distribution
of returns becomes less dispersed, a higher trading trigger does not necessarily
lead to higher mean returns.
When identifying relative value opportunities from implied not historical volatil-
ities, the number of initiated trades rises for investment grade obligors and falls
for speculative grade obligors. This results from both models, although the ab-
solute number of trades is larger in Leland & Toft (1996). This is consistent with
ndings in Finger & Stamicar (2005a) and Cao et al. (2006), where the advantage
of implied volatility in tracking market spreads with CreditGrades is concentrated
among speculative grade obligors. We nd this measure to identify fewer relative
value opportunities on obligors with larger variations in spreads.
The results clearly show a di¤erence in risk and return across models and
volatility input. Identifying relative value opportunities on speculative grade
19Yu (2006) also conducts his analysis with an initial capital of $0.1. The resulting returns
are scaled up accordingly. Unreported results with this initial capital and other trading triggers
leave our conclusions unchanged.
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obligors in CreditGrades with a historical volatility, a maximum holding period
of 180 days and a trading trigger of 2 yields a mean holding period return of 2.64
percent. However, simulating the trading strategy with option-implied volatilities
increases the return to 4.61 percent.20 The corresponding numbers based on
Leland & Toft (1996) are 3.14 and 5.47 percent. The gain from implied volatilities
across trading triggers and maximum holding periods is also apparent from the
number of trades ending in convergence and the fraction of trades with negative
returns. However, the incremental return is much smaller for investment grade
obligors.
On top of this, the mean holding period return and dispersion are both higher
on speculative grade obligors compared to the investment grade sample. This
supports the similar result in Yu (2006) and happens irrespective of model choice
and volatility measure. Although more likely to su¤er from vanishing liquidity
and default, this supports his observation that the aggregate success of the strat-
egy depends on the availability of large variations in spreads. For such obligors,
the more timely implied volatility results in incremental trading returns from
superior entry and exit decisions.
The holding period returns are more favorable when Leland & Toft (1996) is
used to identify relative value opportunities. However, in practice it is hard to
discern exactly where the di¤erence arises, as the models di¤er in many respects
and enter in all parts of the strategy. While model choice does matter, it seems
second to properly measured key inputs.
20While the average protability increases when identifying relative value opportunities from
implied volatilities, so does the volatility of returns. As the mean holding period return consists
of many overlapping holding periods, the statistical signicance of trading returns is analyzed
from a return index below.
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2.6.1 Capital Structure Arbitrage Index Returns
As illustrated in the previous sections, capital structure arbitrage is very risky at
the level of individual trades. The hedge may be ine¤ective and the markets may
continue to diverge, resulting in losses and potential early liquidations. However,
when initiated on the cross-section of obligors, the strategy may be protable
on average depending on the particular implementation. Having established this
nding, the next step is to understand the sources of the prots, i.e. whether the
returns are correlated with priced systematic risk factors. Hence, we construct a
monthly capital structure arbitrage excess return index from all individual trades,
following Duarte et al. (2005) and Yu (2006).
Specically, we compute daily excess returns for all individual trades over
the entire holding period. On a given day, thousands of trades may be open. By
essentially assuming that the arbitrageur is always invested in an equally-weighted
portfolio of hedge funds, where each fund consists of one trade, we calculate an
equally-weighted average of the excess returns on a daily basis. These average
daily excess returns are then compounded into a monthly frequency.
Table 2.5 presents the summary statistics of monthly excess returns based
on a maximum holding period of 180 days, covering 24 months in 2002-2004.
However, some strategies result in months with no trades. In this case, a zero
excess return is assumed.
Again, although also present in the investment grade segment, the benet of
option-implied volatilities is concentrated among speculative grade obligors. Ad-
ditionally, timely inputs are relatively more important than the exact structural
model underlying the strategy. In particular, when based on CreditGrades with
option-implied volatilities and a trading trigger of 2, the mean excess return is
0.44 percent on investment grade and 1.33 percent on speculative grade obligors.
These numbers are highly signicant after correcting for serial correlation. The
corresponding numbers when Leland & Toft (1996) is used to identify relative
value opportunities are 0.27 and 2.39 percent, respectively, both highly signi-
cant.
The excess returns resulting from a historical volatility are much smaller and
most often insignicant. Indeed, the mean excess return from this measure may
turn negative and signicant at a lower trading trigger of 0.5, while it continues
to be positive and signicant based on implied volatilities.
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Addressing whether xed income arbitrage is comparable to picking up nickels
in front of a steamroller, Duarte et al. (2005) nd that most of the strategies
result in monthly excess returns that are positively skewed. While our results
are mixed when relative value positions are identied from historical volatilities,
the skewness is always positive when based on the implied measure. Thus, while
producing large negative returns from time to time, this strategy tends to generate
even larger o¤setting positive returns.
As a nal exercise, in Table 2.6, we explore whether the excess returns rep-
resent compensation for exposure to systematic market factors.21 In particular,
we use the excess return on the S&P Industrial Index (S&PINDS) to proxy for
equity market risk. To proxy for investment grade and speculative grade bond
market risk, the excess returns on the Lehman Brothers Baa and Ba Intermediate
Index (LHIBAAI) and (LHHYBBI) are used. These variables are obtained from
Datastream. As argued by Duarte et al. (2005), such market factors are also
likely to be sensitive to major nancial events such as a sudden ight-to-quality
or ight-to-liquidity. As this risk would be compensated in the excess returns
from these portfolios, we may be able to control for the component of returns
that is compensation for bearing the risk of major, but not yet realized, nancial
events.
As the CDS market was rather illiquid before mid-2002, the regressions consist
of no more than 24 monthly excess returns. Hence, the results must be interpreted
with caution. Yu (2006) nds no relationship between capital structure arbitrage
monthly excess returns and any of the factors, and the factors cannot bid away
the alphas (regression intercepts) of the strategy. Our R2 ranges from 8 to 35
percent, but the market factors are either insignicant or only weakly signicant.
Surprisingly, the occasional weak signicance is not related to the size and sig-
nicance of excess returns, nor rating category. Hence, the evidence does not
indicate that the excess returns represent compensation for exposure to factors
proxying equity and bond market risk.
As we only have 24 monthly excess returns, there is little chance of detecting
signicant alphas after controlling for the market risk. However, the structure
of excess returns after a risk-adjustment is similar to the structure of raw excess
returns in Table 2.5. Indeed, the largest di¤erence in alphas across the historical
21For brevity, only regressions with a trading trigger of 2 are reported. Similar results are
obtained at a lower threshold of 0.5.
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and option-implied volatility is in the speculative grade segment. While three of
four intercepts are negative based on the investment grade obligors, it is always
positive on speculative grade obligors.
Table 2.6: Regression Results
This table reports the results from regressing capital structure arbitrage monthly per-
centage excess returns on the excess returns of equity and bond market portfolios. The
models underlying the strategy are CreditGrades CG and Leland & Toft (1996) LT ,
calibrated with a historical HV and option-implied volatility IV . The strategy is im-
plemented separately on investment grade and speculative grade obligors. S&PINDS
is the excess return on the S&P Industrial Index. LHIBAAI and LHHY BBI are the
excess returns on the Lehman Brothers Baa and Ba Intermediate Index, respectively.
The coverage is 24 months beginning October 2002 and ending September 2004. Stan-
dard errors are shown in parantheses, and ***, ** and * denote signicance at 1, 5 and
10 percent, respectively.
Strategy Intercept S&PINDS LHIBAAI LHHYBBI R2
CG HV Inv -0.57* 0.09 7.29 -14.40* 0.21
(0.28) (2.27) (7.06) (7.80)
CG HV Spec 1.96 -2.61 -53.73 77.25* 0.17
(1.48) (12.02) (37.30) (41.19)
CG IV Inv -0.15 6.13 -26.18** 12.77 0.35
(0.49) (3.96) (12.29) (13.58)
CG IV Spec 3.76 9.11 -45.06 81.11 0.16
(2.21) (18.00) (55.87) (61.70)
LT HV Inv -0.59** 1.51 -1.86 -8.44 0.32
(0.21) (1.74) (5.41) (5.98)
LT HV Spec 1.76 33.36 39.03 -40.44 0.08
(3.18) (25.91) (80.41) (88.80)
LT IV Inv 0.27 2.34 -13.22* 12.13* 0.32
(0.24) (1.98) (6.78) (6.14)
LT IV Spec 7.04*** -22.35 -21.91 121.69* 0.30
(2.22) (18.04) (55.98) (61.82)
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of the risk and return of capital
structure arbitrage using alternative structural credit risk models and volatility
measures. Studying 221 North American industrial obligors in 2002 to 2004,
a divergence between equity and credit markets initiates a convergence-based
market-neutral trading strategy. However, an observed di¤erence in market and
equity-implied model CDS spread may be driven by model misspecication and
key inputs may be mismeasured, sending a false signal of mispricing in the market.
These caveats constitute the focal point in the study.
As the arbitrageur feeds on large variations in equity and credit markets and
the asset volatility is a key input to the pricing of credit, a timely volatility
measure is desirable. In such markets, the historical volatility may severely lag
the market, suggesting the arbitrageur to enter into unfortunate positions and
face large losses.
Using an option-implied volatility results in superior strategy execution and
may initiate the opposite positions of the historical measure. The result is more
positions ending in convergence, more positions with positive holding-period re-
turns and highly signicant excess returns. The gain in returns is largest for the
speculative grade obligors, and cannot be explained by well-known equity and
bond market factors. At a low threshold for strategy initiation, the excess re-
turn may turn negative and signicant based on the historical measure, while it
continues to be positive and signicant based on implied volatilities.
Duarte et al. (2005) and Yu (2006) conduct the rst analysis of the strategy by
implementing the industry benchmark CreditGrades with a historical volatility, as
reputed used by most professionals. CreditGrades and the Leland & Toft (1996)
model di¤er extensively in assumptions governing default and calibration method.
However, while model choice certainly matters, the exact model underlying the
strategy is of secondary importance.
While protable on an aggregate level, individual trades can be very risky.
Irrespective of model choice and volatility measure, the market and equity-implied
model spread may continue to drift apart, and the equity hedge may be ine¤ective.
This may force the arbitrageur to liquidate individual positions early, and su¤er
large losses.
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A structural model allows for numerous implementations of capital structure
arbitrage, as it links rm fundamentals with equities, equity options, corporate
bonds and credit derivatives. As we often nd the hedge in cash equities ine¤ec-
tive, a further improvement may lie in o¤setting positions in equity options such
as out-of-the-money puts. This non-linear product may also reduce the gamma
risk of the strategy, which can cause losses in a fast moving market. As CDS
data continues to expand, future research will shed light on many unexplored
properties of relative value trading across equity and credit markets.
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A Appendix
The appendix contains formulas for the risk-neutral survival probability qt(s),
the CDS spread c(0; T ), the contract value (t; T ) and the equity delta t. Both
models assume constant default-free interest rates, which allow us to concentrate
on the relationship between the equity price and CDS spread, also exploited in
the relative value strategy.
A.1 CreditGrades
The default barrier is given by
LD = LDeZ 
2=2, (2.18)
where L is the random recovery rate given default, L = E (L), Z is a standard
normal random variable and 2 = V ar (lnL). Finger (2002) provides an approx-
imate solution to the survival probability using a time-shifted Brownian motion,
which yields the following result22
q(t) = 

 At
2
+
ln d
At

  d  

 At
2
  ln d
At

, (2.19)
where  () is the cumulative normal distribution function and
d =
V0
LD
e
2
, (2.20)
A2t = 
2
V t+ 
2. (2.21)
The CDS Spread and Hedge Ratio
Assuming constant interest rates, the CDS spread for maturity T is found by
inserting the survival probability (2.19) in equation (2.6), yielding
c(0; T ) = r(1 R) 1  q (0) +H(T )
q (0)  q (T ) e rT  H (T ) , (2.22)
22In essence, the uncertainty in the default barrier is shifted to the starting value of the
Brownian motion. In particular, the approximation assumes that Wt starts at an earlier time
than t = 0: As a result, the default probability is non-zero for even very small t, including t = 0.
In other models such as Leland & Toft (1996), the survival probability q (0) = 1.
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where
H (T ) = er (G (T + ) G ()) , (2.23)
G (T ) = dz+1=2

  ln d
V
p
T
  zV
p
T

+d z+1=2

ln d
V
p
T
+ zV
p
T

, (2.24)
 =
2
2V
, (2.25)
z =
s
1
4
+
2r
2V
, (2.26)
and G(T ) is given in Reiner & Rubinstein (1991).
When determining the hedge ratio, we follow Yu (2006) and approximate the
contract value in equation (2.7) by
(0; T ) = (c (0; T )  c)
Z T
0
e rsq (s) ds (2.27)
=
c (0; T )  c
r
 
q (0)  q (T ) e rT  H (T ) ,
where c (0; T ) is a function of the value of equity S in equation (2.22), and c is
the CDS spread at initiation.23
Using equation (2.8) and the product rule, the hedge ratio is found as
0 = N  d (0; T )
dS
=
N
r
@c (0; T )
@S
 
q (0)  q (T ) e rT  H (T ) , (2.28)
where N denotes the number of shares outstanding. The second term in the
product rule is zero, since by denition c is numerically equal to c (0; T ), evaluated
at the equity value S. Finally, @c(0;T )
@S
is found numerically.
23Yu (2006) interprets this equation in his appendix. Equation (2.27) represents the value of
a contract entered into one instant ago at spread c, that now has a quoted spread of c (0; T )
due to a change in the value of equity.
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A.2 Leland & Toft (1996)
Equation (2.14) may be written as
(Vt) = Vt + 
C
r
 
1 

Vt
VB
 x!
  VB

Vt
VB
 x
, (2.29)
with the value of debt D(Vt)
D(Vt) =
C
r
+

P   C
r

1  er
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(1  )VB   C
r

J () , (2.30)
and equity S(Vt)
S(Vt) = Vt + 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and default barrier VB
VB =
C
r
 
A
r
 B  AP
r
  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r
1 + x  (1  )B . (2.32)
The components of the above formulae are
A = 2ae r
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,
I () =
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K ()  e rF () , (2.35)
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V
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 (j1 ()) +

V
VB
 a z
 (j2 ()) , (2.36)
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J () =
1
zV
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 
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VB
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( b  z2V)
V
p

; j2 () =
( b+ z2V)
V
p

, (2.39)
h1 () =
( b  a2V)
V
p

; h2 () =
( b+ a2V)
V
p

, (2.40)
a =
(r     (2V =2))
2V
, (2.41)
b = ln

Vt
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
, (2.42)
z =
r
(a2V )
2
+ 2r2V

2V
, (2.43)
x = a+ z: (2.44)
 () and  () denote the density of the standard normal distribution and the
cumulative distribution function, respectively.
The CDS Spread and Hedge Ratio
Using equation (2.37), the risk-neutral survival probability at horizon t is
q (t) = 1  F (t) (2.45)
= 1 
 
 (h1 (t)) +

V
VB
 2a
 (h2 (t))
!
:
Assuming constant interest rates, the CDS spread for maturity T is found by
inserting the survival probability (2.45) in equation (2.6), yielding
0 = c(0; T )
Z T
0
e rsq(s)ds+ (1 R)
Z T
0
e rsq0(s)ds: (2.46)
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Integrating the rst term by parts, yields
0 =
c(0; T )
r

1  e rT q(T ) +
Z T
0
e rsq0(s)ds

+ (1 R)
Z T
0
e rsq0(s)ds, (2.47)
where the integral   R T
0
e rsq0(s)ds is given by K(T ) in equation (2.36), following
Reiner & Rubinstein (1991). Then,
0 =
c(0; T )
r
 
1  e rT q(T )  c(0; T )
r
+ (1 R)

K(T ), (2.48)
which allows us to obtain a closed-form solution for the CDS spread
c(0; T ) = r (1 R) K(T )
(1  e rT q(T ) K (T )) : (2.49)
When determining the hedge ratio, we again follow Yu (2006) and approximate
the contract value in equation (2.7) by
(0; T ) = (c (0; T )  c)
Z T
0
e rsq (s) ds: (2.50)
=
c (0; T )  c
r
 
1  e rT q(T ) K (T ) ,
where c (0; T ) is a function of the value of equity S, and c is the CDS spread at
initiation.
Similar to CreditGrades, the hedge ratio is found using equation (2.8)
0 =
N
r
@c (0; T )
@S
 
1  e rT q(T ) K (T ) . (2.51)
However, in Leland & Toft (1996) the CDS spread is not an explicit function
of the equity value. Therefore, @c(0;T )
@S
is found numerically using
@c (0; T )
@S
=
@c (0; T )
@V
@V
@S
=
@c (0; T )
@V
1
@S
@V
: (2.52)
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Chapter3
Credit Risk Premia in the Market for
Credit Default Swaps
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Abstract1
This paper estimates the time-series behavior of credit risk premia in the mar-
ket for Credit Default Swaps for the period 2001 to 2006. A structural model is
used to back out objective default probabilities. The results indicate that risk pre-
mia might be incorrectly estimated, when expected losses are based on a historical
equity volatility measure as opposed to implied volatility. This e¤ect is largest
following the peak in credit spreads and risk premia in the second half of 2002.
Secondly, when default probabilities are based on implied volatility, the risk premia
tend to be countercyclical in the sense that the risk premium is high when expected
losses are high. Finally, using linear regressions, I nd that augmenting the set
of variables predicted by structural models with equity-implied credit risk premia
signicantly increases the explanatory power. This echoes the results found in
Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007) and suggests the need for time varying risk premia in
structural models.
1I thank MarkIt for access to credit default swap data. I am grateful to David Lando and
Jesper Rangvid for useful comments. All remaining errors are my own.
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3.1 Introduction
This paper estimates the time-series behavior of credit risk premia in the mar-
ket for Credit Default Swaps (CDS) for the period 2001 until the end of 2006.
More specically the structural model by Leland & Toft (1996) is used to back
out objective default probabilities from the equity market, and the market CDS
spread is then decomposed into an expected loss component and a risk premium
component.
Not much empirical work has been done on the time variation of risk premia in
credit markets. Berndt, Douglas, Du¢ e, Ferguson & Schranz (2005) and Berndt,
Lookman & Obreja (2006) use expected default frequencies (EDF) from Moodys
KMV together with CDS spreads to extract historical and risk neutral default
intensities respectively. The ratio of these is interpreted as a measure of the
default risk premium observed in the marketplace. They document substantial
time-series variation in risk premia for the period from 2000-2004 with a peak in
the third quarter of 2002 and a subsequent dramatic drop. Elkamhi & Ericsson
(2007) develop a methodology to study the linkages between equity and corporate
bond risk premia and apply it to a panel of corporate bond transactions data for
the period 1995 - 2005. They nd a time-series behavior and degree of time
variation in credit risk premia similar to Berndt et al. (2005), although their
study is based on di¤erent data, a di¤erent nancial instrument and a di¤erent
methodology.
An obvious problem when estimating credit risk premia is the measurement
of objective default probabilities and expected losses. Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007)
base the default probabilities on a historical volatility measure, while Berndt
et al. (2005) and Berndt, Lookman & Obreja (2006) use the EDF measure, and
their estimated default probabilities are thus essentially also based on historical
volatility2. I contribute to the existing literature by applying the methodology
developed in Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007) to a large panel of CDS quotes, but
contrary to them I also back out the default probabilities using option implied
volatility. This should give a better view of the uncertainty in the market, espe-
cially when the uncertainty changes rapidly. According to Cremers et al. (2006)
and Cao et al. (2006), the implied volatility contains important and timely in-
2See Crosbie & Bohn (2003) and Berndt et al. (2005) for a discussion of the EDF measure.
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formation about credit risk di¤erent from the historical measure, while Finger &
Stamicar (2005a) and Finger & Stamicar (2005b) show how model spreads based
on historical volatilities lag the market when spreads increase, while overpredict-
ing the market as spreads recover.
The computation of objective default probabilities is done as in Elkamhi &
Ericsson (2007) by estimating rm specic equity risk premia using the Fama &
MacBeth (1973) approach, and then the equity risk premia are "delevered" into
asset value risk premia. The measure of the credit risk premium is then the part
of the CDS spread in excess of the expected loss component.
Although a close relation exists between corporate bonds and CDS spreads
(Du¢ e (1999)), the latter are preferable from several perspectives. The use of
CDS spreads avoids any noise arising from a misspecied risk-free yield curve
(Houweling & Vorst (2003)) and several recent studies nd that CDS spreads
are a purer measure of credit risk compared to corporate bond credit spreads3.
Furthermore, while the corporate bonds used in Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007) are of
di¤erent maturity and coupon, all of the CDS spreads in this paper have a 5-year
maturity and are e¤ectively new par-coupon credit spreads on the underlying
rm. The results are also expected to be more robust compared to Elkamhi &
Ericsson (2007) since the data in this paper are larger in the cross section, and
the same rms are followed over time.
I nd that the estimated credit risk premia appear more volatile when default
probabilities and expected losses are based on the historical volatility measure
compared to implied volatility. Similar to earlier results I nd that the risk premia
peak in the third quarter of 2002, but the subsequent drop in risk premia is not as
dramatic, when expected losses are based on implied volatility. Furthermore there
is a high degree of uncertainty in the option market in the second half of 2002
as measured by the implied volatility. This result is consistent across industries
and ratings (investment grade and speculative grade), and suggests that it may
be inappropriate to base expected losses on a historical volatility measure, when
estimating credit risk premia.
Secondly, when expected losses are based on implied volatility, the credit risk
premium is high in times of high default probabilities and low in times of low
default probabilities. This suggests that the credit risk premium is countercycli-
3See e.g. Longsta¤ et al. (2005).
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cal. Furthermore the expected loss ratio and the risk premium ratio behave quite
di¤erently from one another over time. Interestingly, when based on implied
volatility, the expected loss ratio peaks in late 2002, when credit spreads soared
and the credit risk premium peaked. The expected loss ratio is actually higher
than 50% at certain points in this period. On the other hand the risk premium
ratio tends to be high in times of low credit spreads and low default probabilities.
Thirdly I show that there is a close relation between VIX and expected losses,
when the asset volatilities are based on implied volatility. Earlier papers such as
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Schaefer & Strebulaev (2004) have showed that
VIX is an important explanatory variable for changes in credit spreads, although
they do not pin down an explanation for the role of VIX, while Berndt et al.
(2005) nd that VIX is related to the credit risk premium. The results of this
paper suggest that VIX is indeed a measure of systematic volatility.
Finally I carry out a regression analysis similar to Ericsson et al. (2005), Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001) and Campbell & Taksler (2003). A benchmark regression
is performed including standard variables implied from structural models. Aug-
menting the regressions with an equity implied measure of the credit risk premium
improves the explanatory power for the levels of the credit spread, while the co-
e¢ cient on this purely model implied risk premium is highly signicant. With
the historical volatility as part of the variables in the regressions the R-square
is 49:4%, and it increases by 3% to 52:4%, when the risk premium is included,
while the R-square increases by 5:5% from 57:4% to 62:9%, when the regressions
are performed with implied volatility. The increase in the explanatory power is
substantially higher, when the risk premium is included for the investment grade
segment compared to the speculative grade segment. This suggests that invest-
ment grade rms have proportionally higher risk premia and that risk premia
are more important for investment grade rms than for speculative grade rms.
Similar results are found in Huang & Huang (2003) and Berndt et al. (2005).
The regression results echo results in Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007), and com-
bined with the other results of the paper, it suggests that structural models should
contain a time varying and countercyclical risk premium. The results also sug-
gest a link between equity risk premia and credit spreads, when the equity risk
premium is properly translated to the credit risk premium through a structural
model. This is in line with Elton et al. (2001), who show that there is a nontrivial
component of credit spreads, interpreted as a risk premium, which is correlated
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with factors explaining equity risk premia. Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007) also nd
that risk premia in the credit and equity markets are related. On the other hand
Berndt, Lookman & Obreja (2006) extract a factor representing the part of de-
fault swap returns, implied by a reduced form credit risk model, that does not
compensate for interest rate risk or expected default losses. They nd that this
factor is priced in the corporate bond market but that they cannot establish with
the same condence that it is a factor for equity returns. However, the expected
losses in Berndt, Lookman & Obreja (2006) are based on the EDF measure.
The results of the paper suggest that much more research is needed is this
area, to understand the link between risk premia in the two markets. Some work
in this direction have recently been done by Chen, Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein
(2006), Bhamra, Kuehn & Strebulaev (2007) and Chen (2007).
Furthermore the R-squares of the regressions are substantially higher when
the implied volatility is included in the regressions, and the explanatory power is
especially high for speculative grade spreads. This supports results in Cao et al.
(2006), who also nd the strongest link between option-implied volatilities and
CDS spreads among rms with the lowest rating.
The paper is also related to Leland (2004), who looks at default probabilities in
structural models, Saita (2006), who studies the risk and return of corporate bond
portfolios, and Driessen (2005), who decomposes corporate bond yield spreads
into tax, liquidity and default risk premia.
Section 3.2 describes how the credit risk premium can be measured, and also
how the premium is measured in this paper. In section 3.3 the data are pre-
sented, while section 3.4 describes the empirical implementation. The results are
presented in section 3.5, and nally section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Measuring Credit Risk Premia (RPI) from
Yield Spreads
We describe the basic intuition behind the credit risk premium and how it can
be measured, and then the approach chosen in this paper is presented.
108
3.2.1 Yield Spread Components
There is a distinction between the credit risk premium and the yield spread.
In order to make this distinction a simple numerical example from Elkamhi &
Ericsson (2007) is used. We consider a unit zero discount bond with zero recovery
in default issued by a rm that can only default at time T: The value of such a
bond is
Bt = e
 r(t;T )TEQ

1(>T )

= e r(t;T )TQt( > T );
where EQ [] is the risk neutral expectation, Qt( > T ) the risk neutral survival
probability and  the default stopping time. The value of the bond is thus the
present value of the risk adjusted survival probability. For now assume that
default risk is not priced and that Pt ( > T ) = Qt( > T ) = 80%; where Pt
denotes the objective survival probability. Further assume that r(t; T ) = 10%
and T = 10: The price of the bond is then Bt = e 0:110  0:8 = 0:2943 and its
continuously compounded yield is 12:23%: The bond thus pays a spread of 223
basis point, even though a risk premium is not present. In this case the spread
is merely an actuarial fair compensation for expected losses.
We now assume that default risk is priced, which implies that Pt ( > T ) >
Qt( > T ): With the same parameters as above and now assuming that Qt( >
T ) = 70% and Pt ( > T ) = 80% the bond price will be lower at Bt = e 0:110 
0:7 = 0:2575 and the yield will be 0:1357: The spread has thus increased to 357
basis points. This increase in the spread of 134 basis points, denoted ; reects
the risk premium for bearing default risk. We can thus express the price of the
bond in three di¤erent ways
Bt = e
 r(t;T )TEQ

1(>T )

= e (r(t;T )+)TEP

1(>T )

= e (r(t;T )++)T  1;
where EP [] is the objective expectation and  is a component which adjusts
for the expected loss (in this case 223 basis points). The rst is the standard
valuation method, using the risk neutral expectation discounted at the risk-free
rate. The second is the present value at the risk adjusted rate of the expected
payment at maturity EP []. The third is the present value of the full face value
discounted at the risk adjusted rate rate augmented by a component ; which
adjusts for the expected loss.
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3.2.2 Measuring the Risk Premium from CDS Spreads
We now proceed to describe the methodology used to measure the risk premium
 from CDS spreads. This is done by decomposing the CDS spread as Elkamhi &
Ericsson (2007) do for corporate bond spreads. Since the accrued premium must
also be paid if a credit event occurs between two payments dates, the payments
in a CDS t nicely into a continous-time framework. Given knowledge of the
term structure of objective survival probabilities of the obligor, fPt( > s); s 2
(t;1)g one can obtain an estimate of the CDS spread that would prevail in a
market without a risk premium (assuming a constant risk-free interest rate r and
a constant recovery rate R)
cno risk(0; T ) =  (1 R)
R T
0
e rsP
0
0(s)dsR T
0
e rsP0(s)ds
, (3.1)
where P0(s) is the objective survival probability of the obligor at t = 0 and
P
0
0(t) = dP0(t)=dt
4: The spread in (3:1) only takes expected losses into account
and the credit risk premium (RPIt) is then measured as the di¤erence between
the CDS spread observed in the market cmarket and cno riskt
RPIt = c
market
t   cno riskt : (3.2)
The CDS spread when a risk premium is present can be priced as in equation
(3.1)
crisk(0; T ) =  (1 R)
R T
0
e rsQ00(s)dsR T
0
e rsQ0(s)ds
; (3.3)
where Q0(s) is the risk neutral survival probability of the obligor at t = 0 and
Q
0
0(t) = dQ(t)=dt: A purely model-implied measure of the credit risk premium is
then dened as5
RPIequityt = c
risk
t   cno riskt : (3.4)
To obtain an estimate of the CDS spreads in equation (3.1) and (3.3) we need
the recovery rate and survival probabilities for di¤erent horizons. The recovery
rate R is set equal to 40%; roughly consistent with the average observed recovery
4 dP0(t)=dt is then the rst hitting time density.
5This purly model implied measure of the risk premium is denoted RPIequityt since it will
be based on the risk premium in the equity market.
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rate between 1982-20066. The recovery rate is kept constant through out the
period, and it is assumed that there is no risk premium associated with the
recovery rate. The size and possible time-series behavior of the expected recovery
rate could be of importance though. We will get back to this in section 3.5.
To get the term structures of survival probabilities, the structural model by
Leland & Toft (1996) is calibrated to the equity market using information from
each rms balance sheet. Together with estimates of the asset value risk premium
it is then possible to also obtain objective survival probabilities. This is similar
to Leland (2004) and Huang & Huang (2003), but the focus in this paper is on
the time-series behavior of the risk premium, and thus it is not assumed, that
current conditional default probabilities are equal to historical average default
probabilities by credit rating.
A di¤erent structural could have been used, but Leland (2004) shows that
the model by Leland & Toft (1996) does a reasonable job of predicting observed
default rates, although short term default rates tend to be underestimated, while
Ericsson et al. (2006) nd that the model performs very well when predicting
CDS spreads7. The empirical implementation is further described in section 3.4
and the model by Leland & Toft (1996) is described in appendix A, which also
presents the model-implied survival probabilities and CDS spreads in closed form.
The risk premia described above is based on the contingent claims approach,
while other empirical studies such as Driessen (2005), Berndt et al. (2005) and
Berndt, Lookman & Obreja (2006) rely on intensity based models. A discussion
of risk premia in these models can be found in Lando (2004).
6According to Moodys (Hamilton, OU, Kim & Cantor (2007)) the average recovery rate on
senior unsecured bonds for the period 1982-2006 was 38:4% : The choice of recovery rate is also
in accordance with Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007).
7The model by Leland & Toft (1996) is also the one used in Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007).
Secondly Huang & Huang (2003) shows that di¤erent structural models predict fairly similar
credit spreads under empirically reasonable parameters.
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3.3 Data
5-year credit default swap spreads with modied restructuring (MR) for U.S.-
dollar denominated senior unsecured debt are used8. The credit default swap
data is provided by MarkIt, who receives data from more than 50 global banks.
These data are aggregated into composite numbers after ltering out outliers and
stale data, and a price is only published if at least three contributors provide
data9. Several lters are then applied to obtain the nal dataset.
First, the CDS data are merged with quarterly balance sheet data from Com-
pustat and daily stock market data from CRSP. The quarterly balance sheet data
are lagged one month from the end of the quarter to avoid any look-ahead bias in
using data not yet available to the market. Firms from the nancial and utility
sector are then excluded since their capital structure is very di¤erent from other
corporates.
Secondly, the dataset is merged with daily data on the 30-day at-the-money
put-implied volatility obtained from OptionMetrics. OptionMetrics is a compre-
hensive database of daily information on exchange-listed equity options in the
U.S. dating back to 1996. OptionMetrics generates the 30-day at-the-money put-
implied volatility by interpolation.
Thirdly, 1250 days of equity returns10 are needed prior to each CDS quote to
estimate daily equity risk premia (see section 3.4 for details).
Finally to minimize market microstructure e¤ects, I only use weekly (Wednes-
day) observations on the CDS quotes, and to ensure that the analysis is based on
reasonably liquid CDSs I exclude rms which have less than 150 weekly quotes.
The nal dataset consists of 33401 weekly quotes distributed across 142 unique
rms, dating back to May 2001 and onwards to the end of October 2006.
8The 5-year maturity is the most liquid point on the credit curve (see e.g. Blanco et al.
(2005)).
9MarkIt data is also used in e.g. Berndt, Lookman & Obreja (2006) and Huang & Zhou
(2007).
10Corresponding to 5 years.
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In Figure 3.1 the average market CDS spread is plotted over time. The average
market spread varies considerably through the sample period, peaking during the
credit crunch in the second half of 2002 and beginning of 2003. Following the
peak in 2002 the average credit spread falls until the end of 2006. The time-series
behavior of the average spread is very similar to the behavior of the median spread
in Berndt, Lookman & Obreja (2006).
In Table 3.1 summary statistics are shown across the senior unsecured credit
rating from Standard & Poors. The presented variables are averages across the
number of quotes in each rating category. The majority of the quotes are A or
BBB rated, and the vast majority of the quotes are also within the investment
grade segment. A better rating is associated with a lower spread and lower
leverage and volatility. This is in line with the predictions of structural models.
A better rating is also associated with a larger rm size.
Figure 3.1: Average Market CDS Spread over Time
The gure illustrates the average market CDS spread over time. The mean is calculated
as averages over the cross section of weekly spreads.
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Table 3.1: Sample Characteristics
This table reports sample characteristics for the 142 obligors. The sample character-
istics are averages over the number of quotes. The statistics are presented across the
senior unsecured credit rating from Standard & Poors. N is the number of quotes and
spread is the avererage 5-year CDS quote. While the historical equity volatility HV is
calculated from a 250-day rolling window of equity returns, the implied equity volatility
IV is inferred from 30-day at-the-money put options. The leverage ratio Lev is total
liabilities divided by the sum of total liabilities and equity market capitalization, and
size is the sum of total liabilities and equity market capitalization in billions of dollars.
Equity prem: is the estimated equity premium.
Rating N Spread HV IV Lev. Size Equity prem.
AAA 956 21 0.284 0.261 0.274 375.086 0.067
AA 2580 26 0.289 0.273 0.211 98.894 0.074
A 11671 49 0.315 0.302 0.346 44.080 0.075
BBB 15505 120 0.349 0.331 0.508 29.403 0.076
BB 2069 321 0.454 0.422 0.559 19.094 0.100
B 620 522 0.629 0.507 0.706 25.701 0.106
3.4 Empirical Implementation
The structural model by Leland & Toft (1996) is used to obtain risk neutral
and objective survival probabilities. In Leland & Toft (1996), rm assets V are
assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion under the risk-neutral measure
dVt = (r   )Vtdt+ V VtdWt, (3.5)
with
dVt = uV Vtdt+ V VtdWt (3.6)
under the objective measure11. r is the risk free interest rate,  is the payout
ratio and V is the asset volatility. The rm defaults when the asset value hits
the endogenously derived default barrier VB. To obtain the survival probabilities
the unobserved asset value Vt; and asset volatility V are needed, and to get the
objective survival probabilities estimates of the expected asset return uV is needed
as well. In the next two sections I describe how these unobserved parameters are
11In this case V includes the payout ratio .
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inferred. A more detailed description of the model by Leland & Toft (1996) is
given in appendix A.
3.4.1 Calibrating the Leland & Toft (1996)-Model
To infer the unobserved asset value Vt; and asset volatility V the model is cal-
ibrated to equity market data in two ways. Firstly using a 250-day historical
volatility and secondly using an implied volatility from equity options. Accord-
ing to Cremers et al. (2006) and Cao et al. (2006), the implied volatility contains
important and timely information about credit risk di¤erent from the historical
measure.
To implement the model, we follow Ericsson et al. (2006) in setting the realized
bankruptcy cost fraction  = 0:15, the tax rate  = 0:20 and the average debt
maturity 
2
= 3:38.12 Furthermore P is the total liabilities from quarterly balance
sheet data, S is the market value of equity and r is the 5-year constant maturity
treasury yield. We also follow Ericsson et al. (2006) in assuming that the average
coupon paid out to all debtholders equals the risk-free interest rate, C = rP .13
The asset payout rate  is calculated as a time-series mean of the weighted average
historical dividend yield and relative interest expense from balance sheet data
 =

Interest expenses
Total liabilities

 L + (Dividend yield) (1  L) (3.7)
L =
Total liabilities
Total liabilities+Market equity
.
The iterative algorithm of Moodys KMV outlined in Crosbie & Bohn (2003)
and Vassalou & Xing (2004) is used to infer the unobserved time-series of asset
values and asset volatility. This iterative scheme goes as follows. The value of
equity St is a function of the asset value Vt, asset volatility V and a set of
parameters  (see equation (3.17) in appendix A), i.e. St = f(Vt; V ; ). A 250-
12The choice of 15 percent bankruptcy costs lies well within the range estimated by Andrade
& Kaplan (1998). 20 percent as an e¤ective tax rate is below the corporate tax rate to reect
the personal tax rate advantage of equity returns. Stohs & Mauer (1996) nd an average debt
maturity of 3.38 years using a panel of 328 industrial rms with detailed debt information in
Moodys Industrial Manuals in 1980-1989.
13A rms debt consists of more than market bonds, and usually a substantial fraction of total
debt is non-interest bearing such as accrued taxes and supplier credits. Furthermore, corporate
bonds may be issued below par, which also opens up for this approximation.
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day window of historical equity values is used to obtain an estimate of the equity
volatility S, by viewing the value of equity as a geometric Brownian motion.
Given this initial estimate of the asset volatility V and quarterly balance sheet
data, the value of the default barrier can be calculated. Using the daily market
values of equity and the equity pricing formula we then back out an implied time-
series of asset values Vt(V ) = f 1(St; V ; ). Next, since the daily asset values
follow a geometric Brownian motion we obtain an improved estimate of the asset
volatility V , which is used in the next iteration. This procedure is repeated until
the values of V converge.
When using implied volatilities from equity options, the instantaneous rela-
tionship given by
St = f(Vt; V ; ) (3.8)
S =
@St
@Vt
V
Vt
St
(3.9)
is solved numerically for the unknown asset value Vt and asset volatility V , where
(3.9) follows from Itos lemma on St.
Table 3.2 gives summary statistics for the calibrated parameters. For each
rating category the average calibrated parameters look reasonably similar across
the two calibration methods, but as we will see later, they will behave di¤erently
over time. At rst sight it may seem surprising that the average calibrated asset
volatilities are smallest for the lower ratings, which is consistent for both calibra-
tion methods. The reason is that these rms have very large leverage ratios as
seen in Table 3.1. So even though these rms have higher equity volatilities they
end up with lower calibrated asset volatilities due to the high leverage. If we look
at the average distance to default measure DD, calculated as V VB
V V
; we also see
that the better rated rms have a larger distance to default, and thus a smaller
risk of defaulting.
As described in the introduction the di¤erence in calibration method could
give rise to di¤erent implied credit risk premia, and less volatile risk premia are
expected, when the survival probabilities and expected losses are based on the
model implemented with the option implied volatility. Suppose e.g. that the
uncertainty in the market suddenly increases. This implies both a higher option
implied volatility and a higher realized equity volatility. The di¤erence is that a
change in uncertainty is immediately captured in the implied volatility but only
116
slowly in the historical volatility. This leads to di¤erences in the calibrated asset
volatility V ; and thus in expected losses. Since a change in uncertainty is also
immediately captured in the market CDS spread cmarkett , the use of default proba-
bilities based on historical volatility, when calculating cno risk(0; T ) from equation
(3.1) might give rise to credit risk premia that are mismeasured. Expected losses
in both Berndt et al. (2005), Berndt, Lookman & Obreja (2006) and Elkamhi &
Ericsson (2007) are based on historical volatilities. I will therefore check if the use
of implied volatility when calculating expected losses leads to better measured
and less volatile risk premia.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Implied Parameters
This table reports the central implied parameters from Leland & Toft (1996), calibrated
with a historical volatility HV in panel A and option-implied volatility IV in panel B.
While the rst measure is calculated from a 250-day rolling window of equity returns,
the latter is implied from 30-day at-the-money put options. The descriptive statistics
are averaged over the number of quotes. The asset value and default barrier (barrier)
are measured in billions of dollars. Asset vol: is the implied asset volatility and DD is
the measure of distance to default calculated as (V   VB)=(V V ).
Variable Asset value Asset vol. Barrier DD
Panel A. Leland & Toft HV
AAA 357.000 0.209 121.274 4.064
AA 95.754 0.234 15.304 4.021
A 41.933 0.209 12.604 3.924
BBB 27.857 0.171 15.282 3.753
BB 17.981 0.189 8.112 3.203
B 24.002 0.171 15.350 2.562
Panel B. Leland & Toft IV
AAA 354.573 0.190 124.643 4.431
AA 95.627 0.218 15.579 4.197
A 41.789 0.200 12.844 3.961
BBB 27.962 0.161 15.929 3.854
BB 18.018 0.179 8.247 3.272
B 24.366 0.146 16.359 2.858
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Having found the asset value V and asset volatility V we can calculate risk
neutral survival probabilities. We now go on to estimate the expected return
on assets uV in equation (3.6) to be able to calculate objective probabilities and
price the CDS in a market without risk premia cno risk(0; T ).
3.4.2 Estimating the Asset Value Risk Premia
The expected asset return uV is found as in Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007). More
specically we link the risk premium on assets to the risk premium on equity14
uV   r = (RV (t)  r) = S (RS(t)  r) ; (3.10)
where (RS(t)  r) is the estimated equity risk premium,
RS(t)dt = E
P [
dSt(Vt)
St(Vt)
]:
RV (t)dt = E
P [
dVt
Vt
]
is the expected asset return uV ; and
S =
 
@St(Vt)
@Vt
Vt
St(V )
! 1
(3.11)
is found numerically using the structural model by Leland & Toft (1996) and
depending on, whether the model parameters (V & v) are calibrated with the
historical volatility or option implied volatility.
The equity premium (RS(t)  r) is estimated for each CDS quote in the
dataset. The approach by Fama & MacBeth (1973) is used together with the
Fama & French (1993) market factor15. Using a history of 1250 daily stock re-
turns betas are estimated for each CDS quote. A cross sectional regression of the
individual stock returns on the betas is then run each day, which yields a daily
market risk premium. A moving average over 1250 days is then used as the factor
risk premium on the given day16.
14The proof of equation (3:10) can be found in Campello, Chen & Zhang (2008).
15This factor can be found on Kenneth Frenchs website.
16Running monthly cross sectional regressions instead, followed by averages over 60 month
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For each stock on each day the equity premium is then found as the beta
multiplied by the market risk premium, and the expected asset return uV is then
found using equation (3.10).
In the last column of Table 3.1 the average equity premia are given across
rating and the average equity premium over time is given in Figure 3.2. The
average risk premium across all observations is 7:76% and we see from Table 3.1
that better rated rms have a lower average risk premium. This is similar to the
average equity risk premia across ratings in Huang & Huang (2003), although the
average estimated risk premia in this paper generally are a bit higher.
Figure 3.2: Equity Risk Premium
The gure illustrates the average equity risk premium over time calculated as averages
over the cross section of weekly risk premia. The risk premia are measured using the
Fama & MacBeth (1973) methodology.
does not change the estimated risk premia signicantly. Nor did the risk premia change signi-
cantly, when all three Fama & French (1993) factors where used, but the factor risk premia on
the SMB and HML where insignicant in a large part of the cross sectional regressions.
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3.5 Empirical Results
With all estimated parameters in place we are able to calculate both objective
and risk neutral default probabilities. Furthermore CDS spreads can be cal-
culated both with and without the risk premium included, which allows us to
decompose the spread. Before we decompose the CDS spreads and calculate the
credit risk premium, a comparison of the estimated objective default probabilities
with actual default rates is in place. We thus start out by comparing the objec-
tive default probabilities across rating categories and horizon with the historical
default rates from Moodys (Hamilton et al. (2007)). Although the sample peri-
ods are di¤erent it will give us an indication of whether the estimated objective
default probabilities are reasonable.
Table 3.3 shows the estimated objective default probabilities together with the
average Moodys default rates for the period 1920-200617. The historical default
rates are generally higher than the model implied default probabilities and the
model implied default probabilities based on implied volatility are generally lower
than the default probabilities based on historical volatility. If we look at the ve
year horizon, which is the maturity of the CDS spreads in the sample, the implied
default probabilities match the historical default rates quite well, although the
default rates are underestimated for the speculative grade segment. Looking at
the A and BBB ratings, which constitutes the majority of the quotes in the
sample, the default rates are also not that dissimilar.
Earlier work by Berndt et al. (2005) and Berndt, Lookman & Obreja (2006)
have relied on KMV expected default frequencies (EDF) as measures of objective
default probabilities. KMV also uses a structural model to estimate a distance
to default measure, which is then mapped into the EDF measure using historical
default rates18. Since the applied methodology in this paper is the same as
in Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007) and given the reasonable size of the estimated
objective default probabilities it is expected that the results of this paper can be
compared to the three mentioned papers.
17The Moodys ratings are transferred to the S&P ratings with Aaa = AAA; Aa = AA and
so forth.
18See Crosbie & Bohn (2003).
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Table 3.3: Historical and Model Implied Default Probabilities
This table reports the historical and model implied default probabilities by rating cat-
egory and horizon. HV is based on the historical volatility while IV is based on
option-implied volatility. The model implied default probabilities are averaged over
the number of quotes, while the historical default probabilities (Actual) represents
Moodys cumulative default rates for the period 1920-2006.
Rating/Horizon 1 3 5 7 10 15 20
AAA (Actual) 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.37 0.89 1.44 1.82
AAA (HV) 0.00 0.08 0.33 0.73 1.50 2.96 4.42
AAA (IV) 0.00 0.07 0.29 0.59 1.15 2.14 3.11
AA (Actual) 0.06 0.29 0.72 1.34 2.31 4.29 5.3
AA (HV) 0.00 0.08 0.34 0.75 1.48 2.77 3.96
AA (IV) 0.00 0.05 0.25 0.55 1.13 2.19 3.21
A (Actual) 0.07 0.51 1.13 1.80 2.9 4.91 6.39
A (HV) 0.05 0.59 1.41 2.32 3.63 5.53 7.06
A (IV) 0.01 0.24 0.79 1.49 2.58 4.24 5.61
BBB (Actual) 0.3 1.61 3.26 4.85 7.29 10.87 13.45
BBB (HV) 0.24 1.66 3.26 4.72 6.57 8.88 10.53
BBB (IV) 0.06 0.70 1.68 2.72 4.13 6.00 7.39
BB (Actual) 1.38 5.47 9.83 13.64 18.79 25.81 30.81
BB (HV) 0.58 3.41 5.98 8.03 10.36 13.00 14.75
BB (IV) 0.27 2.22 4.20 5.87 7.82 10.06 11.55
B (Actual) 4.32 14.23 22.45 28.58 34.86 42.11 46.09
B (HV) 2.42 8.51 12.75 15.76 18.91 22.18 24.20
B (IV) 0.56 3.52 6.28 8.45 10.84 13.42 15.05
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One of the main drivers of the default probabilities and expected losses is the
volatility of the rms assets v. To understand what drives the di¤erences in the
time-series behavior of the estimated credit risk premia later on, we also take a
look at the average time-series behavior of the calibrated asset volatilities from
section 3.4.
In Figure 3.3 the average calibrated asset volatilities are shown over time,
when based on historical and implied volatility respectively. It is clear, that the
calibrated volatilities do not move together and that the asset volatility based on
historical volatility is much smoother than the one based on implied volatility.
In the second half of 2002 the asset volatility based on implied volatility rises
substantially, while this rise in uncertainty is only partly captured by the asset
volatility based on historical volatility. Subsequently the asset volatility based on
implied equity volatility falls faster than the more rigid asset volatility based on
historical equity volatility.
Figure 3.3: Asset Volatilities
The gure illustrates the average calibrated asset volatilities over time based on his-
torical and option implied equity volatilities respectively. The means are calculated as
averages over the cross section of weekly volatilities.
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As we will see in the next section this di¤erent behavior of the calibrated
asset volatilities has implications for the way the expected loss component be-
haves over time and thus for the time-series behavior of the estimated credit risk
premium. From the beginning of 2004 we see that the two calibrated volatilities
move together. We now go on to decompose the CDS spread into an expected
loss component and a risk premium component.
3.5.1 Decomposing the Credit Spread
To decompose the CDS spread and examine the time-series behavior of the credit
risk premium an estimate of the expected loss component is needed.
In Figure 3.4 the average expected loss component cno riskt calculated in equa-
tion (3.1) is plotted over time together with the average market CDS spread
cmarkett from Figure 3.1. In panel A of Figure 3.4 the expected loss component
is calculated with asset volatilities based on historical equity volatility, while the
expected loss component is calculated with asset volatilities based on implied
equity volatility in panel B.
Similar to the market spreads, the expected loss components vary consider-
ably through the sample period, and when based on implied equity volatility the
component peaks around the same time as the market spread, although there is
a tendency for the peaks in the expected loss component to appear a little earlier
than in the spread. The expected loss component peaks somewhat later, when
based on historical equity volatility. When the spreads start to fall the expected
loss component based on implied volatility falls as well, while this happens with
a lag for the expected loss component based on historical volatility. From a com-
parison with Figure 3.3 we see that the di¤erent behavior of the asset volatilities
in Figure 3.3 to a large degree is reected in the movement of the respective
expected losses in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Average Market Spread and Expected Loss Component
The gure illustrates the average market CDS spread and the expected loss component
over time. The means are calculated as averages over the cross section of weekly spreads.
In Panel A the expected loss component is based on historical volatility and in Panel
B it is based on implied volatility.
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The credit risk premium RPIt is the di¤erence between the market CDS
spread cmarkett and the expected loss component c
no risk
t as calculated in equation
(3.2). Figure 3.5 plots the resulting cross sectional averages of the credit risk
premia over time. To illustrate the di¤erence, Figure 3.5 includes both the av-
erage risk premium based on the historical equity volatility and the average risk
premium based on implied equity volatility. The level of the average risk premia
are very similar to the level found in Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007) and the risk
premia also peak in the second half of 2002 as found in earlier studies, but we
see a clear di¤erence in the time-series behavior of the two estimated risk premia.
This di¤erence is especially pronounced in the second half of 2002 and until the
beginning of 2004.
After the peak in late 2002 the risk premia starts to fall, and they basically
keep falling until the end of 2006. The initial fall is much more dramatic though,
when the risk premia are based on historical volatility, compared to the fall in risk
premia, when they are based on implied volatility. The reason for this di¤erent
behavior is of course to be found in the fact, that the rise in uncertainty towards
the end of 2002 stays in the historical equity volatility for some time following
the events.
As we saw in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 this leads to asset volatilities and
expected losses that are too high compared to the expected losses based on im-
plied volatility, which immediately falls when the uncertainty disappears from the
market. From the beginning of 2004 and onwards the two estimated risk premia
move together, just as the asset volatilities in Figure 3.3.
When the expected losses are based on implied volatility there seems to be a
high degree of variation in the risk premia around the peak in late 2002. This is
because the expected loss component and the market CDS spreads do not peak
at the exact same time as seen in Figure 3.4. It is interesting to note that Cao
et al. (2006) nd that the options market tend to lead the CDS market. From
Figure 3.4 we see that this could be the case, and thus the reason for this high
variation in risk premia, since the expected loss component based on implied
volatility peaks earlier than the CDS spread.
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Figure 3.5: Average Credit Risk Premium
The gure illustrates the average credit risk premia over time based on historical volatil-
ity and implied volatility respectively. The means are calculated as averages over the
cross section of weekly spreads.
To show that the di¤erent behavior of the credit risk premia in Figure 3.5 is
consistent across ratings and industries we split up the sample into investment
grade rms and speculative grade rms, and also into ve di¤erent industries.
In Figure 3.6 the average estimated risk premia are plotted for the investment
grade segment in panel A and for the speculative segment in panel B. The same
pattern as in Figure 3.5 emerges. Following the events in 2002 the fall in risk
premia are much more dramatic, when expected losses are based on historical
volatility.
The largest di¤erence in the behavior is seen for the investment grade segment
in panel A. The behavior is very similar to the behavior in Figure 3.5, which is
because the main part of the sample is investment grade rms. The di¤erence is
not as pronounced for the speculative grade segment in panel B.
In Figure 3.7 the rms in the sample have been split up into the ve Fama &
French industries: Consumer, Manufacturing, Hitec, Health and Other19. Again
the same pattern appears. Looking e.g. at the behavior of the average risk
premium in the Health sector in panel D the e¤ect of using default probabilities
based on implied volatility is clear. We see a much smoother risk premium,
while the risk premium based on historical volatility takes a sharp fall in 2003.
Subsequently the estimated risk premia move together from the beginning of
2004.
19See the website of Kenneth French.
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Figure 3.6: Credit Risk Premia for Investment and Speculative Grade
The gure illustrates credit risk premia over time for the investment grade segment
and the speculative grade segment. In panel A the average risk premium is depicted
for the investment grade segment, while the average risk premium for the speculative
grade segment is depicted in panel B. The means are calculated as averages over the
cross section of weekly spreads.
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Figure 3.7: Credit Risk Premia Across Industries
The gure illustrates the credit risk premia over time for the ve Fama & French
industries, Consumer in panel A,Manufacturing in panel B,Hitec in panel C,Health
in panel D and Other in panel E. The means are calculated as averages over the cross
section of weekly spreads
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The decomposition of the CDS spread into a risk premium component and
an expected loss component allows us to study the relative importance of these
components for the CDS spread over time.
Figure 3.8 plots the respective percentage of the total market spread explained
by risk premia ( RPIt
cmarkett
) and expected losses ( c
no risk
t
cmarkett
). In Panel A the ratios are
plotted, with expected losses based on historical volatility. More interestingly
panel B studies the behavior of the two ratios when expected losses are based on
implied volatility. We see that the expected loss ratio is largest in the second half
of 2002, the period when spreads soared and the credit risk premium peaks. The
expected loss ratio is actually higher than 50% at certain points in this period. In
periods of tight credit spreads and low risk premia, we see that the risk premium
component dominates.
It is natural to combine this result with the results on expected losses and the
credit risk premium, when based on implied volatility in Figure 3.4 and Figure
3.5. What we see is that in times of high default probabilities and high expected
losses the credit risk premium is high and in times of low default probabilities
the credit risk premium is low. On the other hand the relative importance of
the credit risk premium is highest in times of low default probabilities and low
spreads. This suggests a countercyclical risk premium, something we look more
into in section 3.5.2.
Unreported results show that the pattern is the same for the speculative grade
and investment grade segment, although the expected loss ratio seems to play a
larger part for the speculative grade segment. I will also get back to this in section
3.5.2. In panel A of Figure 3.8, where expected losses are based on historical
volatility the lagging behavior shows up clearly again, and the expected loss ratio
seems to be of most importance during 2003, with a peak in the middle of 2003.
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Figure 3.8: Expected Loss and Risk Premium Ratios
The gure illustrates the expected loss ratio and the risk premium ratio over time. In
Panel A the expected loss component is based on historical volatility and in Panel B it
is based on implied volatility.
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Berndt et al. (2005) o¤er possible explanations for the time variation in the
risk premia, which I will relate to the ndings in this paper. One explanation
is that the variation in risk premia is partly caused by sluggish movement in
risk capital across sectors. Berndt et al. (2005) argue that variations of the
supply and demand for risk bearing are exacerbated by limited mobility of capital
across di¤erent classes of asset markets, implying that risk premia would tend to
adjust so as to match the demand for capital with the supply of capital that
is available to the sector. Proxying for market volatility they nd that VIX20
adds signicantly to the explanation of CDS spreads after the EDF measure has
been accounted for, and they suggest that credit risk premia strongly depend on
market volatility/VIX. If the market volatility goes up, a given level of capital
available to bear risk represents less and less capital per unit of risk to be borne.
If replacement capital does not move into the corporate debt sector immediately,
the supply and demand for risk capital will match at a higher price per unit of
risk.
In Figure 3.9 the average calibrated asset volatilities from Figure 3.3 are plot-
ted together with VIX. In panel A the average calibrated asset volatilities are
based on the historical volatility, while panel B plots the average asset volatilities
based on the implied volatility together with VIX. Looking at panel A we see that
VIX is much more volatile than the asset volatility based on historical volatility,
and VIX also spikes in late 2002 just as the market CDS spreads in Figure 3.1. It
is a di¤erent story in panel B. We see that the average calibrated asset volatilities
based on implied volatility and the VIX move very closely together throughout
the entire period, suggesting that the asset volatilities and expected losses based
on implied volatility and VIX are related. In theory the average calibrated asset
volatilities should contain both systematic volatility and idiosyncratic volatility,
and the systematic volatility should explain part of the expected losses but also
the credit risk premia21. What the results of Figure 3.9 suggest is that VIX is
indeed a measure of systematic volatility and also an important driver of expected
losses, when these are measured with implied volatility2223. This also suggests
20VIX is an index of option implied volatility on the S&P 500.
21Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007) also includes a discussion of this topic, and relate their results
to Campbell & Taksler (2003).
22Unreported results also show that VIX adds explanatory power to the credit spreads when
both leverage and volatility have been accounted for.
23In panel B the asset volatilities are "delevered", while the VIX volatility is not, and the
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that the EDF measure and expected losses based on historical volatility do not
adequately capture the probability of default implied by the market. Earlier
papers such as Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Schaefer & Strebulaev (2004)
have shown that VIX is an important explanatory variable for changes in credit
spreads, although they did not pin down an explanation for the role of VIX.
Figure 3.9: Asset Volatilities and VIX Volatility
The gure illustrates the average asset volatilities and the VIX volatility over time.
In panel A the VIX volatility is depicted together with the asset volatility based on
historical equity volatility, and in Panel B the VIX volatility is depicted together with
the asset volatility based on implied volatility.
VIX volatility is thus higher than the average asset volatilities during the main part of the
sample period. Interestingly, the average asset volatilities are higher than VIX towards the end
of 2005 and the beginning of 2006, suggesting a lot of idiosyncratic volatility in this period.
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We have not yet discussed the assumption of a constant expected recovery
rate R of 40%. In Figure 3.10, where the average model spread and the average
market spread are plotted, we see that the structural model underestimates the
market spreads during large parts of the sample period24. This suggests that
the assumed recovery rate could be too large. Lowering the recovery rate would
raise the spreads, but from equation (3.1) we see that loss given default (LGD)
is multiplied onto the part of the calculated spread that is determined by the
default probabilities. A lower recovery rate would thus have a small e¤ect on the
size of the calculated spreads in times of low default probabilities, and it is in
exactly these periods that the model underestimates the spreads. Consequently,
as long as the recovery rate is within a reasonable range the results of the paper
would not change25.
As discussed in Berndt et al. (2005), there could also be correlation be-
tween loss given default/recovery rates and the probability of default and in fact
Moodys (Hamilton et al. (2007) ) estimate a negative correlation between annual
corporate default rates and recovery rates. The possibility of a negative corre-
lation between default probabilities and the expected recovery rate could lower
the time variation in the estimated risk premia, when the default probabilities
are based on implied volatility. If we look at Figure 3.4 and 3.5 again, a nega-
tive correlation between the recovery rate and the default probabilities based on
implied volatility would increase the expected loss component in late 2002, and
make it even smaller in 2003 leading to less variation in the resulting average risk
premium. But this would also imply a larger underestimation by the structural
model of the average market spread in times of low spreads as seen in Figure
3.1026.
Based on the above discussion and decomposition of the CDS spreads I con-
clude that the risk premia estimated in earlier papers such as Berndt et al. (2005)
and Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007) might be inappropriate since these risk premia
are based on historical volatility, and one should be careful when drawing conclu-
sions on risk premia based on expected losses estimated with a historical volatility.
24Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007) nd similar results for the same period.
25If anything, a lower recovery rate would enhance the di¤erence in the estimated risk premia
based on historical and implied volatility, since a lower recovery rate would raise the expected
loss component in times of high default probabilities.
26Assuming that the correlation is of similar size under P and Q. Introducing a time varying
recovery rate would also imply a risk premium on the recovery rate.
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This is especially important in times of high uncertainty. More specically the
expected losses based on historical volatility tend to be to smooth and there tends
to be an overprediction of expected losses in 2003 following the period of high
uncertainty in late 2002. Actually Bohn, Arora & Korablev (2005) report that
the EDFs predicted too many defaults in 2003 consistent with the results in this
paper. In the next section this conclusion is supported by a regression analysis
showing that option implied equity volatility does a better job in explaining CDS
spreads compared to the 250-day historical equity volatility. We will also discuss
the possibility of adding a time varying risk premium to structural models.
Figure 3.10: Market Spreads and Model Spreads
The gure illustrates the average market spread and model spread over time. In panel
A the model is calibrated with the historical volatility, and in Panel B the model is
calibrated with implied volatility. The means are calculated as averages over the cross
section of weekly spreads.
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3.5.2 Modeling CDS Spreads
The typical structural model predicts, that the level of credit spreads mainly
depends on asset volatilities and leverage, while most models are silent on risk
premia. Notable exceptions are Chen et al. (2006), Bhamra et al. (2007) and Chen
(2007). Chen et al. (2006) e.g. consider whether existing asset pricing models
that have proven successful in explaining equity returns can explain the level and
volatilities of credit spreads. They have some success with models that exhibit
time varying risk premia. Leland (2004) and Huang & Huang (2003) have also
studied risk premia in the context of structural models, but they do not consider
their dynamics.
Figure 3.11 plots the average model implied credit risk premia (RPI equity)
over time calculated in equation (3.4). These model implied risk premia stem
from the equity market through the translation of the equity risk premium via
the structural model. The gure shows the risk premia when the structural model
is calibrated with the historical volatility and the implied volatility respectively.
The two risk premia do not move in exactly the same way, which follows from
the di¤erences in the calibration of the structural model, but there are large
similarities.
Figure 3.11: Model Implied Risk Premia
The gure illustrates the average model implied credit risk premia over time, when the
structural model is calibrated with the historical and implied equity volatility respec-
tively. The means are calculated as averages over the cross section of weekly spreads.
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A simple comparison of the two average estimated risk premia in Figure 3.11
with the average market CDS spread from Figure 3.1 suggest a link between the
CDS spreads and these model implied risk premia. To see if a time varying risk
premium can help structural models to explain credit spreads I follow Elkamhi
& Ericsson (2007) and consider the following panel regression for the level of the
CDS spreads27
CDSit = +1Levi;t+2Evoli;t+3Ereti;t+4Slopet+5rt+6RPI
equity
i;t +"i;t;
(3.12)
where Lev denotes the rms leverage, Evol is either the rms 250 day historical
volatility or its 30-day option implied volatility, Eret is the daily equity return of
the rm, Slope is the di¤erence between the 10- and 2-year constant maturity rate
and r is the 5-year constant maturity rate corresponding to the maturity of the
CDS spreads. RPI equity is the equity implied measure of the credit risk premium
calculated in equation (3.4), and it is thus purely based on the equity market and
the structural model. The regression in (3:12) is run both with and without the
model implied risk premium in order to gauge the gain in explanatory power by
including this variable. The results are shown in Table 3.4, when the regressions
are run on the full sample28. Panel A of Table 3.4 tabulates the results with
the historical volatility included in the regression, while the results with implied
equity volatility are reported in panel B.
We see that including the equity implied risk premium increases the explana-
tory power of the regressions and the coe¢ cients on the risk premium are all
strongly signicant29. When the risk premium is included in the regression with
the historical volatility the R-square increases by 3% from 49:4% to 52:4%; while
the R-square increases by 5:5% from 57:4% to 62:9% when the regressions are
run with the implied volatility.
27The regresion in Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007) is performed on corporate bond spreads.
28The same variables are included in all of the regressions, although some of the variables
may be insignicant at times.
29This is consistent both when the standard errors are clustered by time and by rm. The
OLS standard errors on the risk premium coe¢ cients are very similar to the standard errors
when clustering by time, while standard errors are substantially larger when clustering by rm.
This indicates a rm e¤ect in the data (see Petersen (2007)). The results are also robust if a
weekly time dummy is included, while clustering by rm. In this case the slope and the interest
rate are left out of the regression since they capture a time e¤ect.
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The results are in line with Elton et al. (2001), who show that there is a
nontrivial component of credit spreads, interpreted as a risk premium, which is
correlated with factors explaining equity risk premia. Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007)
also nd that risk premia in credit and equity market are closely related, and
emphasizes that the nonlinear relationship implied by the structural model plays
an important role in establishing the link between the equity premium, the model
implied credit risk premium and the credit spread.
On the other hand Berndt, Lookman & Obreja (2006) extract a factor rep-
resenting the part of default swap returns, implied by a reduced form credit risk
model, that does not compensate for interest rate risk or expected default losses.
They nd that this factor is priced in the corporate bond market but that they
cannot establish with the same condence that it is a factor for equity returns.
Their estimate of credit risk premia is based on EDFs though, which we have
seen might give rise to mismeasured credit risk premia.
In Table 3.5 the regressions are run for the investment grade segment. Again
the coe¢ cients are highly signicant on the risk premium and now the R-square
increases by 5:3% from 44:4% to 59:7% with the historical volatility included,
while the R-square increases by 8:2% from 52:6% to 60:8% when the regressions
are run with the implied volatility.
In Table 3.6 the regressions are run for the speculative grade segment. Now
there is only a marginal increase in the R-square, which increases by 2:5% from
53:8% to 56:3% with the historical volatility included, while there is no increase
in the R-square, which stays at 74:7%; when the regressions are run with the im-
plied volatility. Furthermore the coe¢ cient on the risk premium is insignicant
when implied volatility is included. Combined with the regression results for the
investment grade segment, this suggest that the risk premium is more important
for investment grade rms than for speculative grade rms, and also that invest-
ment grade rms have proportionally higher risk premia. This supports results
found in e.g. Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007), Berndt et al. (2005) and Huang &
Huang (2003).
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In all of the regressions performed in Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 the R-squares
are higher when implied volatility is included instead of the historical volatility
and this is especially striking for the speculative grade segment, where the R-
squares without the risk premium included are 53:8% and 74:7% respectively.
This conrms that option implied volatility has a higher explanatory power for
credit spreads, and suggest that when measuring the time variation in the risk
premia one should use the information contained in option implied volatilities to
back out default probabilities. Furthermore the results are also in line with Cao
et al. (2006), who nd the strongest link between option-implied volatilities and
CDS spreads among rms with the lowest rating.
3.6 Conclusion
To estimate the time-series behavior of credit risk premia objective default prob-
abilities and expected losses need to be measured correctly. Motivated by recent
ndings in Cao et al. (2006) this paper backs out default probabilities using option
implied volatility through the structural model by Leland & Toft (1996).
Similar to earlier results I nd that the risk premium peaks in the third quarter
of 2002, but the subsequent drop in the risk premium is not as dramatic when
expected losses are based on implied volatility instead of a historical volatility
measure. The risk premia appear less volatile when based on implied volatility
and this result is consistent across industries and ratings (investment grade and
speculative grade), and suggests that it may be inappropriate to base expected
losses on a historical volatility measure, when estimating risk premia.
Secondly, the credit risk premium tends to be countercyclical when expected
losses are based on implied volatility. More specically, the credit risk premium
is high in times of high default probabilities and high expected losses and low in
times of low default probabilities. Furthermore, the expected loss ratio and the
risk premium ratio behave quite di¤erently from one another over time. When
based on implied volatility the expected loss ratio peaked in late 2002, when
credit spreads soared and the credit risk premium peaked.
Finally, I carried out a panel regression analysis of the CDS market spreads.
Augmenting the regressions with an equity implied measure of the credit risk
premium improved the explanatory power for the levels of the credit spread, while
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the coe¢ cient on this model implied risk premium was highly signicant. These
regression results echo results in Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007), and in combination
with the other results of the paper, they suggest that structural models should
contain a time varying and countercyclical risk premium.
The results also suggest a link between equity risk premia and credit spreads,
when the equity risk premium is properly delevered through a structural model.
Elton et al. (2001) show that there is a nontrivial component of credit spreads,
interpreted as a risk premium, which is correlated with factors explaining equity
risk premia and Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007) also nd that risk premia in credit and
equity market are closely related. On the other hand Berndt, Lookman & Obreja
(2006) extract a factor representing the part of default swap returns, implied by a
reduced form credit risk model, that does not compensate for interest rate risk or
expected default losses. They nd that this factor is priced in the corporate bond
market but that they cannot establish with the same condence that it is a factor
for equity returns. However, the expected losses in Berndt, Lookman & Obreja
(2006) are based on the EDF measure, and thus the estimation of the credit risk
premium might be inappropriate. It is clear from the di¤erent results though
that much more research is needed on the time variation of credit risk premia
in credit markets, and also on the relation between the equity risk premium and
credit risk premium. Interesting work in this direction has recently been done in
Chen (2007) and Bhamra et al. (2007).
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A Leland & Toft (1996)
The model by Leland & Toft (1996) assumes that the decision to default is made
by a manager, who acts to maximize the value of equity. At each moment, the
manager must address the question if meeting promised debt service payments is
optimal for the equityholders, thereby keeping their call option alive. If the asset
value exceeds the endogenously derived default barrier VB, the rm will optimally
continue to service the debt - even if the asset value is below the principal value
or if cash ow available for payout is insu¢ cient to nance the net debt service,
requiring additional equity contributions.
In particular, rm assets V are assumed to follow a geometric Brownian mo-
tion under the risk-neutral measure
dVt = (r   )Vtdt+ V VtdWt, (3.13)
where r is the constant risk-free interest rate,  is the fraction of asset value paid
out to security holders, V is the asset volatility and Wt is a standard Brown-
ian motion. Debt of constant maturity  is continuously rolled over, implying
that at any time s the total outstanding debt principal P will have a uniform
distribution over maturities in the interval (s; s+). Each debt contract in the
multi-layered structure is serviced by a continuous coupon. The resulting total
coupon payments C are tax deductible at a rate  , and the realized costs of nan-
cial distress amount to a fraction  of the value of assets in default VB. Rolling
over nite maturity debt in the way prescribed implies a stationary capital struc-
ture, where the total outstanding principal P , total coupon C, average maturity

2
and default barrier VB remain constant through time.
To determine the total value of the levered rm v(Vt), the model follows Leland
(1994) in valuing bankruptcy costs BC(Vt) and tax benets resulting from debt
issuance TB(Vt) as time-independent securities. It follows, that
(Vt) = Vt + TB(Vt) BC(Vt) (3.14)
= S(Vt) +D(Vt),
where S(Vt) is the market value of equity and D(Vt) the market value of total
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debt. Equation (3.14) may be written as
(Vt) = Vt + 
C
r
 
1 

Vt
VB
 x!
  VB

Vt
VB
 x
, (3.15)
with the value of debt
D(Vt) =
C
r
+

P   C
r

1  er
r
  I ()

+

(1  )VB   C
r

J () , (3.16)
equity S(Vt) = (Vt) D(Vt)
S(Vt) = Vt + 
C
r
 
1 

Vt
VB
 x!
  VB

Vt
VB
 x
  C
r
 

P   C
r

1  er
r
  I ()

(3.17)
 

(1  )VB   C
r

J () ,
and default barrier VB
VB =
C
r
 
A
r
 B  AP
r
  Cx
r
1 + x  (1  )B . (3.18)
The components of the above formulae are
A = 2ae r

aV
p


  2z

zV
p


(3.19)
  2
V
p



zV
p


+
2e r
V
p



aV
p


+ (z   a) ,
B =  

2z +
2
z2V



zV
p


(3.20)
  2
V
p



zV
p


+ (z   a) + 1
z2V
,
I () =
1
r
 
K ()  e rF () , (3.21)
K () =

V
VB
 a+z
 (j1 ()) +

V
VB
 a z
 (j2 ()) , (3.22)
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F () =  (h1 ()) +

V
VB
 2a
 (h2 ()) , (3.23)
J () =
1
zV
p

 
 

V
VB
 a+z
 (j1 ()) j1 ()
+

V
VB
 a z
 (j2 ()) j2 ()
!
, (3.24)
j1 () =
( b  z2V)
V
p

; j2 () =
( b+ z2V)
V
p

, (3.25)
h1 () =
( b  a2V)
V
p

; h2 () =
( b+ a2V)
V
p

, (3.26)
a =
(r     (2V =2))
2V
, (3.27)
b = ln

Vt
VB

, (3.28)
z =
r
(a2V )
2
+ 2r2V

2V
, (3.29)
x = a+ z: (3.30)
 () and  () denote the density of the standard normal distribution and the
cumulative distribution function, respectively.
A.1 Survival Probabilities
The risk-neutral survival probability in the model at horizon t is given as
Q (t) = 1  F (t) (3.31)
= 1 
 
 (h1 (t)) +

V
VB
 2a
 (h2 (t))
!
;
where h1 (t) and h2 (t) are given above. The objective survival probability is given
as
P (t) = 1 
 
 (d1 (t)) +

V
VB
 2c
 (d2 (t))
!
; (3.32)
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where
c =
(uV   (2V =2))
2V
d1 (t) =
( b  c2V t)
V
p
t
; d2 (t) =
( b+ c2V t)
V
p
t
and V is the realized mean of the time series of Vt from equation (3.6) The term
structure of default probabilities is needed to price the credit default swap.
A.2 Pricing the Credit Default Swap without a Risk Pre-
mium
The CDS can be priced both with and without a risk premium in the Leland &
Toft (1996) model, when the default probabilities are known. The CDS price of a
contract initiated at time 0 with maturity date T , when there is no risk premium,
is given as
cno risk(0; T ) =  (1 R)
R T
0
e rsP
0
0(s)dsR T
0
e rsP0(s)ds
,
where r is the constant risk-free interest rate, R is the recovery rate, P0(s) is the
objective survival probability of the obligor at t = 0 and  P 00(t) =  dP0(t)=dt is
the rst hitting time density. Rearranging we get
0 = cno risk(0; T )
Z T
0
e rsP (s)ds+ (1 R)
Z T
0
e rsP 0(s)ds; (3.33)
and Integrating the rst term by parts, yields
0 =
cno risk(0; T )
r

1  e rTP (T ) +
Z T
0
e rsP 0(s)ds

+ (1 R)
Z T
0
e rsP 0(s)ds.
(3.34)
following Reiner & Rubinstein (1991) the integral   R T
0
e rsP 0(s)ds is given as
G(T ) =

V
VB
 c+y
 (g1 (T )) +

V
VB
 c y
 (g2 (T )) ; (3.35)
where
c =
(uV   (2V =2))
2V
;
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y =
r
(c2V )
2
+ 2r2V

2V
and
g1 (t) =
( b  y2V t)
V
p
t
; g2 (t) =
( b+ y2V t)
V
p
t
:
Then,
0 =
cno risk(0; T )
r
 
1  e rTP (T )  cno risk(0; T )
r
+ (1 R)

G(T ), (3.36)
which allows us to obtain a closed-form solution for the CDS spread, when there
is no risk premium
cno risk(0; T ) = r (1 R) G(T )
(1  e rTP (T ) G (T )) (3.37)
where G(T ) is given above and
A.3 Pricing the Credit Default Swap with a Risk Pre-
mium Included
The formula for the CDS spread when there is a risk premium present is analogous
to the price without a risk premium
crisk(0; T ) = r (1 R) K(T )
(1  e rTQ(T ) K (T )) ; (3.38)
where
K (T ) =

V
VB
 a+z
 (j1 (T )) +

V
VB
 a z
 (j2 (T ))
a =
(r     (2V =2))
2V
,
b = ln

Vt
VB

,
z =
r
(a2V )
2
+ 2r2V

2V
,
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j1 (T ) =
( b  z2V T )
V
p
T
; j2 (T ) =
( b+ z2V T )
V
p
T
and Q(T ) is given is equation (3:31) :
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Summary
English summary
Chapter 1: AccountingTransparency and the TermStruc-
ture of Credit Default Swap Spreads
This chapter is the rst contribution in the literature to estimate the com-
ponent of the term structure of CDS spreads associated with accounting trans-
parency. To this end, CDS spreads at the 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10-year maturity for a
large cross-section of rms are used together with a newly developed measure of
accounting transparency by Berger et al. (2006). Estimating the gap between the
high and low transparency credit curves, the transparency spread is estimated
around 20 bps at the 1-year maturity. At longer maturities, the transparency
spread narrows and is estimated at 14, 8, 7 and 5 bps at the 3, 5, 7 and 10-year
maturity, respectively. While highly signicant in the short end, the impact of
accounting transparency is not robust and most often insignicantly estimated
for maturities exceeding 5 years. Finally, the e¤ect of accounting transparency
on the term structure of CDS spreads is largest for the most risky rms. These
results are strongly supportive of the model by Du¢ e & Lando (2001), and add
an explanation to the underprediction of short-term credit spreads by traditional
structural credit risk models.
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Chapter 2: Capital Structure Arbitrage: Model Choice
and Volatility Calibration
This chapter analyzes the use of CDSs in a convergence-type trading strat-
egy popular among hedge funds and proprietary trading desks. This strategy,
termed capital structure arbitrage, takes advantage of a lack of synchronicity be-
tween equity and credit markets and is related to recent studies on the lead-lag
relationship between bond, equity and CDS markets. In particular, a structural
model that links fundamentals with di¤erent security classes is used to identify
CDSs that either o¤er a discount against equities or trade at a very high level.
If a relative value opportunity is identied, the arbitrageur takes an appropri-
ate market-neutral position and hopes for market convergence. However, the
arbitrageur faces two major problems, namely positions based on model misspec-
ication and mismeasured inputs. The chapter contributes with an analysis of
the risk and return of capital structure arbitrage addressing both of these con-
cerns. In particular, we implement the industry benchmark model CreditGrades
and Leland & Toft (1996). The models are calibrated with a traditional 250-day
volatility from historical equity returns and an implied volatility from equity op-
tions. In spite of di¤erences in assumptions governing default and calibration,
we nd the exact structural model linking the markets second to timely key in-
puts. Studying an equally-weighted portfolio of all relative value positions, the
excess returns are insignicant when based on the historical volatility. However,
as the arbitrageur feeds on large variations in equity and credit markets and the
asset volatility is a key input to the pricing of credit, a timely volatility measure
is desirable. Indeed, using an option-implied volatility results in superior strat-
egy execution and may initiate the opposite positions of the historical measure.
The result is more positions ending in convergence, more positions with positive
holding-period returns and highly signicant excess returns. The gain is largest in
the speculative grade segment and cannot be explained from systematic market
risk factors. Although the strategy may seem attractive at an aggregate level,
positions on individual obligors can be very risky.
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Chapter 3: Credit Risk Premia in the Market for Credit
Default Swaps
This chapter estimates the time-series behavior of credit risk premia in the
market for Credit Default Swaps for the period 2001 to 2006. The structural
model by Leland & Toft (1996) is used to back out objective default probabili-
ties. To estimate the time-series behavior of credit risk premia objective default
probabilities and expected losses need to be measured correctly. Motivated by
recent ndings in Cao et al. (2006) this paper backs out the default probabilities
using option implied volatility through the structural model.
Similar to earlier results I nd that the risk premium peaks in the third quarter
of 2002, but the subsequent drop in the risk premium is not as dramatic, when
expected losses are based on implied volatility instead of a historical volatility
measure. The risk premia appear less volatile when based on implied volatility
and this result is consistent across industries and ratings (investment grade and
speculative grade), and suggests that it may be inappropriate to base expected
losses on a historical volatility measure, when estimating risk premia.
Secondly, the credit risk premium tends to be countercyclical when expected
losses are based on implied volatility. More specically the credit risk premium
is high in times of high default probabilities and high expected losses and low in
times of low default probabilities. Furthermore the expected loss ratio and the
risk premium ratio behave quite di¤erently from one another over time. When
based on implied volatility the expected loss ratio peaked in late 2002, when
credit spreads soared and the credit risk premium peaked.
Finally I carried out a panel regression analysis of the CDS market spreads.
Augmenting the regressions with an equity implied measure of the credit risk
premium improved the explanatory power for the levels of the credit spread,
while the coe¢ cient on this model implied risk premium was highly signicant.
These regression results echo results in Elkamhi & Ericsson (2007), and suggest
that structural models should contain a time varying risk premium. Together
with the other results of the paper a risk premium that is countercyclical seems
to be desirable. The results also suggests a link between equity risk premia and
credit spreads, when the equity risk premium is properly delevered through a
structural model.
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Dansk resumé
Kapitel 1: Regnskabstransparens og strukturen af CDS
kurven
Dettte kapitel er det første bidrag i litteraturen, som estimerer komponenten i
kurven af CDS spænd, som skyldes støjfyldte observationer af værdien af aktiver.
Til dette formål anvendes CDS spænd med løbetider på 1, 3, 5, 7 og 10 år for
et bredt tværsnit af virksomheder, sammen med et nyudviklet mål for regnsk-
abstransparens af Berger et al. (2006). Ved en estimation af spændet mellem
kreditspændskurverne for virksomheder med høj og lav transparens, estimeres
transparensspændet til 20 bps ved en løbetid på 1 år. Dette transparensspænd
indsnævres ved længere løbetider, og estimeres til 14, 8, 7 og 5 bps ved en lø-
betid på henholdsvis 3, 5, 7 og 10 år. Transparensspændet er stærkt signikant
i den korte ende, men ej robust og ofte insignikant ved løbetider over 5 år. En-
delig ndes e¤ekten af regnskabstransparens på kurven af CDS spænd at være
størst for de mest risikable virksomheder. Disse resultater støtter klart modellen
af Du¢ e & Lando (2001), og tilføjer en forklaring til undervurderingen af korte
kreditspænd af traditionelle strukturelle kreditrisikomodeller.
Kapitel 2: Kapitalstruktur arbitrage: Modelvalg og valg
af volatilitet
Kapitel to analyserer anvendelsen af CDSer i en konvergensbaseret han-
delsstrategi, som er populær i hedge fonde og kvantitative handelsafdelinger.
Denne strategi, kaldet kapitalstruktur arbitrage, udnytter en begrænset synkro-
nicitet mellem aktie- og kreditmarkeder, og er relateret til nyere studier om
hastigheden, hvormed ny information indregnes i forskellige markeder. En struk-
turel model som relaterer virksomhedens fundamentale variable til prisen på
forskellige aktivklasser anvendes til at identicere CDSer, som handles for dyrt
eller billigt relativt til aktien. Hvis en relativ prismulighed kan identiceres,
tager arbitragøren en passende markedsneutral position, og håber på konvergens
mellem markederne. Arbitragøren står dog overfor to væsentlige problemer, nem-
lig positioner initieret af en misspeciceret model eller fejlbedømte inputs. Dette
kapitel bidrager med en analyse af risiko og afkast ved kapitalstruktur arbitrage,
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og adresserer begge ovenstående bekymringer. I særdeleshed implementeres den
i praksis ofte benyttede CreditGrades model samt modellen af Leland & Toft
(1996). Modellerne kalibreres med en traditionel 250-dages volatilitet fra his-
toriske aktieafkast samt en implicit volatilitet fra aktieoptioner. På trods af
forskelle i antagelser bag fallit og kalibrering nder vi, at den præcise model
som relaterer markederne, er mindre væsentlig end rettidige inputs. Studeres en
ligevægtet portefølje af alle relative positioner, er merafkastet insignikant baseret
på den historisk volatilitet. Men da arbitragøren igangsættes af store variationer
i aktie- og kreditmarkeder, og aktivvolatiliteten er en nøglevariabel i prisfastsæt-
telsen af kredit, er et rettidigt volatilitetsmål ønskværdigt. Anvendelsen af en
implicit volatilitet fra aktieoptioner resulterer i en bedre afvikling af strategien,
og kan initiere de modsatte positioner af det historiske mål. Resultatet er ere
positioner, som ender i konvergens, ere positioner med positivt afkast samt et
stærkt signikant merafkast. Gevinsten er størst blandt virksomheder med lavere
kreditvurdering, og kan ikke forklares af systematiske markedsfaktorer. Selvom
strategien synes attraktiv på aggregeret niveau, kan relative positioner på indi-
viduelle virksomheder være meget risikable.
Kapitel 3: Kredit risikopræmier i CDS markedet
Kapitel 3 undersøger, hvorledes risikopræmierne i markedet for Credit De-
fault Swaps (CDS) opførte sig i perioden fra 2001 til 2006. Den strukturelle
kreditrisiko model af Leland & Toft (1996) kalibreres til aktiemarkedet, hvorved
både risikoneutrale -og objektive fallitsandsynligheder kan estimeres, og motiveret
af resultater i Cao et al. (2006) bliver implicit volatilitet fra aktieoptioner brugt
til at kalibrere modellen. Resultaterne viser, at risikopræmierne toppede i slut-
ningen af 2002, hvilket også er fundet i tidligere studier. Det efterfølgende fald i
risikopræmierne er dog ikke så dramatisk, når de objektive fallitsandsynligheder
er baseret på volatilitet fra optionsmarkedet. Risikopræmierne synes således at
være mindre volatile, når de objektive fallitsandsynligheder er baseret på implicit
volatilitet. Dette resultat er konsistent, både på tværs af ratings og på tværs af in-
dustrier, og indikerer at risikopræmier, som er estimeret på baggrund af historisk
volatilitet måske ikke er valide.
Derudover er risikopræmierne mod-cykliske, når de objektive fallitsandsyn-
ligheder er baseret på implicit volatilitet. Det vil sige, at der er en tendens til at
153
risikopræmierne er høje når fallitsandsynlighederne er høje.
Til sidst blev der foretaget en regressionsanalyse, hvor risikopræmier im-
pliceret fra den strukturelle model blev inkluderet i regressionen sammen med
standard variable, som forklarer CDS spændene. Tilføjelsen af risikopræmien
fra modellen øgede forklaringsgraden, og koe¢ cienten på risikopræmien var sig-
nikant. Resultaterne indikerer at en tidsvariende og mod-cyklisk risikopræmie
bør tilstræbes i strukturelle modeller for kreditrisiko.
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